Why? What did the Germans have to gain? The Soviets saw the build up and built defenses for months. The Germans knew the Soviets knew. What was the German end game here?
Even if they were successful what would that success even mean? Was a quick and clean victory possible under htese conditions? Seems like it was going to be massive casualties on both sides. The attack also went against the German military doctrine? Why attack in 1943? The situation had stalemated and diplomats via Sweden had found Stalin was considering peace with territorial concessions in exchange for economic aid.
I'm just baffled. Anyone have any documents or insight here on the German end game with this plan?
Ethan Ward
>stalin wanted peace in an exchange of territory for economic support this sounds interesting, where did you read about it?
Zachary Butler
>What did the Germans have to gain? Destruction of a significant portion of the Red Army.
>What was the German end game here? Pocket and wipe out those 8 armies, at which point the balance of force shifts back in your favor and you can plan further offensives.
>Even if they were successful what would that success even mean? In all likelihood, a "successful" Citadel would still not lead to a pocketing and erasure of roughly 1/5th of the Red Army. More likely is they'd batter their way in, give better than they get, but move too slowly to pinch off the salient before a withdrawal, or at too great a cost to be able to close the pocket before a relieving counteroffensive.
>The attack also went against the German military doctrine? I'm curious as to how you think this is the case. Operational plans against Poland in 39, France in 40, Barbarossa in 41 were all targeting concentrations of troops first and foremost, under the assumption that elimination of the enemy army leaves you in a position to take whatever objectives on the ground you want. Blau was the only real deviation from this general framework, and even that contained large portions of planning to elimination of the Bryansk, Southwestern, and Southern fronts.
>The situation had stalemated and diplomats via Sweden had found Stalin was considering peace with territorial concessions in exchange for economic aid. The evidence for this is extraordinarily weak. It is literally the memoirs of some Swedish embassy personnel who remember someone said something to them to this effect. This is also in direct contradiction to things like the Arcadia Conference back in 1942 where you did have a commitment to unconditional surrender or nothing.
Brayden Howard
Toland or Shirer, can't remember.
Essentially Ribbentrop set it up via proxy in Sweden, Hitler didn't trust it initially but agreed to think about it, and ultimately the whole thing fell through after Kursk, both because Stalin had an open door into western europe and Hitler refused to negotiate from a point of weakness.
Landon Martin
>The attack also went against the German military doctrine?
In these operatinos you list you have pazers moving fast and deep through enemy lines yet citadel proposes smashing into a well defended area.
The typical german strategy should have called for a feigned retreat to thin out the red army and create space for the fast moving tanks to punch in deep rather then two hammer blows at strongly defeneded areas.
I'm just confused why bother with this strategy when, unless im mistaken, the germans considered themselves at a man power defecit in 1943.
Cooper Robinson
>In these operatinos you list you have pazers moving fast and deep through enemy lines yet citadel proposes smashing into a well defended area. In both cases the doctrine was for more mobile elements (which, by the way, are not just panzers) to exploit weaknesses after infantry and artillery make breaches in enemy lines. That the enemy lines here are thicker does not change the doctrine or the focus. Soviet troop concentrations at the Kursk Salient, just under 2 million men with a perimeter of a bit over 350 kilometers, are no heavier than French concentrations during Fall Gelb's thrust at Sedan. Was that "against German doctrine"?
>The typical german strategy should have called for a feigned retreat to thin out the red army and create space for the fast moving tanks to punch in deep rather then two hammer blows at strongly defeneded areas. Please show me a single instance of Germany opening an offensive with a feigned retreat.
>I'm just confused why bother with this strategy when, unless im mistaken, the germans considered themselves at a man power defecit in 1943. The evidence strongly suggests that you're grossly uninformed about German operations and doctrine in World War 2.
Jose Collins
Well, in case yellow you have a huge chunk of the french forces advancing into belgium while the main force conentrated something like 4:1 at sedan.
So I do think your example mirrors my suggestion of what typical German strategy would have been.
Brody Morales
>Well, in case yellow you have a huge chunk of the french forces advancing into belgium And the Gemrans advanced right at them, they were not retreating, or feigning such.
>while the main force conentrated something like 4:1 at sedan. And the Germans achieved local favorable concentrations at the points they 3:1 is closer. Incidentally, the Germans achieved localized superiorities where they thrust at the two points of contact at Kursk. The differences lay in Soviet ability to move reserves to the points of attack, and to react quickly. The German plans were largely the same.
>So I do think your example mirrors my suggestion of what typical German strategy would have been. Attack at a point with local superiority (different from overall frontwide superiority, if that even exists), break through, and encircle to destroy a large part of the enemy army? Yes, that's why they attacked at Kursk.
Justin Rogers
the fake retreat isn't the essential part. the idea is to create opportunity for the panzers to work to their strength of moving fast and deep.
In yellow French assumed the attack would follow the schlieffen plan and advanced forward, all part of the german plan.
Instead of doing this in citadel they opted to just manfight it out. It seems better to feign retreat, spread out the reds, then punch through unfortified thin lines, like was done in yellow.
