Le human waves

Why do people still fall for this meme? Why do they beslive that "the best army in human history" got defeated by unarmed horde without weapons and tactics while NKVD was shooting in their back? Why do they think that there is literally any advantage in this compared to normal attack where some soldiers shoot and some advance?

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ia800405.us.archive.org/26/items/TME30-480/TME30-480.pdf
ia801201.us.archive.org/34/items/1942TM30-480/1942TM30-480.pdf
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Because a semi popular movie, that is most people's only exposure to the Eastern Front, said so.

What is falsely attributed to Soviets in WW2 by modern media (human waves, shortage of rifles etc) actually comes from American experience with Chinese troops during Cold War. Some Chinese units had a shortage of rifles so they'd just issue a bag of grenades instead to soldiers without rifles.

because dehumanizing your enemies makes it easier to kill and breed hate in your civilian population so the military can do whatever it wants in order to "preserve your way of life" without question

>Cold War
fuck, meant to say Korean War, sorry.

>Why do they beslive that "the best army in human history" got defeated by unarmed horde without weapons and tactics while NKVD was shooting in their back?
Because enemy at the gates told them so.
Nobody gives a shit that USSR inherited 20 million Mosin rifles from the empire and Mosin was hardly the only infantry weapon they had in 1941.
The point is that soviets are evil but we can't have you being afraid to go and fight them, so we paint them as fumbling retards, who don't even give their soldiers fucking guns.

Happy?

>The point is that soviets are evil but we can't have you being afraid to go and fight them, so we paint them as fumbling retards, who don't even give their soldiers fucking guns.

Good point

Pretty much this. It's German propaganda from WW2 and it was kept alive by all the former German soldiers who remained in service in FRG after the war.
Seeing Soviets like some crude animals living in a brutal primitive society was useful, and not much was done (nor is it realistic to do anything about it) to break that stereotype.
In reality in terms of tactics and operations Soviets were quite ahead of Western armies after WW2 by virtue of having so much experience.

THere were instances of militia units armed with molotov cocktails instead of rifles in the defence of Moskow (Source: Ivan's War).

But those were militia units, poorly trained citizens called up as a last ditch effort.

I'm just gonna share some Commie tactics I've accumulated from various books and Journals, if anyone's interested:
>The essence of the concept is the desire first, to achieve the simultaneous suppression of the enemy’s offensive thrusts with strikes throughout the depths of his tactical zone and limited offensive tactical thrusts. This is accomplished by the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defensive zone in a selected sector, follow-up strikes throughout the enemy’s tactical rear area, and the subsequent rapid exploitation of tactical success into operational- level success. Nonetheless, while the breakthrough and exploitation tactical phases were critical, winning air supremacy, isolating the zone of conflict from approaching enemy reserves, and blocking enemy logistical efforts were also thought to be important considerations for the achievement of operational success.

>This included the echelon for the attack, exploitation echelons, reserves, and airborne and aviation groups. An echelon for the attack contained the bulk of the main force with shock groups (“udarnyye gruppy”) designated for the conduct of the main breakthrough at the tactical-level. Delaying groups (“skovyvayushchiye gruppy”) were designated to halt and fix enemy forces and prevent their reinforcing against the main attack. The exploitation echelon (“eshelon razvitiya proryva”) was intended to develop tactical success into operational success. Mobile groups of armies and “fronts” made up of tank corps or armies, mechanized corps, and cavalry corps became this exploitation echelon. Theoretically, they were to be committed through breakthrough sectors or gaps to effect a rapid encirclement, block enemy reserves, and conduct other missions to develop the offensive. Combined arms, antitank, and special reserves served as contingency forces. Aviation and airborne groups were also integral parts of the battle formation of an operation.

Forgot to mention these are WW2 strategies and tactics, obviously

>>The Soviet infantry offensive is made by infantry supported by artillery, tanks, engineers, and aviation as the situation demands. It is generally in the form of simultaneous attacks on a broad front with concentrations of artillery and, particularly, tanks in the break-through area. The attack seeks to penetrate the enemy defenses in two or more sectors and converge on a limited objective; its mission is to encircle or envelop enemy groupings and destroy them by simultaneous attacks from all directions.

>The objectives of decentralized defense are to deny the enemy use of terrain, to divide his attacking forces, and to destroy him by numerous local counterattacks on the initiative of the local ground commander

>The centralized type of defense seeks, by employing obstacles or by maneuver, to channelize the enemy attack in a given direction in order to gain a more favorable position for a decisive counterattack with heavily armored units and concentrations of massed artillery. Dummy positions and false fortifications used extensively. A favorite Soviet maneuver is to allow the enemy to penetrate deeply into the lines and trap him in a fire sack.

