How could the soviets in ww2 keep bouncing back after suffering so many casualties whilst one loss in Stalingrad and...

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why's there a BLACK soldaten

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The Soviet Union had a lot of people even with its most populous territories occupied, it's not very hard to understand.

Germany had half the population USSR had, and if we add the germand allies, then population ratio turns around (Axis except Japan had more then double USSR population.) If we even add the occupied territories (western USSR, France, yugu, Poland, Bohemia-Moravia, scandinavia...), then the proportion is even larger.

Don't forget Kursk, that's what really killed the Germans.

Because the initiative went over to Soviets. Furthermore, keep in mind Germans lost a lot of experienced manpower, while Soviets got better and better at fighting. They could replace the numbers and equipment but not the experience.

This. It's a conflict of momentum.

Stain was simply more manly than Hitler and Stalin's leadership put steal and backbone into the Soviet warrior. Also Stalin didn't poop his pants.

Romania, Hungary, Finland, etc. had small populations and the occupied territories didn't bolster German manpower that much besides some Waffen SS units.

Italy had over 50 million people. ROmania 20 million. Hungary over 10 million. Bulgaria 10 million....

>and the occupied territories didn't bolster German manpower that much
t.Historical illiterate. Non-german units made up a very large percentage of the initial Barbarossa invasion force. Romania lost more men in the war then Italy.

Soviets had a weaker industrial output than the UK.

Germany and Allies had much more.

Soviets were already pushing back by then. But Kursk meant the Wehrmacht were basically neutered.

The truth is, the Red Army's victory is on account of the defeat at Moscow and the desperate defence in 1941. After that, Germany was simply stretched too thin to really beat the Soveits.

Germany alone had close to 90 million when you factor in annexed territories. Then consider how much of their population the Soviet Union lost in the initial rush and occupation of the entire ukraine and belarus.

>entire army killed or captured
>"germans didn't lose"
retard spotted

because the americans and british kept shipping them supplies which made sure they never ran out

Italy had 43 million, Romania 16 million, Hungary 9 million, and Bulgaria 7 million.
>t.Historical illiterate. Non-german units made up a very large percentage of the initial Barbarossa invasion force. Romania lost more men in the war then Italy.
I said occupied territories, not allies you absolute retard. Even then, 17% of the total Axis forces made up of allies at the start of Barbarossa is in no way a "very large percentage". Their largest proportion in 1942 was still only 28%.
Ok, and? We're talking about German manpower available for use by the German army, not some dirt farmers in occupied Poland. The Soviet Union at their worst point in 1942 still had 130 million people, and that number increased as more territory was liberated.

They had backing from the western countries, obviusly.

Someone redpill me on the casualty lists you see on Wikipedia and elsewhere. Are they reliable? If so, how did the Soviet Union manage to absorb such losses (especially of equipment) and keep fighting? Manpower wise they were at a disadvantage vis a vis the European axis, and in terms of tank production they only outproduced them about 2:1 (How? Germany alone had a much higher GDP, plus it also controlled all the good bits of Europe...), but, say, the Wikipedia entry for Kursk has them losing ten times as many tanks as the Germans.

What's going on? Do we use different methodologies for Axis vs Soviet losses? Did the Soviets do better on fronts which do not have flashy battles everyone remembers, which evened out the odds? Citations would be welcome.

USSR had 168 million in 1937, Germany had only 68 million. so thats more than 2x for USSR

>Soviets had a weaker industrial output than the UK.
The UK also singlehandedly outproduced Germany, so I don't see how that's even relevant.

The first major defeat of German forces happened long before Stalingrad, in the battle of Moscow in the very beginning of 1942 and that major Soviet victory ruined the whole Barbarossa plan.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow

Then already named Stalingrad and Kursk happened after which Wehrmacht and the whole Reich were actually doomed.

t. Russian with 4 grandfathers (not naming other relatives) who fought in the war (2 of them were killed).

>(How? Germany alone had a much higher GDP, plus it also controlled all the good bits of Europe...)
Because German production methodology was ridiculously inefficient.
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e039/7d742101be41fed2589e0dff628b6af63d61.pdf
Germany only really excelled in raw resource production. When it came to actually processing that stuff into war materiel, they sucked. Badly.