Luis Allen
When did the Germans feign retreat in Fall Gelb?
Levi Rogers
>the idea is to create opportunity for the panzers to work to their strength of moving fast and deep. And you do that by breaking the enemy line somewhere. The Germans were not able to do this in Catadel, but they were in Yellow. In either case though, you have to crack the enemy formation open before you can use their mobility.
>Instead of doing this in citadel they opted to just manfight it out. But that's wrong you retard. It's that they were unable to achieve the breakthrough that would led to the exploitation.
>It seems better to feign retreat, spread out the reds, then punch through unfortified thin lines, like was done in yellow. What seems better to you and what is a good idea diverge widely. What if, just what IF the Soviets aren't staggeringly stupid and don't do the one and only thing that makes your "feigned retreat" worth anything at all? What if they advance slowly and methodically and simply occupy your now abandoned positions? What if they use their air power to disrupt your "feigned retreat", and leave whole divisions or even armies badly disrupted and ripe for mauling? What if they decide their best place to attack is in a completely different sector?
James Miller
It was a "limited offensive of purely operational importance"; Germany had no longer had the means to carry out a strategic-level offensive such as Barbarossa or Blue. It had two aims: stabilizing the front by slicing off the salient, therefore giving Germany breathing room to focus more on a potential invasion by the Western Allies, and to deal a preemptive blow to the Soviet forces before they began their summer offensive, or "attacking the avalanche before it falls". Withdrawal from the area was seen as out of the question since it would leave Eastern Ukraine open to conquest, which contained important resources like the Stalino coalfields, the Zaporozhye hydroelectric plant, and the manganese deposits around Nikopol. Hitler said that losing the ore output alone would mean the end of the war. As for a victory at Kursk, it wouldn't really matter much. Such a relatively small-scale offensive would have little effect on the outcome of the war and would be rendered irrelevant by the fact that Germany was now fighting on two fronts.
Noah Campbell
>Why? Germany's only asset was that they knew how to attack damn well. This was going to be the most horrific assault any of those men would know--everyone accepted that going in, even Hitler felt ill thinking about it--but it was something that played to their strengths. A static grind was something they associated losing WW1 with, and were terrified that the Soviets were just better at that sort of thing. So: >they had to force a mobile battle >they had to make it as efficient as possible for themselves--it had to trigger massive Soviet losses to make Stalin even blink >at the same time, Germany struggled with logistics so it couldn't be too wide-ranging or everyone would just laugh as they ran out of gas halfway to nowhere >there was exactly one place with enough slavs per square mile for a mobile battle that could be small in distance but large in kills I wonder where that place was?
Asher Davis
except there is no 4 rings of defense line in depth in Sedan
Julian James
the Germans could've retreated behind the Dnieper and set up very favorable defenses against the soviets i think they are much better in doing counteroffensive by this stage in the war
Nathaniel Gonzalez
>Germany's only asset was that they knew how to attack damn well
Citation fucking needed
Ryder Sanders
Which is why the breakthrough succeeded in Sedan but failed at Kursk. That doesn't change the idea of what German doctrine or what their plans were. Mobility isn't some magical concept where you just decide HEY LETS FIGHT A MOBILE WAR AND NOT A STATIC ONE. Ability to employ mobility needs to be created, it won't happen on its own.
Cooper Thompson
>Why? Epic tank battle. Just for the sake of history it was worth the price.
Brody Collins
>The evidence strongly suggests that you're grossly uninformed about German operations and doctrine in World War 2.
The fuck are you on about? After Stalingrad Krauts were practically out of men on the Eastern Front, and were completely OUT of fucking reserves. Krauts had to start new conscription in early 1943 just to not run out of cannon fooder.
And Yes, Kursk was fucking retarded on the part of Krauts. They were now fighting a lost war, out of Oil, and manpower. Their failure clearly shows that Krauts are only good at attaking an unexpected oponnent, but when attacking a heavily defended area they are failing hard.
>Pocket and wipe out those 8 armies, at which point the balance of force shifts back in your favor and you can plan further offensives.
Uhmm... what fucking offensives? Krauts could not mount ANY kind of offensive, after failure of Fall Balu. They were already out of Oil, you dumb fuck.
Fucking weheraboos.
Jason Watson
>The Soviets saw the build up and built defenses for months.
The Soviets only knew the Kursk Offensive was coming because the British informed them what was on the way after deciphering German communications.
Sure, a large salient like that is an expected target but the Soviets didn't know if it would be actually be attacked or if it was going to be a feint with the real attack coming elsewhere.
With the knowledge from the British, (via the Poles breaking the German code) the Soviet could afford to bet it all on Kursk.
Jaxon Hill
You realize his plan is just the one Manstein proposed? Your basically calling Mannstein a retard?
Robert Carter
No, I'm not. Can you read?
Juan Russell
Purely from what you've written, I'd guess the Germans didn't trust Stalin's will to peace, or else they may have tried to pressure him into a better deal.
