Are colors quantifiable?

Qualia are literally the only real thing. You could get a brain injury and forget what red is but if you look at a red shirt you will still experience its redness

>You could get a brain injury and forget what red is but if you look at a red shirt you will still experience its redness
You can also get brain damage that causes you to still possess the functional ability to see things but makes it so that you believe / report to others that you can't see anything. It's a behavioral routine the brain runs, not an actual non-physical phenomenon. You're just compelled to believe it is a non-physical phenomenon because doing so gives you an abstract shortcut to behave around, much like how mathematics can let you accomplish things much more efficiently than working without mathematics would let you even though by working in mathematics you're turning away from the real, physical world and interacting with imaginary objects instead.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight

Anything that can be displayed on a screen accurately is quantifiable
wavelength, frequency, intensity, etc.

Yet you still see the redness.

I mean the only actually interesting one I've heard was of the Hopi language. Where the concepts are so utterly bound to a unique metaphysics as to have been considered untranslatable. Not a different conceptual language but an entirely different set of concepts. With that being said if you look at the same thing you will experience it the same way, then it will be filtered through your conceptual framework.

>Yet you still see the redness.
No. First of all, in normal / non-brain damaged subjects, what's happening is you're behaving and reporting as though this abstract / non-real thing called "redness" is present. No literal non-physical "redness" object is ever actually there. Second of all, in blindsight, the subject doesn't even have the abstract / non-real thing to reference. All they have is a sense of sight they aren't aware of having. So if you put obstacles in front of them like a tipped over garbage can they'll walk around it and not trip over it, but when you ask them about it they won't know that's why they walked in the way they did and will deny having seen anything.

Yeah I mean we're focusing on the example of braindamage too much.

>what's happening is you're behaving and reporting as though this abstract / non-real thing called "redness" is present.
>abstract / non-real
In what sense? Redness is a property of a red object.
The redness is real.

>No literal non-physical "redness" object is ever actually there.
its not an object. Redness is a property of the object that has redness.
The person who sees experiences redness

>Redness is a property of a red object.
>The redness is real.
The wavelength range 620–750 nm is real.
The "qualia" of "what it's like to see red" is not actually real beyond being an abstract reference point that a given subject's brain makes use of as a shortcut for making certain useful behaviors more likely to happen.
>Redness is a property of the object that has redness.
No, wavelength range between 620-750 nm is the property the given "red" object has. It doesn't possess the property of "what it's like to see red." We're compelled to behave as though that "redness" exists, but that behavior of the given subject whose eyes are in the presence of a "red" wavelength object is all there really is to that "redness."
> The person who sees experiences redness
They're compelled to behave and report that they've "experienced redness." There isn't an actual "redness" phenomenon underlying that behavior.
>we're focusing on the example of braindamage too much
Examples of brain damage are probably the best way to learn about how this topic really works though. Most of the modern knowledge of how our bodies and perception work come from what was learned when observing cases where normal processes broke down.

>The "qualia" of "what it's like to see red"
There's your problem. Its not "what its like to see red" You experience the redness before any of that

I think you've got it wrong about what qualia means mate. Its not a concept. Its what you experience. Its a property of things but its a direct experience that we build concepts out of.

Think of a word. The qualia is the sound and the meaning is the concept

>You experience the redness before any of that
The belief in immediacy is part of the trick your brain plays on you. In reality, there's nothing immediate about what happens when you see something, hence the blindsight example being possible.
>Think of a word. The qualia is the sound and the meaning is the concept
You *believe* you "experience" the "qualia" of sound. Because that behavior is useful, not because your compelled belief is literally true.

Well I mean there's two different things going on. There's the "if a tree fall in the woods is there any sound" So in that sense yeah an object with the property of redness doesn't have any innate redness in the presence of no viewers.

But it does have the ability to have redness. Its a property of that object.

>You *believe* you "experience" the "qualia" of sound. Because that behavior is useful, not because your compelled belief is literally true.

Yeah ok mate. Explain that one.

When someone speaks a word to me I experience the sound. If someone speaks a word of Arabic to me, assuming a similar level of hearing, I will experience the same qualia as someone who speaks arabic. I just won't have any concept to link to the word.