>According to Soviet doctrine, speed of maneuver, seizure of favorable terrain, and quick deployment of main forces and artillery upon contact are essential. Aggressive reconnaissance, ground and air, is continual throughout the operation. Usually, a strong advance guard is utilized. An attack upon the flank is sought. The fullest use of artillery at the earliest possible moment is made.

>The Red Army Air Force is to support the Red Army in all operations. It assists the artillery in the preparation for an offensive, supports the ground forces during the break.through, and covers them during disengaging operations by attacking enemy ground formations. In addition to this primary mission as "flying artillery" for the ground forces

It helps the wehrboos and naziboos cope with loss.

Which is weird because actual, real human waves are comically easy to beat. See Boxer rebellion, Opium wars, etc.

But it isn't a meme? Check the Kill-to-Death ratio

I don't know if it's historicaly true, but I do think it's a valid strategy. You put a constant pressure on the front line without wasting guns and veterans. Plus those who survive certainly have what it takes to make good soldiers. I don't see any flaw.

Which explains the insane casualties the russians still had when advancing, run into german machine gun fire until they are out of ammo.
Or ask the fins, they know too.

Fucking wannabe anglo commies everywhere.

If we're talking deaths, then the average K/D was about 2.2 for the Jerries, not very human wave-ish. If we look at permanent losses, however, Germany only averaged 1.4 (With 14 million total Soviets lost).
And even then there's shit like the Jassy-Kishinev offensive where the Jerries outnumbered the Commies, but still took greater losses than the Soviets.

lmao France did more to defeat the nazis than the soviets did. You need a reality check buddy

HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHHAHAA

Then how you explain this? Even though it is a stereotype, stereotypes have some basis in truth.

My point is if the Soviets only used human waves they wouldn't even be close to winning that war. They actually tried human waves to break encirclements in the first few months of Barbarossa and it failed miserably just like it did in Finland, it's just a really shit strategy. Real life isn't Starcraft.

>No source
>Just a pie chart (with percentages)
Hmm, that's probably because only about 400,000 US soldiers died, and the bulk of the German army was in the Eastern Front? See Also I feel like China's percentage is a bit too low, could be wrong, though.

>be soviet
>throw your people at the enemy
>everyone dies
>allies defeat Hitler for you
>somehow you take credit for nazi defeat
Why are russians so bad at war?

come and find out )))

Deep battle was objectively superior to any other conventional battle methods until the 1980's where America develop Airland battle
Blitzkrieg was muddled on its own bullshit tied down to the concept of kesselsclacht and trying to find a single schwerpunkt where Deep battle was more concern on disorienting the enemy by multiple concurrent strike that you do not have any footing

Allies defeat hitlers?
What kinda thought process brought you there?
The most of what america did was supplying and organizing the invasion from the france coast.
Moving in on Germany was them fighting kids,peasants and old vets while most of the actual german force was situated in the east.
Pic related is kinda how it went down.

People aren't fucking robots, the people left would be mentally scarred and completely unmotivated chaff.

I've seen accounts from almost every side describing attacks as "human waves" that's often just what an attack looked like in world war 2.

I think personally it had to do with supply lines. While I don't doubt that the USSR could have had an abundance of weapons, the fact that its railroad system was underdeveloped and the equipment had to cross large distances to get anywhere probably would have led to the weapons not being there when they were needed. It wasn't that they didn't have munitions, it's that the munitions couldn't get there on time.

True but the sheer number in which the soviets did it at times was perfect for that story.
The soviets threw insane amounts of human bodies at the germans and the fins for that matter.

what are you talking about?

soviet logistics were insanely efficient they were literally never out of supplies

Its was also quite usual for soldiers to pick up enemy guns and ammo throughout the fights.
Its just good to know that at the start of the german/russian shitfest the russians didnt have any good equipment YET, in the later stages they absolutely rocked german positions

commieboos are the worst.

It's worth noting that while Soviet losses at individual battles were indeed ''insane'' compared to German, overall casualties during the war were 1(Germans) : 1,3(Soviets) which is hardly ''insane''.

They were doing that though. I'm not talking about this being the reason they won the war but they did use reconnaissance by fire which resulted in huge casualties and engaged in some tactically sensless battles which ended in either loss or hyrrhic victory.

Even if they were working at peak efficiency, distance is a bit of a problem. When your factory is on the other side of the Urals and the train takes two days to get to the front, if the enemy attacks tomorrow, you're still fucked.