The superior soviet planned economy utilized all of their resources in a utilitarian way. They didn't waste anything on aesthetics unlike the leather clad BDSM obsessed Nazis. A great example is the t34 tank armor, which was slanted, utilizing less steel to provide greater protection than the Nazis who had aesthetically pleasing right angled armored tanks with less foot for foot protection despite using more steel and precious metals. The soviets had more submachine guns per soldier, more sniper rifles, and more planes.

The trucks sent via lend lease also helped somewhat in that they were less reliant on horses unlike the Wehrmacht.

That part about machinery production also seems important - the Soviets had a laser focus on producing armaments for land warfare in vertically integrated factories, while the Germans diverted large amounts of resources to capital goods pre-Speer and the needs of other theaters like anti-air defenses and naval vessels.

>implying that made them lose the war

>while the Germans diverted large amounts of resources to capital goods pre-Speer
This is really not borne out by the available evidence. Speer claims it, but German military appropriations as fractions of the overall budget were higher than their equivalents in the budgets of any allied nation.

warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/ww2overview1998.pdf (Page 34 of the PDF)

> and the needs of other theaters like anti-air defenses
This is also unpersuasive. Same link, pages 30-31. Soviet overall gun (artillery of all classes) production is roughly 1.5 times that of Germany's.

>and naval vessels.
This one is true, but Germany's naval program was the red-headed stepchild of its military procurement. They were a tiny fraction of the overall budget, steel ration, and labor allocation. Somehow, I doubt that converting it to things like tanks or planes would have helped enough to offset the major advantages the Soviets have in most other categories.

>This is really not borne out by the available evidence. Speer claims it, but German military appropriations as fractions of the overall budget were higher than their equivalents in the budgets of any allied nation.
Germany did indeed have a high level of investment into capital pre-1942, see pic related. Investment into machinery increased by a billion RM from 1938-42, but after that it was cut in half; Hitler wanted the iron to be diverted to armaments. I think you're confusing me to be a proponent of the "peace economy in wartime" view, which I'm not in all, in fact I argue the opposite; that armaments production was relatively low in 1939-42 because of focus on investment, and the "armaments miracle" was largely a result of said investments maturing.
>Soviet overall gun (artillery of all classes) production is roughly 1.5 times that of Germany's
Well sure, but we're looking at anti-aircraft specifically and it tied up a lot of men and resources in a largely wasteful endeavor. Enemy aircraft were largely shot down by German fighters, not AA, until the summer of 1944. To quote Germany and the Second World War, volume V/II, p. 634:
>There was a heavy price to pay for the employment of the anti-aircraft personnel. Over a million men were tied up in it. For every 16,000 shells fired only one aircraft was brought down. In 1941 manufacture of AA ammunition was twice that of field artillery ammunition for the army. Despite all the switches of priories during the Speer era, anti-aircraft artillery still accounted for some 18% of all ammunition produced in the final year of the war.
>They were a tiny fraction of the overall budget, steel ration, and labor allocation
Depends on the year. In the middle of 1942 warships represented 12.1% of the total value of armaments output, the third largest area behind aircraft and ammunition. By mid 1944 it had dropped to fifth place at a mere 5.6%, likely another reason why Heer armament production was able to increase.

>1937
Yeah before the Anchluss and the annexation of Czech lands.

>I think you're confusing me to be a proponent of the "peace economy in wartime" view,
I was, Mea Culpa.

>Well sure, but we're looking at anti-aircraft specifically and it tied up a lot of men and resources in a largely wasteful endeavor.
I don't have a breakdown on how many Soviet guns were flak as opposed to field or anti-tank, but ultimately, production of artillery from the factory perspective isn't that different. And I'm quite certain that the Soviets built a lot of anti-air guns themselves. Even if you take every single Reich Defense AA gun, magically convert it to a field or anti-tank gun for free, and throw them at the Eastern Front, the Soviets still outbuild them on artillery.

>Enemy aircraft were largely shot down by German fighters, not AA, until the summer of 1944. To quote Germany and the Second World War, volume V/II, p. 634:
Flak's purpose is not solely measured in the number of aircraft downed. Flak presence also forces bombers to bomb at higher altitudes on faster passes, and enormously lowers the amount of damage caused by raids even when it does not succeed in downing planes.

