I can't stop being a dualist

Would you mind elaborating a bit? I get how access consciousness could come from unconscious processes.

Not phenomenal consciousness

Go with non-dualism. Its the only way forward. Dualism is small brain appraoch. Non-dualism is big brain approach.

alright

*becomes an idealist*

well when you can understand the materialist perspective as more than just "tiny robots"
comeback and we'll have a discussion.

Ive read a lot of Dan Dennetts ideas, about IIT and so on

None of them are satisfactory, and the problem of how do you get something as intangible as consciousness from unconscious interactions still applies. The best way forward for materialism imho is to deny consciousness completely. I cant believe that though

don't take dan's interpretation of biology.
you gotta do that yourself.
sometimes philosophers don't grasp the entirety of a scientific field. they only seek the science that proves their point.

study brain biology.
you'll probably still be a dualist, but you'll be able to explain it better.

A dualism is a dualism. Note that they still are mind/body dualists because they are Platonists. They still believe that 'reason' is superior to 'experience'.

>non-dualism is idealism
kek

Platonism is correct, being consists of matter and form, therefore you should not stop being a dualist

Platonism is incorrect. Matter and form do not exist. Dualism is for children.

You can't explain consciousness arising from purely material substance!

>Thinks magical ghost energy causally influences the material world.

Seems legit

> noise can be parsed into information

you're living in the 1930s the your ideas aren't worth considering

>dan dennett is not smart
shut your whore philosopher mouth, and die (since I assume you can't nose-breathe)

>reason is superior to experience
Reason is superior to experience, and experience is superior to reason

The optimization parameters differ

alright, I guess I'm more of a panpsychist/russelian monist/epiphenomenalist if you want to put it that way

>everything is connected maaaannnnn
before entanglement was declared irreducible you were retarded, but now you're the poster-boy for advanced physik
and it feels bad

t. p-zombie

You're putting the cart before the horse. Physical processes are clearly indicated in nearly every aspect of cognition, decision making, memory formation and retrieval; layered neural networks have been proven able to adapt to any number of domain-specific disciplines and they are physically analgous to cortical columns, or stacks of grey-white matter. And your problem is - the you who exists breathing simultaneously as you ignore the sensation of your feet on the ground or the smalls of your armpits - that you think everything all at once is somehow some magical phenomenon. Why? You can't even BE all of yourself all of the time, so clearly consciousness is as much a reduction as it is a step up in complexity.

Take your pedophile cartoons back to

so sad you /p/ friends have to hide in empty labels for everything; I do appreciate the effort it took your dumbass to avoid using 'NPC'

tell me you don't believe humans are trillions of years old, bro?

I wonder if Veeky Forums still fall for these kind of baits, they don't even know what does this expression actually mean.

>you can't explain how "appleness" can arise from mere carbon atoms!

No. I'm an atheist, but physicalist fundamentalism is absurd. Science has no explanation for the phenomenon (if we can call it that) of consciousness. Modern dualism is the dualism between the physical and consciousness. This dualism has not been successfully reconciled by anyone other than, perhaps, by those who posit that consciousness is primary and the physical secondary - but that leaves the question of why a consistent and predictable physical world, changes in which have profound and predictable effects on consciousness, would emerge from consciousness. The best explanation seems to be that the physical and consciousness are co-phenomena of some sort. Certainly physicalist reductionism fails to tackle the issue.

>actually
>sadsac^sadsac
responds to himself

either subjective experience is an inherent property or it emerges from complex interactions.

I'm more willing to believe that consciousness is fundamental than that the whole human race has some kind of overarching consciousness

You seem to be misunderstanding the hard problem of consciousness. The nature of consciousness is irrelevant to the hard problem. The hard problem concerns the question of why ANY interiority/awareness exists at all. Why are we not just p-zombies? And how does consciousness arise from the physical if, as physicalists would have us believe, it does arise from the physical?

honestly imho reductive physicalism is just eliminative materialism with a bunch of word-play

The alternative is thinking that I don't exist, which is inconceivable.

or were you presenting a strawman as an argument? Prove to me that a human being in physical form given time to develop in a human-like time frame wouldn't experience qualia de facto. There's no intelligent reason to believe they wouldn't

To me it's clear it arises in agent-agent interactions. You need to be aware of your self across time, which any adaptation will not necessarily do. You know how you have to learn to stop yourself from initiating previously refined actions? Social experience is that all day every day, and I'd say it is due to our highly specialized apparatus being further refined by social cohesion

>p-zombies exist
i doubt even non-conscious entities don't experience broad-scale overlap. It is inherent in the physical representations of their neurons; they will be confused by context mapping the wrong qualia (like the feeling of being stalked).

