Are Kantian ethics just guised up consequentialism?

It isn't sportsmanlike to degrade your enemies like that. Although I do feel the same way about utilitarianism.

But it's true.

>deontology is not by a long shot "guised up consequentialism".

Kantian deontology is, though, because Kant is only concerned with what results from following the three criterion in his categorical imperative; lying is always wrong regardless of intent. That is consequential

>Taking anything other than the first critique and Prolegomena seriously.

Kant literally said that his morality was based on the fact that we cannot prove or disprove the existence of God, so you better act morally just in case.

Being purposfully delusional is a waste of time. The First Critique is a masterwork that destroyed all the spooks before it. Then Kant proceeds to build those same spooks back up.

He literally believed they were unfounded in any sort of reality and decided that you should live morally just in case. It's a fancy Pascal's Wager.

Categorical imperative is a priori. Consequence implies experience.

I haven't read what he says on ethics but building on what I know of his critique:
>Our understanding of what qualifies as "true" is grounded a priori.
>Morality is grounded a priori.
>We can't prove that what we know a priori is "true".
>But we still know it anyways.

literally no. Maybe some similarities to rule consequentialism, but no kantian would ever admit it

A priori our cognitive function gives structure to reality, he admits that this is not reality in-itself. He may have believed morality is a priori, but obviously it is based on experience and environment, which is why different cultures have different moralities.

He says we can never prove god, the soul, or freewill exists. Thus we must have faith that these things exist so we can live a moral life.

The first critique is fantastic, and in large part I believe literally true. His second and third are him just trying to fit reality with his Christian upbringing.

Categorical imperative is a moral philosophy, which means it's dependent on the culture.
The first critique seems literally true universally for conscious beings.

Slightly off topic, but do you think Kant would discard his assumptions in the Groundwork if he could read and understand Darwin? Seems to me like his entire argument regarding a "good will" is based on bad science. See excerpt from the Groundwork below... "In the natural predispositions of an organized being, i.e., a being arranged purposively for life, we assume as a principle that no instrument is to be encountered in it for any end except that which is the most suitable to and appropriate for it. Now if, in a being that has reason and a will, its preservation,
its welfare—in a word, its happiness—were the real end of nature, then nature would have hit on a very bad arrangement in appointing reason
in this creature to accomplish the aim. For all the actions it has to execute toward this aim, and the entire rule of its conduct, would be prescribed to it
much more precisely through instinct, and that end could be obtained far more safely through it than could ever happen through reason........an implanted natural instinct would have guided us
much more certainly to this end, yet since reason nevertheless has been imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one that ought to have influence on the will, its true vocation must therefore be not to produce volition as a
means to some other aim, but rather to produce a will good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary, since everywhere else nature goes
to work purposively in distributing its predispositions. This will may therefore
not be the single and entire good, but it must be the highest good.

Now that I think about it, maybe the structure of the brain and cognitive function does give some sense of morality to the mind prior to conceiving it. This could explain why different cultures have different moralities, different subgroups of the human species have slightly different brain structures giving differences of morality which seem inherent to reality, but is really part of the form of the cognitive function.

However, this is somewhat disproven because someone taken from one culture at birth and raised in another culture would likely adopt the new cultures sense of morality over their birth culture.

In any case, the representation of reality that is expericed by us does seem to have a morality to it, but I believe this is largely fictional. Morality is a structure man imposes on reality where there is no inherent morality. This of course does not discount the social utility of morality, or saying morality is bad in itself, just that morality is similar to a promise. The promise doesn't exist in reality, but between concious individuals and it is in the self interest of each to keep it so they can be seen as trustworthy and reap the benefits of society.

He already admits you can't prove god and that morality is a choice. I would assume given better science he would still argue you should choose to believe in God so you can live a better life.