>Depends on the year. In the middle of 1942 warships represented 12.1% of the total value of armaments output, the third largest area behind aircraft and ammunition. By mid 1944 it had dropped to fifth place at a mere 5.6%, likely another reason why Heer armament production was able to increase.
Where are you getting those numbers? I'm looking at table A-6 from Wages of Destruction, and he's giving a closer to 11.6% value, but I'm not entirely certain what sources he's drawing on himself to generate that. In any case, my previous point still stands. Soviet production on almost every land armament end-unit was more than 12.1% over that of Germany's. Redirecting resources from naval procurement would not be enough to bridge the gap.

Germans also produced a fuckton of ammunition. Hitler was obsessed with ammo.

How old are you if your grandads fought in ww2?

More importantly, how does he have four of them.

>Are they reliable?
They are somewhat reliable, but not really useful to compare German and Soviet performance.
Soviets had a different system of counting casualties in men and equipment. They were a lot more ''sensitive'' about it than Germans, so if a tank ditched a track, it was a ''loss'', because it's not operationally useful.
Similarly, if a tank had production faults, it was a ''loss'', and then it was repaired and counted as a new tank. If it gets wrecked in fighting and gets repaired again, it's also a new tank.
You had several thousand ''ghost'' T-34s like this.
They were also stricter when it came to personnel loses, lightly wounded men who were quickly returned to service, or men who were ill, were also counted as ''casualties''. Germans did it differently.
Another problem is the area in which casualties are counted. Some of these battles, especially when it comes to German offensives, you have Germans counting casualties just for the opening area of the operation, and then for Soviet side casualties are counted on a much wider area of Soviet counter-offensive.
Soviet casualties were huge of course, but nothing lopsided like the battles would have you think.
In combat across the whole conflict (that is, excluding POWs and civilians who were killed or died), Soviets had 30% more dead.

Furthermore, a lot of these battles early on resulted in the encirclement of Soviet force. This obviously led to higher casualties.
So in reality it had nothing to do with disregard for human life or notorious ''human waves''.
There were moments when Soviet troops were sent without much munition, equipment, training and so on, especially early in the war, but that wasn't the rule, and they were fighting for survival for fucks sake.

You think the Soviets didn't produce a fuckton of ammunition? warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/ehr88postprint.pdf (page 2). Every year except 1944 they were at war with Germany, they produced more ammo than the Germans did. The overall ratio, however, was admittedly less than on most other things, only about 10/9.

Not him, but I'm 30, and I had a grandfather in WW2 and my other grandfather was a bit too young but wound up in Korea.

This however, is a much better question, one that I would be interested in as well.

Why are gay furfags a thing? Would they not be next in line after the jews had their austistic krautnigger regime won?

GrandGrandfathers, sorry. Too stupid for Inglisch

Based Italy

Hitler loved his precious dog more than his sexy piece of ass Eva Braun, is it any surprise Germans are furries??

High national spirit and deep battle was meant to have a lot of casualities in exchange of the total anihilation of armies.There is a reason why most German soldiers died on the eastern front

More like Bosnia and Montenegro.

>I don't have a breakdown on how many Soviet guns were flak as opposed to field or anti-tank,
I've been looking for a figure on this and I've only been able to find an unsourced figure on axishistory claiming that Soviet production of AA guns from 1941-45 was 36,438. I do know the production of German AA guns from January 1942 to November 1944 however, from DRZW V/II p. 637: 25,468 light AA guns and 13,975 heavy AA guns, for a total of 39,443 guns over the period. There were also 12,906 guns of all types produced from May 1940 to December 1941, and 70.7 million AA shells were produced from 1940 to 1944. I can't make a comprehensive comparison between Germany and the USSR in this area, but it's undoubtable that this was a significant resource sink.
>Flak's purpose is not solely measured in the number of aircraft downed. Flak presence also forces bombers to bomb at higher altitudes on faster passes, and enormously lowers the amount of damage caused by raids even when it does not succeed in downing planes.
That may be, but it's not really my opinion that matters here. It's that of German officials at the time, such as Walter Koehler, chariman of the Oberrhein armaments commission and minister-president of Baden, who said in a letter to Speer:
>"I have long held the view - one shared by many knowledgeable people - that flak, unless it is firing at tanks, has been the greatest investment mistake of this war. The great hopes placed in this weapon at the beginning of the war in no way have been fulfilled." The expenditure of men and material on it, he argued, was in a 'downright ridiculous ratio to its success'.
>Where are you getting those numbers?
From this table.