The problem is fucking retarded philos thought that reductionism was an important point of view at all (because model-based physics was so successful). It isn't to biology at all.

>You need to be aware of your self across time, which any adaptation will not necessarily do. You know how you have to learn to stop yourself from initiating previously refined actions? Social experience is that all day every day, and I'd say it is due to our highly specialized apparatus being further refined by social cohesion
All this seems in principle possible for a being that is not conscious but is intelligent and has memory to accomplish.
>i doubt even non-conscious entities don't experience broad-scale overlap.
By definition, non-conscious entities don't experience anything at all. I guess maybe you're referring to neural correlates of the overlap?

broad-scale overlap =/= qualia and subjective experience

unless it does, which makes the world a lot fucking weirder

honestly, given the complex interactions in the universe, the materialist view of consciousness would essentially prove pantheism.

yeah i don't genuinely believe consciousness is anything but a misnomer for juggling a lot of balls in the air desu

>qualia is special because i define it as special
yeah, give it a rest
Qualia is the other parts of your brain influencing your perception of the system that feeds your brain that perception. I will live to see much much much smarter people than I delineate that idea across the multitude of systems in our brain

>Qualia is the other parts of your brain influencing your perception of the system that feeds your brain that perception.
No, qualia IS the perception. The question of qualia is the question of why there is something perceived, as opposed to just complex information processing going on like we see in a computer.
You seem to not understand the hard problem of consciousness.

>Qualia is the other parts of your brain influencing your perception of the system that feeds your brain that perception
You're begging the question here

It's entirely conceivable that this would happen without what we know about qualia

If anything this is arguing for epiphenomenalism

he's a zombie lol

>defining a state that can't be perceived or tested
ahhh, that's a problematic way of classifying anything, and is definitely unscientific

What is the marker for consciousness, awareness? You can train a hive of insects not to venture into certain areas. You act like a p-zombie to do various tasks throughout the day - what's so special with consciousness if you can turn it off?

>why an architecture that splines and parses the information would need oversight
what? How could you ever have qualia without something to decide what to do with the qualia? Qualia without any level of consciousness is insect-motor-neuron level decision making (purely instinctual). Anything about that level of thought requires some modicum of thought, or consciousness. If you're defining consciousness as the hard-problem then you're begging the question of reductionism. i.e. if we can't define every single state of every neuron in the brain as it relates to this 'instance of perception-qualia-cognition' then we haven't defined 'consciousness'

That's totally invalid. Of course your brain isn't occupied by whatever it is you are experiencing at every given moment. It does organizing; it cleans memories; it is assigning metabolic downtime; it is clearing metabolites.

There's tons of shit that doesn't roll up into more complext behaviours, but there are small changes that affect the whole system, so either the physicality is important or it isn't. I don't know how to argue against a special set of irreducible components that we can't see (categories of the mind etc). For me it is clear that our emotional state is intrinsically linked to our health, which is clearly a manifestation of the physical.

From my understanding of your arguments, , , you can't even define consciousness let alone why it wouldn't be a part of a system that has to selectively ignore qualia... There's no reason we developed intelligence except it helped

There's nothing really special about the human brain except for the fact that it's really complex.

So how does consciousness arise?

1) Consciousness is an immaterial thing that somehow interacts with the brain
2) Consciousness is a property of neurons or the brain as a whole, or a fundamental property
3) Consciousness is an emergent property
4) Consciousness doesn't exist

I can't accept 4. 1 is extremely unlikely. If 3 is true, then why do some systems have consciousness and some don't? Is there a threshold? If there isn't one, or if there's a weak one, this view collapses to 2. If it's dependent on integrated information, then why can't any system have some rudimentary form of consciousness? Why can't light switches have some basic form of consciousness, if we do? If there is one, then why aren't other complex, non-biological systems conscious? Or are they?