The qualia however is the same.

>Its a property of that object.
The wavelength range is the property of that object. The other stuff (insofar as it exists at all) is the property of your brain making you behave and report things about that object.
>When someone speaks a word to me I experience the sound.
You *believe* you do. That's a key distinction. You may *believe* it's very real and immediate and definitely something that happens and not just some belief, but all of that is something your brain is capable of making you believe without that belief needing to be true. And if it isn't true, then what you have is a perfectly explicable physical world where reproducing what our brains do with AI will be a matter of reproducing behavior. Whereas if it somehow were true, what you'd have is inane non-physical magic and strong AI will never count because of the persistent belief that it's missing this non-physical magic.
>If someone speaks a word of Arabic to me, assuming a similar level of hearing, I will experience the same qualia as someone who speaks arabic.
You'll behave in response to your ears being in range of that speaking in ways that are similar to the behavior others engage in when in range of that speaking e.g. you and the other person who understands Arabic might both make some similar sounds when prompted to repeat what was said.

>The wavelength range is the property of that object.
Think of function not science.
For a human it has the property of redness

>You *believe* you do. That's a key distinction. You may *believe* it's very real and immediate and definitely something that happens and not just some belief, but all of that is something your brain is capable of making you believe without that belief needing to be true
I mean its interesting. But also redundant. There is an experience created. The qualia isn't the belief or the reality. Even if it is magic the experience is the same.

>You'll behave in response to your ears being in range of that speaking in ways that are similar to the behavior others engage in when in range of that speaking e.g. you and the other person who understands Arabic might both make some similar sounds when prompted to repeat what was said.
Nothing to do with it mate. I'll "hear" the exact same "sound"

>Whereas if it somehow were true, what you'd have is inane non-physical magic and strong AI will never count because of the persistent belief that it's missing this non-physical magic.
Actually this is a really interesting point. An ai can only be programmed to recognise gradients actually. Then programmed to react from those inputs.

Qualia is what the camera SEES not what the recognition software picks up when it gradiates it.

So actually I guess that, no AI can't actually process qualia, only to gradiate it based on what its been programmed to do

>For a human it has the property of redness
You *believe* it has that "redness" because that's how your brain works. It doesn't have any such thing in reality.
>There is an experience created. The qualia isn't the belief or the reality.
You're claiming "an experience is created." That claim is a belief. You believe it isn't a belief, but that doesn't make it stop being a belief.
>I'll "hear" the exact same "sound"
No, you'll both be exposed to the same sound waves, but you won't both have exactly the same physiological responses or behavioral responses to it. For one thing, a person who knows a language is more likely to believe they "heard" words or phrases with corresponding sound waves that don't objectively possess any similarity to the sounds waves that were actually made by the speaking person but do possess the abstract / imaginary quality of being semantically interchangeable with the words or phrases that were actually said. Your knowledge, habits, expectations, etc. all influence what you believe you "experience." You get the narrative that you "experienced" something after your brain's already ran through a bunch of processes you aren't personally aware of. You never get raw sensations, you just get stories that you're compelled to interpret as though they were raw sensations.

>No, you'll both be exposed to the same sound waves, but you won't both have exactly the same physiological responses or behavioral responses to it
Jesus Christ buddy I hope you're winding me up on this one.

In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweJliə/; singular form: quale) are claimed to be individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlJs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in a specific instance like "what is it like to taste a specific orange, this particular orange now". Examples of qualia include the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characters of sensation, qualia stand in contrast to "propositional attitudes",[1] where the focus is on beliefs about experience rather than what is it directly like to be experiencing.

>Qualia is what the camera SEES not what the recognition software picks up when it gradiates it.
This is exactly why belief in "qualia" / the hard problem is itself the real problem. You're caught up in a distinction that doesn't exist in reality. There is no "what the camera SEES." There's data that things like software or people can behave in response to. AI isn't incapable of doing something we're capable of doing with visual input. We're both collections of physical processes, we don't transcend physics.
My argument is that it's a useful trick the brain plays. Of course the definition for it is going to be written from the point of view of someone who's under the influence of that trick. That isn't an argument against it being a non-real but useful trick any more than the existence of the word "sunrise" implies geocentrism is correct. In both cases you just have examples of language reflecting a wrong belief.