The Germans didn't have Lend Lease.

The Timing of the first major arrivals of lend lease during 1942 saved the Soviet Union from LOSING the protracted war of attrition, rather than winning
Lend Lease supplied 82.5% of Soviet wartime copper production, 96% of wartime aluminum production, along with 956,700 miles of field telephone cable, 2,100 miles of sea cable, 1,100 miles of underwater cable, 35,800 radio stations, 5,899 radio receivers, and 348 radars.

without lend-lease that entire region, and people would be a brief lesson in German childrens school books.

if left totally to their own devices, without a single solitary form of aid from the US or some outside interference like lend-lease, the soviet union and the core of boleshevism would have been extinguished like a small match in a hurricane.
and 1943 Ensured Soviet Victory. By 1943 Germany had "lost" the initiative it was stalemating for in 1942.
the deciding factor was this aide. It broke the stalemate, and nearly every post in this thread has proven that, whether my own, or others refutations. all of them show the dead being broken by 1943. Coincidentally the height of lend-lease aide to the soviet union (into 44)

The Sovs took 14.5M uniformed combat fatalities. They won with blood, it's that simple. Nobody but a ruthless Stalin could have prosecuted such a conflict as this. He murdered his own people.

World War II in general was an entire conflict between modes of production:
Socialism, Communism, and capitalism.
Capitalism and communism are symbiotic. Capitalist countries NEED communist countries (I.e. China etc..) to sacrifice their populations to production, and in turn are Consumed by capitalist nations at ever increasing rates.
this balance is maintained through economic usury, warfare and exploitative banking systems. The cold-war was largely a conflict designed to "break" American production (as it relates to this Capitalism/communism symbiosis) and return it back to the side of Communism. (which the coldwar largely did, as American production returned overseas during and after).
its is only now the US will try to start the cycle with communism again, and return production to a domestic capacity, which as we see, is fueling the seeds of war already with the "east" (Russia/china).

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>Italy
Truly the greatest ally

I'd quibble with the narrative about antiaircraft artillery being ineffective at knocking down Allied aircraft relative to those knocked down by fighter aircraft. German fighters scored many kills of stragglers damaged by flak who had fallen out of formation and were doomed.

Flak also severely degraded bombing accuracy and ferocity. There is a direct payoff to manufacturing production from that, particularly at critical targets.

>USSR won the war because the allie gave them some wires and trucks

Imagine being this stupid.

That's the conclusion Rolf-Dieter Müller reaches in DRZW V/II:
>Nevertheless, until the summer of 1944, the figures of aircraft downed by AA artillery lagged far behind those shot down by fighter aircraft. Not even the concentration of AA batteries to protect the most important armaments works, repeatedly urged by Speer, diminished the destructive strength of Allied bomber formations.
Your first assertion can't really be quantified, and as for your last one, Tooze shows convincingly that German armaments output was indeed heavily affected by Allied strategic bombing.

>USSR won the war because the allies gave them every single meaningful war materiel, and helped them deliver it thousands of miles to every front of war they were engaged in, at the most critical juncture conceivable.

ftfy

>Be me
>be Dutch
>Fuck.

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Why do you say trucks like that's not a very important thing?

The counts for bomber aircraft destroyed, flak vs. fighters, can't be judged by fighter claimed kills, would be my point. The fighters will undoubtedly claim every straggler as their handiwork, but we all know that's not the case. So you'd have to rebalance those numbers accordingly. This would be difficult to quantify as you mention, but not at all difficult to qualify as I'm sure you'd agree. And as the Nazis consistently deployed at least 2 separate fighter mass attacks on returning bomber raids, they knew the stragglers were easy pickings and were taking advantage. Those are the numbers that would have to be teased out of the data to provide a proper analysis.

The overall bombing offensive indeed affected German manufacturing(although not as much as a proper strategy would have wrought), but you can see for yourself the strike pattern at historical targets, as there are marked up photographs of such. Invariably there is a triangular pattern that is often short (often well short) of the target center, just as a massed antiaircraft barrage would tend to motivate.

Most of the aerial bombs dropped on Germany came after D-Day as we know, in a roughly 10 month period. The minority of them were dropped over the previous 5 years. You'd have to take this into consideration as well, in order to do a proper analysis.