>arguing for robotic reactions for everything
no, that's absurd
we don't even do the same thing when exposed to the same stimulus when we train to do exactly that (sports are a great example of this)
>simulcast
why the fuck would anything that didn't need to worry about immediate death all day want a live stream of qualia? Of course thinking about things requires a break from qualia, and selectively turning off qualia is something every fucking animal does. That humans can literally imagine themselves in another place while they are dying is a great example of how qualia is not consciousness, but that 'consciousness' is a qualia simulator trained/approximated by qualia.

I mean why do you guys think there's something else in the brain aside from "im special", and "the abstract things I feel don't correlate to words and physicality easily"

you're conflating qualia with sense-data. That's not what we're talking about.

>what's so special with consciousness if you can turn it off?
what's special is the internal subjective aspect. It's completely bizarre, and it's not clear why it even exists in a complex information-processing machine like the brain.

>you can't even define consciousness
you really can't give a good description for it. if you can, you're describing something else. I'm pretty sure you know what I'm talking about.

consciousness is the subjective integration of qualia

it's also completely conceivable that a complex information-processing system like the brain wouldn't have a rich internal life. The subjectivity of consciousness is completely unnecessary. So why is it there?

>consciousness is immaterial
gulag
>consciousness is a property of a collection of parts
that's also an option, why would the entire brain always be influencing the other parts all of the time? Lots of the time parts are acting entirely independently, and the processing occurs in the in betweens (cortical columns, and it looks like especially in gray matter-column interactions).

3 emergent property
Dude people in the field of complexity can't robustly define that fucking word, let alone come to a fucking compromise between them. You dung eaters rely on labels way too much

4. You can't even define the word, but it is irreducible

>internal subjective aspect
Do you think all brains are wired and trained the same way?

Yeah, hide behind empty projections instead of PROVIDING a simplistic reduction of the term for the sake of arguing ourselves onto a better framework. Lol

Consciousness is the subjective understanding of other lower levels' processes' ongoing natures. How about, "Our perception that our perception requires computation time,"?

>it is conceivable that a information crunching, parsing, and decision making machine wouldn't be entirely robotic
It would result in the death of the organism tons of the time. Insects get away with it because of their proliferation cycles; cniderians get away with it for the same reason + gestation immortality; high-energy/long-term gestation/high-training requirement animals like mammals can't afford knee-jerk reactions to every stimuli

We needed to control ourselves, and to control yourself you need to understand
1) there are things that aren't pertinent to your control
2) there is something to control (You)
3) you control you (observing yourself outside of time)

All of this gibberish just seems to indicate that time's forward arrow prevents a qualia-action machine from being an effective information-processing system.

>it is conceivable that a information crunching, parsing, and decision making machine would be entirely robotic
I meant to make fun of you like this, but I'm dumb

There's no way roboticism/algorithmic decision making works when engaged in N-S like situations. It doesn't work. You need an adaptive system working from hypotheticals, which requires a weighing system and a decision making system working in parallel, but not simultaneously, or you'd become incredibly predictable.

>What is the marker for consciousness, awareness?
Awareness isn't a marker for consciousness, it IS consciousness. When I say "consciousness", I mean "being aware".
>You act like a p-zombie to do various tasks throughout the day - what's so special with consciousness if you can turn it off?
I can't turn it off by an act of will. It would be nice if I could - for going to the dentist, for example. I could probably turn it off by shooting myself in the head.
But that's not the important part. Even if I could turn it on and off, it wouldn't change what we're discussing. One of the things that make consciousness special is that it is literally what separates the experience of being alive from that of being dead. If I had all my intelligence and problem-solving ability, but was not conscious, it would be exactly the same, as far as I was concerned, as being dead - or, more precisely, as never having come to life in the first place.
>Qualia without any level of consciousness is
No, you don't understand what the word "qualia" refers to. There is, by definition, no such thing as "qualia without any level of consciousness". "Qualia" is just a way to talk about particular subsets or aspects of consciousness -- for example, the quale of the scent of orange peel, as opposed to the entirety of consciousness, which includes that quale and also other qualia.

Would the invention of a sentient AI prove dualism incorrect?