>His second and third are him just trying to fit reality with his Christian upbringing.
I absolutely agree with this one, but
>Categorical imperative is a moral philosophy, which means it's dependent on the culture.
Dude, you couldn't be more wrong.
The first formulation of the CI is universally true for every conscious being, too. He only get's in trouble as soon as he derives the "end in itself"-formulation which is based on a logical error.

So, he's about as right as all moral theorists who based their morality on reason.

I'm really trying to focus on this sentence i guess: "In the natural predispositions of an organized being, i.e., a being arranged purposively for life, we assume as a principle that no instrument is to be encountered in it for any end except that which is the most suitable to and appropriate for it."

As far as I know, this view—that organisms were perfectly designed for their natural purpose—was widely believe by the educated and uneducated alike at the time of Kant's writing, but was essentially disproven by Darwin's natural selection and quickly fell out of popular belief. Later in the first part of the groundwork, Kant essentially says, "this idea [above] is the very foundation of my deontological approach to morals and if it's wrong, everything else here is wrong." Nowadays, most would regard the quoted sentence as factually wrong... Anybody disagree, because I've always thought of this as a crippling issue and I never hear much talk about it??

Categorical imperative is a priori.
>He may have believed morality is a priori, but obviously it is based on experience and environment
No, it is not obvious. Something that is a priori is not based on experience by definition. We only derive the value of objects through experience. Morality is absolute.
>he admits that this is not reality in-itself
>thus we must have faith that these things exist so we can live a moral life
We can't help but believe what we know a priori. Being able to logically prove that it is true is quite another thing.
>Categorical imperative is a moral philosophy, which means it's dependent on the culture.
That is horrendous bullshit. Please, be kind enough to stop repeating it. Again something that is a priori cannot possibly be based on experience.

>which is based on a logical error.
The logical error being?

His first fomulation being act as if your action became a universal law is so meaningless.

It could mean, don't lie, becuase you don't want universal lying.
But if nazi's were at the door asking for a jew, you would be more moral to lie.
If nazis were at the door, but the jew in question was a child molestor, you could make the moral argument to turn them in.

If you make the case that each of these is a different circumstance, then evey case is a different circumstance and catagorical imperative becomes basically the same as any situational ethic.

It is not universally true, it is completly constructed.

I think he's wrong because he was founding his ethic on the belief in a God. If you are a religious minded person, you would likely see him as right.

Someone basing their morality on reason would be more correct given their reason was sound.

The issue here is faith I think, either you believe God created man (either through evolution or not), or you don't believe. Kant would have predicated his morality on God no matter the situation, I imagine, so wondering if he would change his mind is meaningless.

Consequentialism is just guised up egoism or mob rule

>I think he's wrong because he was founding his ethic on the belief in a God

The fact that you say this proves you haven't read anything he's written.

He literally says that you can't prove god and thus morality, so you should believe in god simply so you can live morally.

After this, he then proceeds to create a basis for morality in reason, but the impetus is the same.

The morality is still based ENTIRELY on reason you fucking moron.

Kant never says "God says you should do X, in the Old Testament, therefore it is morally right".

I know something, a priori is not based on experience, what I am saying is he belived the catagorical imperative was a priori, I am saying morality is not a priori.

You are not reading correctly, I am saying his basis for morality being the a priori catagorical imperative, is wrong.

A baby comes from the womb a priori experiencing time and space.
A baby does not come from the womb experiencing a priori morality, it is given to them by the culture and upbrining.

I have no reason to believe the catagorical imperative, however reasonable he may have attempted to make it, because it is based on a belief that morality is a thing at all.

He admits you would need to believe in god to believe in morality, I don't get how you dont get this.

>A baby does not come from the womb experiencing a priori morality, it is given to them by the culture and upbrining.
You are wrong.

Daily reminder that all moral claims are consequentalist.

>Creates a moral system entirely based on reason
>you have to believe in God though

Nope.

Some cultures belive canibalism is okay, some think it is abhorent. Why would somthing so fundamental be different if morality were a priori?

