Consciousness

Is solipsism possible?
Is consciousness really like a private movie that could conceivably be playing without anything beyond it? Is there really such a sharp distinction between the "external" world and the "internal" world?

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Ask yourself that question.

>Is consciousness really like a private movie that could conceivably be playing without anything beyond it
who's watching it then? the skyclad observer?

I've been doing that.
I think direct realism about perception is true, but even if it is, it might not be necessarily true, and then solipsism is still possible.
And even if direct realism is necessarily true, everything we think is perception might be hallucination or dreaming instead, which would be another possible form of solipsism.
So where I'm at right now is, direct realism can only rule out solipsism if direct realism is necessarily true and perception is a necessary part of consciousness.
But I don't know.

Solipsism is the premise that only your self exist and nothing else.

This is more of a question of validity/verification of other minds.

If your mind is the only one, then it is to be unique by default. The question then remains whether or not mind is even unique or what makes it unique in the first place.

A mind of a person is basically composed of external senses and internal logic system. From what we know of so far, brain houses that logic system and our body houses those senses. The body of a person is divided into male or female depending on the genetic structure. It can also be divided further into different species if needed. However if you believe your body to be male then there must be a female part to it. A dick is designed around existence of vaginas.

Still you could argue and discount the possibility of all those knowledge and we'd really just be stuck with extreme skepticism. If we're at extreme skepticism, why even assume the existence of a self? A self that is without a body and exist unto itself that cannot know anything and knows nothing.

>If we're at extreme skepticism, why even assume the existence of a self? A self that is without a body and exist unto itself that cannot know anything and knows nothing.
But the solipsist would say that clearly the mind exists because he is having conscious experiences etc., it's just that he finds no reason to believe those experiences relate to anything outside his mind.

yuki.la/his/608930

>the external world is as intimately known to you as the internal world of your introspective experience. That is, physical objects appearing in space are bound by the same degree of law-governed certainty that your inner stream of consciousness displays, so you can't assume that the former is totally doubtful while the latter is totally reliable; rather, since the latter is reliable, so is the former.
This mischaracterizes transcendental idealism, which says that physical objects and space are precisely not part of the external world but the internal

You misinterpreted that paragraph; "external world" is clarified to mean "physical objects appearing in space."

Put another way, "objectivity as represented via outer sense."

No misinterpretation.
>"external world" is clarified to mean "physical objects appearing in space."
The latter are not mind-external in Kant's system. The mind-external for Kant would be the thing in itself. Kant has the internal/external world distinction which solipsism relies on.

You're misinterpreting "external world" to mean "mind-independent domain."

The paragraph in question says that the external world - that is, the *spatially* external world of outer sense - can be known just as well as the representations of inner sense can be known.

The paragraph affirms the empirical reality of the external world - it does not deny its transcendental ideality.

>You're misinterpreting "external world" to mean "mind-independent domain."
How is that a misinterpretation?
We agree that Kant thought there was a part of reality internal to the mind (AKA reality-as-experienced), and a part of reality external to the mind (AKA reality-in-itself), right?
I'm using "external world" to refer to the latter.

whatever a indivual consciusness is it is a subset of a larger set, as in a thing occuring as part of reality occuring, so solipsism is just wrong

>whatever a indivual consciusness is it is a subset of a larger set, as in a thing occuring as part of reality occuring
what is your argument for this? why couldn't an individual consciousness be the whole of reality rather than just a part of it?

There is representational externality - for which the word "external" is used in its literal, spatial meaning - and there is the domain of things-in-themselves, which are "external" only in a metaphorical, non-spatial way. But in every instance in which the word "external" has appeared here, you seem to interpret it to mean "mind-independent." The context of Kant's writing, however, tends to make it clear enough whether words like "external" or "outside" or "separate" are to be interpreted in a literally spatial way, or in a way that is merely analogous to spatiality (as in saying that a predicate term P is "contained in" a subject term S, where such "containment" logical, not literally physical).

Likewise, the context of the summary paragraph in question makes it clear how the word "external" should be interpreted, I still think.

>There is representational externality - for which the word "external" is used in its literal, spatial meaning - and there is the domain of things-in-themselves, which are "external" only in a metaphorical, non-spatial way.
Sure, but if "external world" just refers to space and objects etc then even Berkeley believed in the external world
The external world is whatever exists outside the mind

>Sure, but if "external world" just refers to space and objects etc then even Berkeley believed in the external world

Yes! As I believe Berkeley himself said, the external world is just as it appears to be, is thoroughly knowable, precisely *because* it wouldn't exist independently of the mind(s) knowing it. This doesn't nullify his other differences with Kant, however.

> The external world is whatever exists outside the mind

If you only accept a meaning of "external" that *cannot* include literal spatial externality, you're going to invite equivocations and misinterpretations. Have you read all of the Critique of Pure Reason?

The interaction problem means that any model with an internal/external dichotomy is incorrect.

>If you only accept a meaning of "external" that *cannot* include literal spatial externality
Of course I don't. There is a world external to the skin too, and external to my house, etc.
But the entrenched usage in philosophy is that "the external world" refers to whatever exists beyond the mind.
This is why we say Berkeley's idealism precisely amounts to a rejection of the external world.
In the way you insist on using the term, there has never been anyone who has denied the existence of the external world, since according to your usage the external world exists as long as there exists some version of spatial reality, even within the mind or as a mere appearance.

how so?

Because to claim that something is true is a physical action that must arise from physical sources. Anything claimed to be true can thus only be physical.

>But the entrenched usage in philosophy is that "the external world" refers to whatever exists beyond the mind.

Even granting this, the original paragraph was specifically about the usage(s) of the term in Kant's system. When I said

>If you only accept a meaning of "external" that *cannot* include literal spatial externality

it was specifically in the context of my question about your familiarity with the Critique of Pure Reason.

> In the way you insist on using the term, there has never been anyone who has denied the existence of the external world, since according to your usage the external world exists as long as there exists some version of spatial reality, even within the mind or as a mere appearance.

It's up to each philosopher to use the term for themselves; Kant and Berkeley allow for mere spatial representations to qualify as "external reality," but another philosopher could set different criteria - maybe acknowledging that no amount of spatial representation is enough to demonstrate the existence of an "external world" in some more strict sense. But again, I was only challenging your interpretation regarding the criteria of one philosopher in particular - only later did I involve the criteria of another philosopher, who *you* brought up. I never pretended to be defining the term for all of philosophy.