>From my understanding of your arguments, , , (You) you can't even define consciousness
I'm not making an argument so much as I am discussing a mystery. You're the one, if I understand you correctly, who is claiming that there is no mystery to begin with. I'm not claiming to understand consciousness. What I'm claiming is that physicalism doesn't understand it, either.
Thomas Nagel did a pretty good job of "defining" consciousness. He basically said that consciousness is a way of referring to why there is something that it's like to be certain things. There's something that it's like to be a man, but presumably there isn't something that it's like to be a rock. And if there is something that it's like to be a rock, then the rock is conscious, so the mystery remains.

No, it would just show that we can put matter together in such a way that consciousness arises. But we already know that human reproductive systems can do that.

Yes, you are.

>How about, "Our perception that our perception requires computation time,"?
this isnt necessary or sufficient for consciousness

its impossible by definition to know if anything is conscious

yeah you can people train to do so all the time
You do turn off your pain when you exercise
you do turn off your perception of unimportant sensory data whenever you focus on something
you lose track of the physical sensation you have a body when you are deeply in thought
you lose track of reality when you are visualizing/imagining something, or dreaming

>consciousness separates being alive and dead
Ennui feels like being dead but is in fact alive; insects clearly are not conscious but are in fact alive

>qualia is reducible
I think it can be but it certainly isn't reducible by referring to it with the adjectives that are our lowest-common-denominators (earthy tones etc)

>consciousness is a mystery
Yeah, I wasn't the smartest kid in the room. In fact by many measures I was the least because I was the least likely to respond to stimuli. I've always been very withdrawn, or the most detached. I've always seen myself retrospectively get lost in a tailwind of emotion in social experiences and seen myself (as a part observer) do things I regret while I simultaneously feel the emotional motivation to do them in the first place.

I have always felt like qualia, the processing our brain does, our "superego/consciousness" are all working in tandem and in shutter-step, and don't see anything particularly special about any of it. I believe an ubermensch would be brought about by exacting control on the 'qualia' of the ego, or the ability to understand and control how one understand and controls.

I appreciate you bringing Nagel's thought experiment into this, as it is precisely this reasoning that I use myself. However, I could easily imagine myself as an insect. You would feel qualia, but you would probably be unable to remember it in the abstract and navigate a systemic response to it. You would be a feeling set of rules without any ability to proactively tailor them; you would be the feelings you had.
That doesn't define consciousness

don't just respond with nou, specify something missing from that, or you don't even know if there is

im ok with this admission, but only so far as it isn't used to propel further argument

If you don't think consciousness can be defined then there's no real reason to think it is special either. One person's "consciousness" may be very very different from another's. Particularly, I have met some people who are always aware - in the moment - of their actions. They are always robustly existential; they are almost always very conscientious; they are always successful; they always tailor their responses. Some people's ability to tailor their emotional-action axis is much higher than others; some people can deign information from noisier channels; some people can project an abstract model from very little data. Those all seem to be highly correlated in those types of people i refer to earlier. Those people probably have better brain architecture, which has been tailored further by the way they explore, map, and excise their ideas.

Oh, I agree. But I'm 99.99% convinced that other humans have interior experience. So I can imagine a machine somehow convincing me that it does, too.
>You would feel qualia ... That doesn't define consciousness
user, you're clearly not using the words "qualia" and "consciousness" to mean what I mean by them. The way I'm using the words is, I think, closer to the standard usage of the words. And following this standard usage... if there are qualia, then there is consciousness - by definition.
If there is ANY degree of subjective experience, of feeling, of awareness, of interiority... ANY, even the slightest bit, then there is consciousness.

that's a very specious definition
Any so called information processing machine that appears to change its computation result without extrinsic stimuli change would look like it is conscious. But it could be related to internal machinery having timings unrelated to the specific problem at hand

Subjective experience is only subjective if there is an observer observing the observation. If it is just discrepancy between two outside observers... well that could be the subjectiveness inherent in the observers, or it could be error-prone pattern-matching in the way the data is presented (observers are never identical), or it could be something internal that isn't a choice, but is dependent on other previous inputs - but is still machinical/deterministic in nature

I mean you can have noise in the output and make anything look subjective

Correct, incorrect, it's like we both understand that ideas exist...

