Let's have an IJN & air power myths thread

Let's have an IJN & air power myths thread.
>Japan realized the value of air power unlike other countries
Wrong. All three naval countries built as many carriers as were allowed under the treaty.

>Japanese carriers were superior
Wrong. American carriers were generally better designed for the Pacific and British carriers were better designed for the Mediterranean.

>Japanese pilots were superior
Wrong. Japanese carrier pilots did very poorly against their counterparts in US carrier pilots. Japanese carrier pilots shined only when they faced off against 3rd rate pilots such as Australian pilots or USMC pilots.

>Japan dominated the naval war until the HellCat/ Essex carriers/ mid- to late- war, etc.
Wrong. Japan essentially tied the US performance in the first ever carrier battle (both sides hit the other side's carriers, but US lost its carrier because Japanese carriers were post-treaty builds). Japan lost all carrier battles after Coral Sea, including losing basically its entire carrier force at Midway.

>IJN invented massing carriers
Wrong. USN experimented with massing carriers in the 30s and decided to mass air power while still benefiting from dispersing (much like US artillery doctrine).

bump

When japs pretended the katana was superior to any other sword

>British carriers were better designed for the Mediterranean.
Wut? What the hell does this even mean? And how the fuck could armoring the flight deck and consequently limiting the number of planes you can carry be considered a good idea?

Operating in the med means closer distances to hostile land bases and more likely to come under hostile air attack. The armored deck was thought of as a better defense than a big fighter contingent because it was believed no amount of naval aviation could challenge land-based airpower.

That kind of thinking made a bit of sense, since the amount of carriers Britain could build was limited, so you can't mass 12+ carriers like the USN did and throw the better part of 1000 planes at a land base and overwhelm it. The Royal Navy also had plenty of mediterranean bases which would have provided the fighter cover in place of the carriers.

Which was a generalized design decision and had nothing to do with operating in the Med, which by the way, the British carrier air arm operated outside of extensively. And despite thinking that the armored flight deck was better protections than a bigger CAP, they were wrong.

>operating in the Med, which by the way, the British carrier air arm operated outside of extensively
Your broken English makes it hard to figure out what you are trying to say, but in case you are trying to say that the RN carriers did not often operate in the Med, you are really really wrong.

>And despite thinking that the armored flight deck was better protections than a bigger CAP, they were wrong.
Did you know that the late-model Essex carriers had armored decks? Turns out it's actually a good thing to have protection against bombs.

>3rd rate
The misuse of this figure of speech bothers me

I think the allure is less complete technological superority and more "a moderately sized asian country modernized and built up a navy that rivaled the navy of the largest industrial power in the world"

>Your broken English makes it hard to figure out what you are trying to say, but in case you are trying to say that the RN carriers did not often operate in the Med, you are really really wrong.
There is nothing broken about my English. The Royal Navy was not particularly designed to fight in the Med, it had responsibilities all over the world. They operated extensively in the Atlantic and Pacific, often very far away from support from land based air or reasonable expectation of enemy land based air. To assert that they were designed primarily for Mediterranean combat is baseless and quite honestly retarded.

9F was the basis for the Essex, not 9G. You're thinking of the Midway class carriers, which were almost twice as big as the Essexes and featured so many design changes that direct comparisons between the two are difficult.

I thought the Brits designed mainly light Carriers and escort Carriers because they mainly cared for spotting wolf packs or DDs.

They didn't really need it for the Mediterranean because Malta exists (planes from Malta is what destroyed the Italian fleet). They needed it for the Atlantic and not really for fleet actions, hence why the German BCs and BBs were very effective against British CVLs.

There's so much wrong with this post we have to deconstruct it piece by piece.