Degeneracy comes in bunches. There's not a single gay person who is "just gay" and nothing else, he will also be a pedophile, or a scat-lover, or a bug chaser, or a furry, or a crossdresser or some other kind of disgusting faggot.

this is unironically true.

I'll concede that the value of AA wasn't so much in the outright destruction of aircraft, but the general of the flak arm as early as 1942 acknowledged that they were essentially at the limit of their technological and tactical capabilities. In July 1943, he claimed that "a real defense against enemy mass raids by the flak artillery is no longer feasible." Aircraft speeds and service ceilings were steadily rising, while flak muzzle velocities had hardly changed since 1918. Planes operating around 10,000 meters would be very hard to hit for most guns. Meanwhile the Allies were increasingly deploying countermeasures such as chaff that jammed German radar that flak depended on and were never fully resolved. When the British dropped aluminum strips over Hamburg for example, it took 50,000 heavy-caliber shells to down 3 bombers, but fighters who were also suffering from radar disruption destroyed three times more. I'm not saying that flak was a complete waste, but they were diverting huge amounts of resources and labor to an increasingly antiquated service. Attempts to modernize were centered around highly experimental rocketry, and we know how that went. Nearly a million men were involved directly in the flak arm of the Luftwaffe, but even in the last year of the war 800,000 were employed manufacturing flak armaments, and just over half of the copper quota in 1941/42 went to flak guns and ammunition. It's estimated that the amount of aluminum needed for flak munitions alone throughout the entire war would be enough to build around 40,000 fighters. It was Hitler who continued this obsession over flak, as others such as Milch, Göring, and Kehrl all advocated for less of a focus on AA.

Yea, how else are you gonna drive into Moscow like daddy Isorrow does?

it was a crippling blow to the German army.

But the thing is, the bombers have very little bombing effectiveness at 30,000 feet. Many Allied bombers couldn't even operate at that altitude, in fact. The flak disrupts bombing effectiveness in several different ways then. It drives the bombers to greater and greater altitudes, it causes them to veer off or drop their loads short of the target, it breaks up bomber formations and creates stragglers vulnerable to additional attack. All of this decreases the damage to German manufacturing, which is the whole point.

The Nazis ran out of pilots, not planes, so aircraft production is not a valid concern in this discussion. Further, training a gunner will be far less taxing to the war effort than training a combat pilot, so flak helps ease that personnel crunch as well. You get defense using the personnel and tools you have at your disposal, even if another might be useful as well.

Absent flak, it would have been like how it ended up in Japan. They eventually dropped bombing altitudes to 5,000 feet or so, removed all cabin pressure equipment and defensive armament to save weight and carry more bombs, and simply plastered the Japanese home islands because they had lost the ability to defend themselves any more. Nazi Germany never had to face that, because they hardened up and had a fearsome sting.

I might quibble with your reference to flak ammunition and guns, which were used for German antitank weapons as well, and not exclusively as AA defense. Plenty of high velocity equipment was used in ground combat as well, and I'm guessing you're including that in your numbers.

soviets had unlimited manpower

50% of trucks = 50% of logistics

At least they did something against the soviets

Excuse me. You're claiming that in combat on the Eastern Front, the Soviets averaged just 30% more dead than the Germans?
That's an absolutely outrageous claim and one that I've never, repeat never, heard elsewhere. Source please? Most everything I've even seen indicates that the the statistic is more like a 70% ratio.
Casualties were counted differently between the two armies for sure. But I think it's almost an established fact now that German units were destroying more man-power & equipment in almost every engagement than they themselves sustained, and certainly over the war overall the ratio on manpower KIA'd is higher than 1:1.3 as you indicated.

The answer is: it was a simple math equation. The OKH staff officers took out their calculators in August '41 and plugged away and realized they'd just missed the bus. The premise of Barbarossa was that victory could be attained by destroying the Red Army. While they came spectacularly close to doing so in June/July, they did not. So Hitler being Hitler decides to at least try to hold on to what they have and starve the Soviets into submission, settling for smaller scale offensives like Fall Blau - seizure of Caucasus and Stalingrad.
When they lost an entire German field army in one-stroke at Stalingrad, they briefly lost the strategic initiative. This see-sawed between the Germans + Soviets for a few months until it was finally established that the Soviets indeed firmly possessed the initiative. Hence Stalingrad is considered a "turning point" because it proceeded when the Germans lost the ability to impose their will. It wasn't the loss of the men of the 6th army itself or the battle itself necessarily that determined that - it was probably coming sooner or later anyway - Stalingrad just expedited that process.
Btw at this same time they lost a fuck-ton of troops down in Tunisia too and had to commit troops to the Italian front so lost strategic reserves. Many reasons doomed them.