Incest is another point. We are repulsed sexually by pheramones that are too similar to us genetically. This is a biological basis which we then give a moral basis to after the fact.

Of course, I also invite you to stop believing in space and time.

He said it himself, you would have no reason to be moral if there were no god. I don't know how you aren't getting this.

An infant child will always experience time and space.
A child may act empathetically, but this is biological, an evolutionary trait, they are not moral until they are taught it culturally, this is why different cultures have different moralities.

>Why would somthing so fundamental be different if morality were a priori?
Because it is not that fundamental.
>This is a biological basis
So it is not based on culture or experience?

>they are not moral until they are taught it culturally
This is wrong.

>He said it himself, you would have no reason to be moral if there were no god.

Even if that were true, why do you think I would have to accept every single thing he says, just because I accept some of the things he says?

I'm not a sycophant.

>ethical
Morality is as real as god

My point being, I can't act against space and time. I can however act against morality. Morality is chosen or learned.

Saying since there is a biological response to incest so the catagorical imperative is accurate seems like a streach. Plus, biologically I don't like pain, doesn't mean pain is imorally.

You are being a syncophant for saying the catagorical imperative has any a priori basis. My choices being predicated on whether they should be a universal law is so obviously a construction after the fact.

Why do different cultures have different moralities if it is a priori?

>I can however act against morality.
If you don't like pain you can't logically convince yourself to like pain.
>Saying since there is a biological response to incest so the catagorical imperative is accurate seems like a streach.
Something that is universally true is a priori.
>biologically I don't like pain, doesn't mean pain is imoral
Because you didn't choose to feel pain.

Categorical imperative is by definition a priori. If you disagree with that stop using the them. Just have in mind that by doing that you make the claim that morality is not absolute.

Because you are mistaking values for morality.

t. someone who does not understand Kant's use of the word "maxims"

GUSSIED-UP. You meant to write GUSSIED-UP.

Kant states that the catagorical imperative is a priori and then goes on to define it with the formulations. He was mistaken to believe the catagorical imperative as defined by the formulations is a priori.

We don't know incest is repulsive until we experience the bad response to pheremones. We then impose morality on it.
Some people are not repulsed by incest, they seek it out. Does that mean morality is based not on reason but on human faculties, just like im saying.

Morality is relative, I don't know how you could think otherwise.

1. You are thinking of values. You don't even KNOW what morality is.
2. Categorical imperative IS a priori BY DEFINITION. You don't KNOW what categorical imperative is.

>We don't know incest is repulsive until we experience the bad response to pheremones[sic].
We can't cognize something unless we have experience of it. That doesn't make the way we perceive and conceptualize it less a priori. You don't even KNOW your basics.

>Does that mean morality is based not on reason but on human faculties
No, it means value is. But this value is absolute for each individual. Which is morality.
>Morality is relative
Value is.

...

Yes, this argument does sound kind of silly.
I think I sort of understand where the confusion stems from.
Instinctive behavior is automatic and preprogrammed. It lacks intent.
Intent only comes into being at the level of reason.
Thus reason perceives an instinctively induced emotional state as an end in itself regardless of its evolutionary significance.

Categorical imperative is shit:

1.) Act as if it will be universal law.
Nah, I act in my self interest every time. So will everyone else.

2.) Treat people as an end in themselves.
Don't have to. Will when I want to.

My morality is a priori true. Fuck no it ain't.

Can someone explain (by Kant's definition) the difference between Values and Morality?

>His first fomulation being act as if your action became a universal law is so meaningless.
It's empty - it's not meaningless. (Kant didn't realize himself it was empty btw.). It's purely formalistic; it's a test of possible content in a formal way.
Look at formal logic: if a conclussion is formally correct it doesn't say anything about it's (real) truth. If all green animals eat humans and all rabbits are animals and green, all rabbits eat humans. That's right, formally - but it's not true, because the content isn't true.
That's the big problem with Cunt: as great as his formalism is, it doesn't say anything about reality. Nevertheless, the empty formalism is useful, because you can use it to already falsify everything which is formally false.