It both is and isn't a meme. It was true during the Polish-Soviet war, Khalkyn Gol and Winter War, they used human waves. But they pretty much abandoned it by 1942 as it was completely useless to do.

>Moving in on Germany was them fighting kids,peasants and old vets while most of the actual german force was situated in the east.
Kek, that's wrong
The Germans had hundreds of thousands of well-trained and well-equipped troops defending the Siegfried Line. They didn't start using kids and pensioners until 1945.

this
they had hundred of thousands captured at the Colmar pocket,during Operation Dragoon etc
its true that the cream of the crop was in the Eastern Front but those in the west arent exactly slouches either

Comes probably from the Rzhev Meatgrinder.

>Deep battle was objectively superior to any other conventional battle methods until the 1980's where America develop Airland battle
Please; as an operation, it's basic "Mass where your enemy is weak" and "try to keep him guessing where you'll hit". About the only thing that was really special about the Soviet operational doctrine was how they would often try to attack at multiple points at once, which often led to none of them, or at best one of them, succeeding, while the rest were messy failures. Everyone remembers Uranus, but not the simultaneous and about as large Mars offensive, which was a total clusterfuck. Similarly with Kursk and those simultaneous attacks near Vitebsk.

>Blitzkrieg was muddled on its own bullshit tied down to the concept of kesselsclacht and trying to find a single schwerpunkt where Deep battle was more concern on disorienting the enemy by multiple concurrent strike that you do not have any footing

But "Deep battle" only started working successfully when they stopped trying to do the multiple concurrent strikes and started a rolling offensive with one focal point at a time, almost like what the Germans were doing.

>They didn't start using kids and pensioners until 1945.
I think this meme more has to do with the relatively low quality of the troops on the beaches at Normandy. Since most people's understanidng of the Western Front is

>D-DAY!
>BULGE!
>VICTORY IN EUROPE!

They don't quite grasp that troops manning beach front fortifications are usually relatively unreliable ones, because it's a relatively easy job, and the tougher guys are the ones stationed a little further back where their superior skill means more in a more open, maneuvering battle.

what is better ccording to you then, attacking on place where is your enemy weak and getting a lot of your troops here without him noticing is much harder than illiterate like you imagines.

While it's not related to the argument, I do like how you call me an illiterate and manage to make no less than 5 obvious English errors in the space of 34 words.

And quite simply, it is wasteful in the extreme to try to make multi-axial attacks. Nevermind the logistical challenge of trying to support 4-5 simultaneous breakthroughs; to achieve enough force that you can attack in multiple sectors at once and have at least a 3:1 if not greater ratio of force in each implies that you're so much stronger than your adversary that pretty much any damn operational method will work.

The Schwerpunkt system proved its own efficacy; and I think it's very telling that the Soviets had greater success when they abandoned the broad front methods and moved closer to it.

>The Schwerpunkt system proved its own efficacy
yeah, like it proved during the entire war while Soviets lost it when they tried to execute multi -axial attacks like in Stalingrad or during the Operation Bagration

Bagration was undertaken during crushing Anglo-American land and air military involvement and the peak of material support of trucks, food, and communications and industrial equipment for the Red Army.
Stalingrad's twin attack, Mars, was a complete embarrassment.

What the fuck are you talking about? Stalingrad had a huge accompanying failure.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mars

By the time of Nagration, the Soviets stopped that kind on nonsense. That's why they attacked sequentially, only doing the Zukraine operation after Bagration stopped advancing, and then mopping up the Baltic States after that.

I didnt knew delay action is failure and that Soviets attacked in one huge autistic way like Hitlerites in Barbarossa during Bagration.

>Delay action.
Delaying what? The Germans hadn't been on the offensive around Moscow for over a year by that point. It featured almost twice as much armor commitment as Uranus, and those armored forces suffered some 93% losses. It was a failed offensive that the Soviets later tried to cover up as being something it wasn't.

>And that Soviets attacked in one huge autistic way like Hitlerites in Barbarossa during Bagration.
So you're very ignorant? What's new?

>Soviet Deep Battle
>German Blitzkrieg
Any other good things to read about regarding modern battle philosophy? Love reading this shit, surely there Anglo armies had their own philosophies? What about East Asia, like the Japs?