Attached: IMG_4957.jpg (500x477, 70K)

Anglos showing their Germanic roots

The first major defeat of German forces actually has to the Rostov battle (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Rostov_(1941)). This was when the German juggernaut was still coming towards Moscow and well before it was stopped let alone turned back (i.e. the actual defeat). In the Battle of Rostov, the Soviets checked a German advance and then repelled them, recapturing a major & strategically critical city.
Guderian wrote later, "we should have known the writing was on the wall with Rostov"

Also like seriously wondering how old you are if you're grandparents not just fought but *died* in WW2. That means your parents were born!

A coalition, multi-ethnic army is almost never as efficient as a national army of the same number of men. There is "friction" that reduces the impact of each additional man added vis a vis an ally. So even if they can raise additional man-power, they're really only getting 70% of what they receive (because of that friction).
First, the Germans needed specialists/technical experts and their allies didn't provide a whole lot of that... Second they needed foot infantry, which they were provided with. Problem was this infantry turned out to be a huge liability that Hitler didn't recognize and it turned out they were probably better off just fighting the war on their own. Does anyone really think the Germans would have bunched up 20 divisions around Stalingrad if their flanks weren't protected by 2 (Rumanian) field armies on each side and Italians + Hungarians further anchoring the line? No of course not.
So not only was this supposed additional man-power really only usable for rote labour, but they were such a liability in the field that they actually eroded rather than enhanced Germany's striking power.
So in short: you can't just say that Germany had more manpower available to her than the Soviets because it's just not true. IF they parity among their national populations, then we both know that's a game changer and Germany wins.

Retard. The reason the Germans won so much 39-41 was their superior mobility (and still only 15% of their army was mechanized).
American cars mobilized the Russian army - got them moving, fast, faster than the Germans. The Russians simply would have been unable to get transform their army in the highly mobile, combined arms force that wrecked AGC in Bagration without American trucks. You're welcome, Ivan. I regret it every day.

>Retard. The reason the Germans won so much 39-41 was their superior mobility
Not, it wasnt you nigger, it was that their enemies were smaller, weaker and unprepared and could not resists Hunnic zerg rush.

If Germany had more manpower then it would've been their own armies which would've been poorly equipped and trained instead of Romanian armies. More manpower would not have magically made artillery tubes and trucks spring up.

>furries to Europa "we are growing stronger"

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>when most of your army is fighting partisan in the balkans and you don't have enought trucks to make them retreat to defend Italy
>save thousand of lives in the end
>got away with the most lenient peace treaty despite being as brutal as the German and the Japan
>got a shitload of money to help rebuild
Did the Italian lose the war but win at the peace treaty?
How did they even do it?

The eternal Italian knows exactly how to avoid the killing blows. You all complain about the Eternal Kraut and the Perfidious Albion, yet none of you have noticed the Master a Italy pulling the strings.

>The Germans won in 1940 because their enemies were weaker and not because of superior mobility

They certainly were not weaker. The French + BEF + Belgians were collectively "stronger." The French army was the most powerful in the world. You basically agreed with me yourself. Like you said they were "unprepared" and could not "resist Hunnic zerg rush." That's because the Germans's mechanized combined arms groups allowed them to exploit penetrations by 100s of kms in a day to encircle troops, wreak havoc in the French's rear and reach the Channel coast before the BEF + French could even withdraw from Belgian. The French didn't have the mobility to redeploy cohesive fighting units to parry the German armored spearheads that were already deep in France's strategic depth. Without the German's mobility, it takes many more weeks to reach the coast and in the meantime the French/BEF will have had time to withdraw from the trap, establish credible defensive lines, etc.

>pic related. this map not possible without the German's superior mobility

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Well let's take a look at your statement.
>If Germany had more manpower then it would've been their own armies which would've been poorly equipped and trained instead of Romanian armies. More manpower would not have magically made artillery tubes and trucks spring up.