do you think numbers exist? if not, how can 2+3=5 be true?

maybe ideas are the thing that conscious was needed to navigate

you had memories with a whole bunch of context and nothing to turn to "label" them with (re: analogy of naive NNs to reasoning)

math is the kind of shit that basically makes the question kind of irrelevant IMO

non-intuitive maths stuff is always levels more interesting than why my shit felt different today (from a suburban observer kinda way)

>tfw i want to unironically recommend Hegel but i know it won't be take seriously

Yes, I know these things exist, and that's why I'm a Platonist. Being consists of matter and form, I'm not some monotard trying to explain concepts and consciousness as physical objects.

>Am I dumb Veeky Forums?
You're wrong, but not necessarily dumb. Anyway, you shouldn't be a dualist because you wouldn't ever be able to tell if you were "really having qualia" vs. your brain just compelling you to believe, report, and behave as though various useful abstract fictions were "real." We already know brains can and do frequently make their owners believe in untrue things, which isn't at all strange since there's no requirement that biological adaptations involve giving you the literal truth; adaptations just need to be useful, which is a distinct concept from truth. So really you're left with a decision between:
A) Recognizing you can't really know whether you're having literal qualia vs. just being subject to behavioral routines that lead you to believe you're having literal qualia even though you aren't and therefore opting to go with the explanation that doesn't involve introducing inexplicable phantasms beyond the realm of physics vs.
B) Opting to go with the non-physical "experience" ghosts theory because you're convinced you somehow are able to tell the difference between "really experiencing" vs. just being subject to behavioral routines that lead you to believe in something that isn't literally real.
And if you choose option B I don't know what reason you could possibly have for thinking you would be able to tell the difference. Whenever I see people arguing for dualism it always seems to me that their reason for doing so boils down to overrating the fidelity of what their brain is doing for them. Everything we know about the way the brain operates points towards literal truth not being much of a priority for it.

> Anyway, you shouldn't be a dualist because you wouldn't ever be able to tell if you were "really having qualia" vs. your brain just compelling you to believe, report, and behave as though various useful abstract fictions were "real."
user, you don't understand what the word "qualia" means. "Qualia" refers to subjective experience. It doesn't matter whether you are "really" having them or your brain is "compelling you". If there is subjective experience, there are qualia.

you can easily be convinced that Im deluding myself, but I cant

I can easily believe that Im wrong about how my experiences are. I cant believe that they dont exist

Ideas do not exist. Nobody is buying your snake oil, pagan.

I understand what the word "qualia" means. You don't understand that I'm disagreeing with what you think is an infallible premise. I don't believe in "subjective experience" as a literal thing that exists and requires some special new science to account for. I believe in physiology (e.g. blood pressure rising) and behavior (including belief behavior and reporting behavior). The behavior your brain compels you to engage in references convenient abstract fictions which you're led to believe are literally "there," but in reality they only exist in a way similar to how the eye of a storm exists. The eye of a storm is really nothing at all, but everything revolving around that nothing makes it end up being a pseudo-something we can reference and talk about.

i'm guessing "layers" of irony messed your brain up; it took me a while to understand this

>fractal/analogy of patterns/domain-less solutions exist
i liek genetics

is qualia like the GOD expansion? is it never really fully expanded? If you get multiple separate outputs from a quantum of perception/consciousness do they all get umbrella'd under "qualia"?

did forms explictly refer to math throughout Plato's works? Or was it like atoms, and was just a supposition born of the idea of recursion, which was probably first formulated by Zeno.

Lol say it again I dare you, say "ideas do not exist" out loud and see if Parmenides doesn't appear and shatter your skull with a hammer

How embarrassing to think that "is not is".

>I don't believe in "subjective experience" as a literal thing that exists and requires some special new science to account for.
If you don't mind, forget the second part for a moment... Do you believe that subjective experience exists?
And if you don't, then please explain how you can deny what is literally the most self-evident thing.