Japan is actually the closest to using human wave tactics in WW2, they inherited this retarded school of thought about infantry charges from 1905. When they're doing their short range infiltration through jungles or landing a few KMs behind the front they were pretty good, but in a stand up fight they did some really dumb shit

Well most of the Deep Battle stuff I posted comes from David M Glantz, tactics posted here come from the US Military Intelligence handbook, here's the whole thing digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=dodmilintel

For Japan, there's the "Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941" by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie. I'm not a huge fan of Naval stuff or Japan in general, so the only info I have on their tactics is a U.S handbook on Imperial Japanese forces in 1944, which you can find here:
ia800405.us.archive.org/26/items/TME30-480/TME30-480.pdf
And here's one in 1942
ia801201.us.archive.org/34/items/1942TM30-480/1942TM30-480.pdf

For extra USSR stuff, there's David M. Glantz's "Soviet Military Operational Art, In Pursuit of Deep Battle"

German propaganda adopted by the US during the Cold War

The Soviet Union fought a ground war from 1941-1945. The US didn't enter France until 1944.

It's not that simple, the Volksturm meme only started when Germany was being penetrated and several of the most experienced divisions (including Lehr, the instructional unit for Panzer tactics) were deployed in the west for refits and gave the Americans and Brits some trouble. A lot of it was loaded with Ostbattalion static divisions who were pretty woeful and had no motivation to defend France though

Blitzkrieg itself is a very vague term that is coined around
no wehrmacht or heer doctrine ever soundly put blitzkrieg in any of their battle plans

Bliztkreig was a meme made up by a journalist to describe Germany's quick campaigns so it makes sense the German military wouldn't use it, I think Hitler even called it a stupid word or some autistic shit

should we call it fast deep penetrating maneuver warfare with combined arms

They just called them Schwerpunkts and Kesselschlachts. Germany didn't really do the whole Operational Battle thing, much to their detriment

so they call those things focal point or cauldron wars?
thats breddy autistic

German strategy was very vague apart from take place X and left up to the commanders discretion, until it wasn't and Hitler couldn't plan an operation so it was a fucking disaster every time after he put his big boy pants on

There is no such thing as "Blitzkrieg." Hitler never used the term, nor did anybody in the German military.

Human wave tactics came differently in the countries that used them. The first to note is the soviet union who had a reputation for fierce offensives since 1920. The army was not the most modern and well-equiped but with manpower and pressure they were able to push the poles all the way to warsaw, they faught on large expanses in the siberia against allied armies, in ukraine against some rebels and in many other places in russia all atthe same time. For this the russians had massive trust issues with their own citizens, learned to take as much fighting they can to the enemy and ultimately win and execute a bunch of people to make sure they don't need to lose more men in fighting. Tukhachevskiy was an officer who modernized the army and its strategies (especially in 1936) making the red army one of the largest and modern armies of the world of the time with his many manuals and strategies to go with it. He learned from his mistakes against the poles, he learned from his success against the tambov rebels, and culminated the strategies for a co-operative assault with every unit available to put pressure on wide fronts. He was one of the officers who was purged (which was a plot by the germans to make russia eliminate its best officers) and his strategy was misinterpreted by officers of the red army so they just charged all in. Furthermore russia in 1941 was in its worst shape, they didn't have maps for the places they were defending, huge chunks of their equipment were captured by the quick advance of the enemy and the rest was blown away by the german air force. It was so bad one pilot took to the skies to see the damage done and shot himself after landing. All russia had to save itself was manpower and thus, human waves, thank you.

Even the Chinese soldiers weren't using human waves, they were just using tactics not at all suited to fighting the USA in Korea, that worked against the Japanese and ROC armies.

The charging forward relentless thing came from Chinese tactics were to hit ONE POINT relentlessly, with guys going forward one after another in a line (which had no way of sending a message back to where this line was forming).

The way this usually works is that they'd hit one point, make a breakthrough there, and then assemble a huge force behind enemy lines. This actually worked in the opening days of the conflict, where the Chinese seemed to be everywhere, and massive encirclements were threatened.

But that was because the US had it's troops over extended and spread too thin with gaps in the line. You might notice that China is a super big place, and if you're guarding a giant front like that, your troops are probably spread out really thin. As soon as the front contracted however, that stopped being an issue, and the Chinese stopped finding gaps, without changing their tactics to respond. So pretty much wherever they checked, there would be available fire support, reserves, and communication able to respond to the attack. Because the Chinese communications were crap, everyone would keep charging forward, not because of an absurd willingness to die, but because they literally had no idea how the attack was proceeding until it was over.

As for the bag full of grenades thing, that's an old trick. The German Stormtroopers would do that in WWI too. As it turns out, when you're taking a trench, it helps to have a LOT of grenades on hand. Bag full of grenades is also used as an anti-vehicle/anti-tank device when you don't have Bazookas.