>There is no "what the camera SEES."
That's true but the reality is that its untrue because the camera cannot see. It cannot experience because its not alive

>For one thing, a person who knows a language is more likely to believe they "heard" words or phrases with corresponding sound waves that don't objectively possess any similarity to the sounds waves that were actually made by the speaking person but do possess the abstract / imaginary quality of being semantically interchangeable with the words or phrases that were actually said. Your knowledge, habits, expectations, etc. all influence what you believe you "experience."
See this is super interesting because it illustrates the cross over between propositional attitudes and qualia.
We've all been there when you can read between the lines or you hear something that's not there or you skim read.
I mean its interesting but I can't really see the application of it. It would seem to me that we fill in the blanks rather than experience what is actually happening.

>My argument is that it's a useful trick the brain plays. Of course the definition for it is going to be written from the point of view of someone who's under the influence of that trick. That isn't an argument against it being a non-real but useful trick any more than the existence of the word "sunrise" implies geocentrism is correct. In both cases you just have examples of language reflecting a wrong belief.
I mean I think you'd have a hard time arguing that all of life is non qualative man. The example I can think of is someone who talks english but is deaf. All of the concepts and propositional attitudes are there but there's no experience. No soundwaves or whatever you'd call it. Perfectly able to understand but simply unable to hear

>I mean I think you'd have a hard time arguing that all of life is non qualative man.
This might help (video's speaker is Marvin Minsky, founder of the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory and a highly respected cognitive scientist):
youtube.com/watch?v=jSOXlKjk6pg
>The example I can think of is someone who talks english but is deaf. All of the concepts and propositional attitudes are there but there's no experience. No soundwaves or whatever you'd call it. Perfectly able to understand but simply unable to hear
Did you check out the blindsight example?
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blindsight
>All they have is a sense of sight they aren't aware of having. So if you put obstacles in front of them like a tipped over garbage can they'll walk around it and not trip over it, but when you ask them about it they won't know that's why they walked in the way they did and will deny having seen anything.
With blindsight, the person not only has concepts, but they have functional eyes that take in stimuli and a body that does things in response to that stimuli. The difference between blindsight and normally sighted people is what I believe the "qualia" thing amounts to in reality. It's fundamentally a behavioral difference and a matter of whether you have access to that abstract reference point to engage in higher level behaviors around it. Because we have this abstract reference point available to us as normally sighted people, we can speak about our stimuli and make plans based on the stimuli that go beyond the base level reactions the blindsighted person engages in like avoiding obstacles.
Also, consider the famous philosophical zombie thought experiment normally used to try to prove "qualia" are real. The philosophical zombie isn't deaf. He behaves outwardly exactly the same as a non-zombie would. If you say "hello," he says "hello" back to you. You can have the behavior without there needing to be "qualia."

>Did you check out the blindsight example?
Nah just had a quick look though.

I mean the argument there is that they don't experience it so its not qualia.

Well I mean that Minsky fella's interesting but not actually saying a lot. So for example imagine a scale between pleasure and pain, not real but whatever, there's no degrees within it. No unit of measurement within it so it can't really be quantified as such. I mean you can say "muh attitudes" and for example an imput will "hurt" a sook more than say a war veteran. But the imput may be the same. Or someone with fibromyalgia may feel it but be so inured to it as to barely notice it.

So it effects us differently even though it is the same input. But If someone is on morphine they may FEEL it completely differently because their nervous system is changed.

Apart from that I guess the only interesting thing was "orange" because actually a lot of different inputs are orange, when does it become yellow, when does it become red. But the input is the same.

idk basically just talking nonsense I guess.

A classic is "try to imagine another colour that you have never seen before" though.

there is no reason to accept any particular linking hypothesis between the mental computation involved in color detection and the subjective experience of color perception

Too many STEMspergs here.

>positivism

*knock knock*

*who's there*

Old Inés

Old Inés who?