>I thought
No.
>the Brits designed mainly light Carriers and escort Carriers because they mainly cared for spotting wolf packs or DDs
British carriers weren't exactly "light" for the most part and were used in all roles a carrier is good for. Perhaps you're thinking of their older battlecruiser conversions, could technically be classified as light but they weren't purpose-built.
>They didn't really need it for the Mediterranean
Yeah, those convoys to Malta didn't need any air cover at all to make it safely to the island.
>because Malta exists
Malta was resupplied with planes by carriers throughout the campaign.
>(planes from Malta is what destroyed the Italian fleet)
It was a strike from British carriers that crippled the Italian fleet at Taranto, most of Malta's offensive actions by aircraft against ships were interdicting convoys to North Africa.
>They needed it for the Atlantic and not really for fleet actions
British carriers were mostly used in the Atlantic for fleet actions such as the Norway campaign and hunting the Bismarck, it wasn't until (American-built) escort carriers came along in great numbers that convoy duty and hunting submarines became their priorities
>hence why the German BCs and BBs were very effective against British CVLs
The only time German surface ships encountered a Brit carrier was HMS Glorious during the Norway campaign, a converted battlecruiser. She was sunk by gunfire despite the best efforts by her escorts, but I challenge you to name any WW2 carrier that would've survived the encounter.

Oh yeah OP is a strawmanning faggot, nobody other than an oversimplifying brainlet makes those claims.

>They operated extensively in the Atlantic and Pacific, often very far away from support from land based air or reasonable expectation of enemy land based air.
They operated for the most parts in the Mediterranean. Obviously until 1943 when the Med was clear of enemies. It was clear that the Med was the focus of UK carrier arm.
Look it up, instead of trying to guess what happened in the past.

>British carriers were mostly used in the Atlantic for fleet actions such as the Norway campaign and hunting the Bismarck
British carriers were mostly used in the Mediterranean. Seriously look the fuck up.

I was not implying they were used mostly in the Atlantic, I was stating that their use in the Atlantic was mostly in fleet actions.

Okay, but they did in fact use anime girls for their boats

>it's another "muh USN stronk" thread
Into the trash it goes

>but I challenge you to name any WW2 carrier that would've survived the encounter.
Ise
:^)

>Ise
>carrier
I know you're memeing, but come on.

Well played, though it's still two German battleships versus half a Japanese battleship.

8x14" vs 18x11" isn't too bad.
Really depends on if the Japanese captain is as retarded as Hughes though.

I don't believe the Scharnhorst-class had guns that were capable of doing much to the armor of an Ise-class though. 11-inch guns are good for raiding convoys, not for piercing the armor of a superdreadnaught.

Essex-class carriers had armored flight decks and that didn't seem to impede them very much. For treaty carriers, which were limited to 27,000 tons or less (standard displacement) then omitting the armor to save weight probably makes sense. But for post-treaty carriers, armor was considered essential for improving survivability in battle, at least until guided-missiles became a thing and armor was rendered useless.

The Lexington and Shoukaku class carriers could go 34 and 34.5 knots receptively. Both can outrun the scharhorst, while the converted Glorious was too slow.

Wrong. Let's take a look at the early war service history (Somewhat arbitrarily defined as until the end of 1942) of the CVs that the British started the war with.

>Ark Royal: In the Atlantic until the Norweigan debacle, sent to Gibraltar in June of 1940, stayed there until September, stayed in the Med until early December went to the Azores in December, went back in late December, stayed in the Med until February 1941, when was recalled to the Atlantic to try to hunt down the Scharnhorst and Gnisenau, went back to the Med in April, was recalled back to the Atlantic in May to hunt for the Bismarck, went back at the very end of the month where it stayed until it was sunk in November.
Atlantic: 13 months
Mediterranean 15 months.

>Courageous: On anti-submarine duty in the Atlantic, sunk on the 17th of September
Atlantic: Half a month
Mediterranean: 0.