>The logical error being?
That needed a pretty long answer, because the fault is pretty subtle.
Premises are:
1,
CI
2,
>der Mensch und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen existirt als Zweck an sich selbst, nicht bloß als Mittel zum beliebigen Gebrauche für diesen oder jenen Willen, sondern muß in allen seinen sowohl auf sich selbst, als auch auf andere vernünftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck betrachtet werden."
(paraphrased in short: man exists as an end in itself and has to be regarded as an end in every of his acts aimed at himself or every other rational being)

Conclusion is:
>Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.

From 1&2 clearly follows one part of this, namely:
>Act in such a way that you treat [...] your own person never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.

What doesn't follow is:
>Act in such a way that you treat humanity, [...] in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.

2, doesn't refer to the treating of others, it just refers to what you acts are ultimately aimed at (which is youself as an end in itself). And: every rational being acts that way.
That means, the treating of others as an end of your acts doesn't follow from the premises. What follows is that you aren't allowed to hinder them being an end of their own acts.
Kant derives an actuality where he should have only derived a possibility.

Hope that made sense, my English is quite bad, I guess.

> He said it himself, you would have no reason to be moral if there were no god. I don't know how you aren't getting this.

Citations?

Because here's one where he says the exact opposite.

(I assume the following were all/mostly you:
> he was founding his ethic on the belief in a God
> Kant would have predicated his morality on God no matter the situation
> god, the soul, or freewill... we must have faith that these things exist so we can live a moral life.
> He literally says that you can't prove god and thus morality, so you should believe in god simply so you can live morally.
>He admits you would need to believe in god to believe in morality, I don't get how you dont get this.
> He admits you would need to believe in god to believe in morality, I don't get how you dont get this.)

He does not say that, in fact, he speaks very poorly of people who would act "morally" only for if there is a God. Actually I will just quote him,
" Suppose, then, that a person, partly because all the highly praised speculative arguments for the existence of God are so weak, and partly because he finds many irregularities both in nature and in the world of morals, became persuaded of the proposition: There is no God. Still, if because of this he regarded the laws of duty as merely imaginary, invalid, nonobligatory, and decided to violate them boldly, he would in his own eyes be a worthless human being. Indeed, even if such a person could later overcome his initial doubts and convince himself that there is a God after all, still with his way of thinking he would forever remain a worthless human being."

Kant's morality is the only sort of morality which cannot be arbitrary

completely wrong

not quite as wrong but still wrong, this poster may have read sections of the first half of the first critique or the proleg.

I don't believe so. His idea about teleological judgement, e.g that organized beings are purposive, is an idea that he says coexists with a mechanical explanation for them. These may seem contradictory but they are not.

his proof of God rests on morality, not the other way around - see section 86 of the coj "Ethicotheology"

please read the second critique

he said the *opposite* of this, although his principle of the highest good does rest on the assumption of God. You know you have fucked up if you do not just misunderstand someone but have understood the exact opposite of what they have said!

read the second critique instead or relying on secondary sources

The fault is not subtle, the fault is glaring, and you could have condensed that to about two sentences, maybe one.

He did realize it was formal, he says so in the second Critique that it is merely a formal law.

agree with the rest though

>It's empty
It is not, though.
A moral imperative has a conceptual and intuitive component.You can argue that without an intuitive component nothing can be moral because value is synthetic.

>it just refers to what you acts are ultimately aimed at (which is yourself as an end in itself)
If I understand correctly you seem to be assuming that other people are not inherently valuable and that Kant ended up projecting the fact that we consider ourselves to be inherently valuable on others due to some cognitive error though the quote you posted doesn't suggest that. It simply suggests that other people are inherently valuable, at least as given outside of context.