First, more manpower *does* magically create more artillery tubes, tanks, etc. A huge problem in Germany was that their skilled laborers were being conscripted leaving serious manpower shortages in production facilities. So more manpower does translate to less stripping of Germany's workforce and a corresponding increase in production to equip German soldiers.
Second, German infantry (their most critical shortage imo) would have been perfectly well equipped because of the aforementioned production boom that results from doubling their manpower pool + # of specialists. The Rumanians were so poorly equipped because they had no military production capacity worth mentioning and the Germans quite rightly prioritized its own units in supply & reequip -- that the same consideration was not extended to the Rumanians is the "friction" inherent in coalition warfare. German infantry would have been better equipped (no friction, no withholding of gear, as Germans they are prioritized).
Third, even if they were just as poorly equipped as the Rumanians were (which is inconceivable) they still would have been a part of the German army - an institution whose discipline, tactics and command + control nodes were immeasurably better than any other German ally - and so I doubt these would have disintegrated with half a day of fighting on the Don and elsewhere like the Rumanians and Italians did.
Fourth, even if these "extra" German divisions were just as poorly equipped, trained and led as the Rumanians (all impossible) they *definitely* would not have switched sides in a back-room deal a year before the war was lost and turned their guns immediately onto their neighboring units.

Except German production was bottlenecked by raw materials, not manpower. So no, having more men wouldn't have magically made more weapons spring up.

> German infantry would have been better equipped (no friction, no withholding of gear, as Germans they are prioritized).
With what non-existent gear?

>Third, even if they were just as poorly equipped as the Rumanians were (which is inconceivable)
they still would have been a part of the German army - an institution whose discipline, tactics and command + control nodes were immeasurably better than any other German ally - and so I doubt these would have disintegrated with half a day of fighting on the Don and elsewhere like the Rumanians and Italians did.
So they last one full day instead of half a day, so what? Without heavy weapons they wouldn't have done shit.

The Soviet army was also multi ethnic, of course.

>Except German production was bottlenecked by raw materials, not manpower. So no, having more men wouldn't have magically made more weapons spring up.
Okay why don't you please enlighten me as to specifically what raw materials were bottlenecking production of rifles, light & heavy machine guns, bicycles, howitzers, mortars, anti-tank guns and motor vehicles?
The German economy was better endowed with natural resources than the allies until late 1943. One of the oft-mentioned "scarce resources" for the Germans was rubber - and yet in 1943 they had produced more rubber (188k tons) than the US did (185k). When Hitler signed the order "Ruestung 42" in early 1942 he significantly reallocated raw materials to the army at the expense of the Airforce and Navy. And yet 5k fighters were produced in 1942 and 10k in 1943. But here you are telling me that the Germans were *incapable* of producing the materials required to outfit a couple dozen infantry divisions?

>With what non-existent gear?
Again, there was no shortage of gear to fully equip infantry divisions. It was just wasn't a problem in 1942, except insofar as the Germans outpaced their supply lines. They produced double the # of rifles in '43 as the year before. Even in 1944 the German economy could produce for 240 infantry divisions and 40 armored.

> So they last one full day instead of half a day, so what? Without heavy weapons they wouldn't have done shit.
The Russians pounded and pounded much more exposed (no river barrier, flanked on 3 sides) German lines at Rzhev throughout 12/1941 - 8/1943 and never did German units melt away at the army level like the Rumanians did. They withdrew in good order. If you honestly believe that a German army holding the Don line would have lasted "one full day" only then you are off your rocker.

>The Soviet army was also multi ethnic, of course.
True. As were the Americans, Brits and French. But the Soviets did not fight as a coalition but as one nation under one command structure. I should have said multi-national coalition, as forces comprised of different commands from wholly independent governments, with differing war aims, and cultures are bound to produce the "friction" I was talking about and thus often results in war-making potential that is in reality less than the sum-total of the total man-power and industrial capabilities of the coalition's constituents.

no one forbade the Huns from creating unified command

>The German economy was better endowed with natural resources than the allies until late 1943
brainlet.jpg

Axis allies were under German command. I don't know where that guy's getting his info from but I would just ignore him.

I dont talk about Eastern Front where those units were regular expaditionary corps, but about stuff like Africa and Medditierean sea. Mussolini didnt knew shit about Barbarossa so he invaded Greece.

>expaditionary
>Medditierean

so... this is the power of protestant degeneracy...

It literally was though
They tripped over Stalingrad and gave the Soviets time to build a real army.