>Furious: Assigned to home fleet, participated in Norweigan campaign, made strikes at occupied Tromso in September and October of 1940, ferried planes to the Gold Coast in November, chased the Admiral Hipper in the Atlantic for a bit before resuming ferry duties to the Gold Coast in march of 1941, went to Gibraltar but not in the Med proper towards the end of April (handed planes off to the Ark Royal) then sailed up to Belfast, returning with some more planes to actually go into the Med proper for the first time in mid-May. Went back to the Atlantic after that to bomb more German controlled ports in Norway, where she stayed until the end of July, where she went to Gibraltar, but not into the Med proper to hand off planes again. Then she went to Philadelphia for a major refit, which was not completed until April 1942. (Not counting this period at all) Then 3 months of atlantic training, returning to the the Med from August 41 to the end of the year.

Atlantic: 24 months.
Mediterranean 8 months.
1/?

>Glorious: Started War in Mediterranean, but was moved to the Indian Ocean in October to hunt for the Graf Spee, where she stayed until December. Assigned to the Med until the beginning of April, where she was transferred to the Home Fleet. Sunk during Norweigan campaign on June 8th.
Atlantic: 2 months
Mediterranean: 5 months
Indian Ocean: 3 months.

>Eagle: Started the war patrolling the Indian Ocean, where she stayed until the 26th of May, then being assigned to the Med. Stayed in the Med until April 13th, 1941, and then went to Mombassa (Kenya), arriving there by April 26th. Went around South Africa to Sierra Leone, reaching Freetown on May 25th. Went searching for German raiders until October, where she returned to Britain, arriving on the first of November and being refitted until early January 1942. Worked up for the next month or so, and went to Gibraltar, arriving on February 23rd. She stayed in the Med until her sinking on August 11th.

Atlantic 6 months.
Mediterranean 16.5 months
Indian Ocean. 10 months

2/4?

>Argus: Not being counted by me since she was more of an air transport than a "real" carrier. Still, if you do wish to count her: Started the war in the gulf of lion, where she stayed until mid June of 1940. Then went to ferry planes to Reykjavik. Went back to the Med for Operation Hurry, stayed there until August. Returned to the UK to bring planes to the Gold Coast on September 5th, and then returned to the UK in late October. Left Liverpool on 11th of November, where she went to Gibraltar but not the Med proper. Ferried stuff between the UK and Gibraltar until the end of May (41). She was then refitted until late August. August to September was ferrying planes to Murmansk, then back to Gibraltar in late September, returning to the UK on October 20th, went back to Gibraltar by November 8th, went back into the Med for real to participate in Perpetual, recalled to the UK in January of 42, returned to Gibraltar on Februrary 24th, then provided naval air cover for med operations until June; when she returns to the UK again to pick up more stuff. Returned to the med proper in November 1942, and stayed there until the end of the year.

Atlantic 22.5 months
Med 17 months.

3/4

>Hermes: Started war on anti-submarine duties in the Western Approaches, then was transferred to Dakar to hunt German raiders in the south Atlantic by the end of October. Stayed there until the end of the year. Spent most of January in refit, then returned to Dakar to resume patrolling for commerce raiders. Stayed there until the end of May. Continued operations in the region until the collapse of the French government, attempted to attack the Richelieu, but failed to sink it. Went back to Freetown after that, and joined a convoy heading to south Africa, where she reached it on August 17th. Was in repair until the beginning of November, and then arrived in Freetown by the beginning of December. Was chasing more commerce raiders until early March, where she was transferred to the Indian to hunt commerce raiders there. Stayed in Indian Ocean on patrol until November 19th, where she was refitted that would last until the end of January (42), Stayed in Indian Ocean until was sunk by the Japanese on April 9th.

Atlantic: 16.5 months
Med: 0
Indian Ocean:10.5 months

By my count, that leaves us with totals of 62 carrier months of Atlantic service (84.5 if you count the Argus), 44.5 (61.5 if Argus) carrier months of Med service, and 23.5 carrier months of Indian Ocean service. You are wrong.

Yes
I remember there was a /k/ thread where user posted a magazine from the Showa Era showing the IJN ships as girls

The USN used the same technology for the Iowa as did the Regia Marina and Kreigsmarine, it was ubiquitous for the era