You'll note then, that I don't use the term "Blitzkrieg" in my post.

They entirely did an "Operational Battle" thing, they just didn't call it Blitzkrieg. Germany's operational failures had a hell of a lot more to do with insufficient planning in the event that their opponent survived devastation of the local forces than it did with some failure on the point of one penetration vs many penetrations.

>They entirely did an "Operational Battle" thing
Not really, they just had objectives and everything beyond that was left to the commanders on the field, it's why after the sickle cut in1940 they had problems with over extended lines, why Moscow and Leningrad weren't taken, and why suddenly Stalingrad became the focal point of the Caucasus offensive for no reason

This guy gets it.

>Not really, they just had objectives and everything beyond that was left to the commanders on the field, it's why after the sickle cut in1940 they had problems with over extended lines, why Moscow and Leningrad weren't taken, and why suddenly Stalingrad became the focal point of the Caucasus offensive for no reason
None of this is correct.

Yes, they had objectives and left a lot of initiative in the hands of field commanders, but htose objectives were operational in scope. Everyone had rpobelms with over-extended lines and problems bringing uspplies up, and the Soviets and Americans also had to stop offensives for inability to bring reinfrocements and POLs as quick as their mobile units were advancing. Moscow and Leningrad were not taken because of insufficiency of force, not because the operatioanl planning was bad; and a More Soviet style doctrine would not have enabled them to take those cities.

Stalingrad became the focal point of Blau beceause that's where the bulk of the defenders were, and the need to keep the flanks secure. If you put that kind of force into the Caucasus proper, the Soviets launch a Uranus 2 months earlier and run laughing all the way to Rostov.

>htose objectives were operational in scope
Not really, no Heeresgruppe had a concrete plan going forward beyond "encircle as much as you can and destroy piecemeal"
>Moscow and Leningrad were not taken because of insufficiency of force
Because Hitler diverted divisions to the south, against any of the vague goals that passes for operational strategy for you
>Stalingrad became the focal point of Blau beceause that's where the bulk of the defenders were, and the need to keep the flanks secure
Then why did they denude their flanks by sending everything in the Panzer Korps to the fucking city? No mobile reserve at all to counter anything and have to get Manstein to save your arse isn't very good strategy

The Soviets would literally send people to cross a river knowing the river had strong currents, was super cold and that a majority of the people couldn't swim even though there was no need to do such a thing, then why did they? Because IF they had to, those people would die regardless so they might as well do it and die now.

The Soviets instilled a weird mentallity in Russians that can be summed up as "Hac мнoгo" or "we are many". This mentallity is the suicidal mentallity that 'do your duty and die, it doesn't matter because we are many to continue'. They also really didn't care about their people and when they found out a volga minority was about to be used by germans to revolt, they sent the entire community to labour cams and those who couldn't were killed so when the German spies finally parachuted there they found empty villages.

>Not really, no Heeresgruppe had a concrete plan going forward beyond "encircle as much as you can and destroy piecemeal"
That is an operational plan; and to be honest, it's not that much different from what the Soviets were doing on their counterattacks. The destruction of enemy assets is pretty much always critical to making or keeping any sort of advance.

>Because Hitler diverted divisions to the south, against any of the vague goals that passes for operational strategy for you
First off, if Hitler goes charging straight for Moscow, you're not likely to get the disastrous (from the Soviet perspective) Roslavl-Novozybkov Offensive. Secondly, you do need to do something about that army massing around Kiev. You might disagree with his priorities, bot to pretend that there was no operational planning behind it is simply wrong.

>Then why did they denude their flanks by sending everything in the Panzer Korps to the fucking city?
They didn't. I have no idea what you're talking about. XIV and LI corps were the only ones with tank contingents sent into the city, and either alone were much smaller than 22PZ (a division) on its own. Don't forget too, that there was a hell of a lot of fighting in the open before getting to the city, which you'd want armor for.

> No mobile reserve at all to counter anything and have to get Manstein to save your arse isn't very good strategy
Please stop using terms like opertiaonal and strategic interchangeably, they are not the same thing. In any case, lack of a reserve is not pertinent to the difference between Soviet and German opertiaonal doctrines. Attacks like the Vyzama one were pretty successful, and those didn't leave anything in reserve either.

It's technically true, but not in the way movies depict a hoard running with flags in small groups. But I red a few anecdotes from soviet soldiers in the war describing the tactic, soldiers running at lines towards the enemy. Some not armed/partially armed.