Platonism refers mostly to mathemaical objects and the like after Quine

plato's beard is interesting
basically begs the question that there's always another plane of existence (or a set larger than the current set of all things) where the ledger that counts the 0 on a particular plane of existence is

I thought platonism was essentially the idea of a hologram/entanglement between real-world classifications and the idea we have of that object; but that's pretty stupid and presupposes broader question than it answers, and doesn't really answer ours. The question we have is not that what we represent exists in some "form plane" but that there is a form plane that intersects with ours in some matter that deems what patterns are arise out of what physicality is there (like pascal's triangle).

But I think that there are specific solutions is interesting, and not that other patterns have other solutions

Like answering what is a chair? We define our classifications with abstract reasoning, but we do so without speaking only using analytic philosophy because it is insane.

Why would I care what a pseud thinks? Sorry! I'm an empiricist. Thought is existent but the qualities of thought (ideas) do not.
Logic is a system for children.

>Do you believe that subjective experience exists?
I already said I don't believe "subjective experience" is a literally real thing. What does literally exist is a whole convoluted pile of physiology and behaviors which reference useful abstract fictions. The abstract fictions are probably the closest thing to what "subjective experience" actually is insofar as it's anything at all, though you can also say the behaviors referencing those abstract fictions are part of it too. I need to be clear in pointing these things out because otherwise you might interpret an unqualified "subjective experience don't exist" as meaning there's no such thing as the physiology, or the behaviors, or the abstract fictions. For example you might think I mean we're the same as a computer programmed to print "I'm in pain," when really that computer would be missing a ton of the stuff that goes on when we report we're "in pain."
>explain how you can deny what is literally the most self-evident thing
I already explained why you shouldn't overrate what you're led to believe is true by your brain here:
No matter how "self-evident" you're compelled to believe something is, that doesn't make for any increase in the likelihood your compelled belief is literally true. Your brain is perfectly capable of compelling reports of a high degree of confidence in a false belief. We have more reason to believe in the basic realities of a physical world than we do in what we're personally led to believe is true about the philosophical nature of our sensory input because with the former this has been validated across countless many independent reports and mathematical confirmations while with the latter you're putting all your eggs in the one basket of trusting your brain to be honest when we have lots of evidence your brain is frequently not honest due to certain non-literally real abstract objects having value for adaptation purposes.

thats what it used to be

but now its just the idea that mathematical truths are real independent of our minds

Numbers and principles are among the forms in Plato, yes. Not sure what you're getting at.

No, Platonism is a dualist system of matter and form, chair and all. It's nice to know that people have given up denying forms in the case of numbers, but that's not where Platonism stops.

Bitch Plato was heavily inspired by Pythagoras, who fetishizes numbers

>I already said I don't believe "subjective experience" is a literally real thing.
But this is insane. Obviously subjective experience exists. Aren't you having a first-person experience of seeing words on a computer screen right now?

>But this is insane.
Not really, no.
>Obviously subjective experience exists.
There is no actual evidence that literally real non-physical phenomena exist beyond the instinct we have to behave as though they do.
>Aren't you having a first-person experience of seeing words on a computer screen right now?
I'm compelled to behave as though I am, but my position is that this isn't literally the case in reality. The concept of the "experience of seeing words" in my view here is an abstract fiction, much like the abstract fictions of language, mathematics, music, money, or baseball. Abstract fictions can be hugely useful to behave around even though they aren't literally real in themselves. And just as we can deliberately build up elaborate behaviors around things we know aren't truly real in themselves, our brains can do something similar by making us believe and behave around things that aren't truly real in themselves.

>And just as we can deliberately build up elaborate behaviors around things we know aren't truly real in themselves, our brains can do something similar by making us believe and behave around things that aren't truly real in themselves.
But I'm not trying to claim that what you see represents something real "out there". I'm just trying to claim that you are, indeed, seeing something. Even if it's an illusion, it's still subjective experience, is it not?

/ig/ Idealism General

QUICK RUNDOWN
>Dr. Godehard Bruentrup: What Is Idealism?
youtube.com/watch?v=JDR5i6z4L8c

>In philosophy, idealism is the group of philosophies which assert that reality, or reality as we can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial.

ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES
>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/
>Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/idealism/v-1

ACADEMIC ARTICLES
>Eliminating the Physical
philpapers.org/rec/ELLETP-2
>A New Epistemic Argument for Idealism
philpapers.org/rec/SMIANE-2
>How To Avoid Solipsism While Remaining An Idealist
philpapers.org/rec/HENHTA

BOOKS
>George Berkeley-Principles of Human Knowledge
gutenberg.org/files/4723/4723-h/4723-h.htm
>George Berkeley-Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous
gutenberg.org/files/4724/4724-h/4724-h.htm
>John Foster-A World For Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism
gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=0DB12BBA4A197862E272211B7A059880

YOUTUBE
>The Introspective Argument:
Part 1: youtube.com/watch?v=4l1lQMCOguw
Part 2: youtube.com/watch?v=i4DyfIsj8FU
>Dr. David Chalmers explains why materialism is false
youtube.com/watch?v=kdbs-HUAxC8
>Why substance dualism is roundly rejected in contemporary philosophy of mind
youtube.com/watch?v=iVbG90kr1B0

Atheist idealism seems accurate to me. Theism is obviously false, materialism is incomplete - and seems to be in principle incomplete (the hard problem).

Atheist Idealism makes absolutely no sense. What is a dream without a dreamer? Theism is the only rational alternative to solipsism

Check out the Introspective Argument in /ig/

If there are two rocks, is there two or are there rocks?

Give me an argument for why the dream must have a dreamer, unless what you mean is that you want to call sentience itself "God", in which case I wont' disagree.

>I'm just trying to claim that you are, indeed, seeing something. Even if it's an illusion, it's still subjective experience, is it not?
I'm saying we're not really having "sight experiences." We're just behaving as though non-real placeholder abstractions of visual stimuli are there because it's useful / adaptive for us to behave that way. It might seem "very real" or "self evident" that something is there, but my argument is that this isn't true and that our brains are perfectly capable of making us believe it's true even though it isn't. Belief of this nature can happen without anything actually appearing to you in reality. You are probably very certain it isn't just a belief, but your certainty is itself just a belief. You can protest that you're "seeing it" right now, at this very moment, but again, that's a belief. There's no good reason to overrate these beliefs just because they're very strong and involuntary. The difference between a strong belief and a weak belief is very little where the brain is concerned.

Explain to me how a dream makes any sense if there is no dreamer... If there is nobody to experience anything from the first person perspective then experience means absolutely nothing. That's what consciousness is: first-person, subjective, this is what makes the hard problem hard.
>youtube.com/watch?v=kdbs-HUAxC8

I'm not trying to call sentience God. I'm saying God is the architect and we are characters in his dream.

I hold an alternative to both theism and solipsism: I hold that multiple sentiences almost certainly exist, and they are experiencing a shared existence. However, the nature of the relationships between these sentiences is unclear. In a sense, they are actually just aspects of one sentience. But they do not perceive multiply - each sentience perceives fully what it perceives. Separation in time (my sentience yesterday, my sentience tomorrow...) might actually be the same sort of thing as separation in sentience (my sentience, your sentience). Then sentience is primary, the ego is something this one sentience beholds fully as it beholds it, but somehow simultaneously the one sentience beholds all other things that any sentience beholds.

Here is the complete, unabridged list of past mysteries and phenomena known to ancients that had no physical explanation and eventually still turned out to be nonphysical
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And let's not forget
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I understand that the hard problem is the most challenging thing to date because we have how can one explain, describe, or study subjectivity from objectivity (or for some, what appears to be objectivity), let alone how it came about in the first place, but this "haha you can't explain it therefore it's more than physical :DDDD" shit has a batting average of 0.000. Stop this fucking nonsense

I think I'm starting to understand your perspective. I do not mean ideas such as yours when I say "Theism". I just mean the right side of the picture, what is labeled "creationism"/"deism". Also, I have no use for the word "God". It has connotations that are unnecessary for discussing this matter.

But my believing in an illusion... is still a subjective experience, the experience of believing.

>In a sense, they are actually just aspects of one sentience.

how is this not a step in the direction of theism?

And the very definition of a dream is:
>A series of thoughts, images, and sensations occurring IN A PERSON'S MIND during sleep. example sentence: ‘I had a recurrent dream about falling from great heights’

>Experience dreams during sleep. Example sentence: I dreamed about her last night’

Source: en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dream

You would have to equivocate on what you mean by dream for a dream to make any sense without a person to experience it.