>completely wrong
Can you be more specific?
>Our understanding of what qualifies as "true" is grounded a priori.
>Morality is grounded a priori.
I assume that everyone agrees those are true. If not then maybe I have fundamentally misunderstood something. I do believe them to be true in any case.
>We can't prove that what we know a priori is "true".
Kant probably wouldn't phrase it in that way but I think it agrees with his philosophy. Even if it doesn't I think it is correct anyways. If the criteria of what qualifies as truth are given to us a priori it would be impossible to prove them through applying them to themselves because we will always come to the point at which they are just given to us. I do have a recollection that Kant also said we would need an independent source of cognition to do that.
>But we still know it anyways.
This seems to me to be a natural conclusion from the above since we are given knowledge that is absolute and universal but logically unprovable.

>Our understanding of what qualifies as "true" is grounded a priori.
>We can't prove what we know a priori is "true".

What we know a priori is merely formal and are the conditions for any experience prior to the experience being possible. What we have in us a priori are not "truths" but rules for combining (unity) our sense information (the manifold) into an experience.

They're only true insofar as they are requirements for us to think about or experience. E.g it is impossible to think two opposing predicates of a single subject at the same time - this is a limitation of our cognitive faculty, NOT a limitation of things in themselves. So it is not so much what is "true" but how things must be if they are going to be objects of our experience at all.

One of the main points of the first Critique is that we *CAN* prove that something is true. Infact this is the exact refutation of Hume - that we can prove what is true, but only insofar as it is true for us, for how our cognitive faculties are constituted. Not true for how things actually are. It doesn't matter that they aren't possible to prove in terms of themselves.

At any rate it doesn't matter what we know a priori for practical reason. The point is that practical reason abstracts from all experience (phenomenal realm) - so you can't use the categories nor the forms of intuition (space and time and their abstractions) to determine anything about it. The moral law is derived from that basis, namely, that since it is from reason it must be universal, and since it stems from freedom it must presuppose freedom (for yourself and others), everything is then built down from that.

>What we have in us a priori are not "truths"
How did you interpret "we can't prove that what we a priori is true" as "what we know a priori is true"?
What we know a priori is not true or false.The rules that define what is true or false are a priori.

>The point is that pure reason abstracts from all experience. The moral law is derived from that basis.
Moral reasoning is merely formal but the concepts we think of through moral reasoning are not merely formal as long as they are associated with a sensible object(value).

That wouldn't explain cultural pluralism, dumbass

According to warosu it died a peaceful death.
warosu.org/lit/thread/S10102309

>If I understand correctly you seem to be assuming that other people are not inherently valuable
No. Without a doubt, Kant assumes other people are (better: consider themselves to be) inherently valuable, which is part of premise #2. But Kant claims that due to the inherent value of other people and the CI you have to (actively) make them an end of your own acts instead of using them merely as a means to an end. You may paraphrase that as: act in their interest, too.
If there was a third premise, namely something like "be altruistic", it would be true - but said premise isn't there. Kant just constantly smuggles it into his arguments and conclusions.

To fulfil the CI it would be enough if you don't hinder others to
>Act in such a way that you treat [...] your own person never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.

That means, you only have to maintain the possibility of others acting in such a way (treating themselves as an end of their own acts) and you're not allowed to prevent it by your acts. Nothing more, nothing less.

>other people are (better: consider themselves to be) inherently valuable
No. No. No. What the hell are you doing? Those are two completely different things.
I find other people valuable =/= I find myself valuable
How can you possibly confuse those.
Valuing yourself does not translate to being altruistic but valuing other people DOES translate to being altruistic.
Can't you spot the glaring difference?
"I find other people valuable" is not a logical derivation from "I find myself valuable". It is a completely independent intuitive percept. That is why it is treated as something given from the outside i.e. an end in itself.

>der Mensch und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen existirt als Zweck an sich selbst
>a human and overall any conscious being exists as an end in itself
I am not acquainted with the context but this seems to suggest that the subject ("I") sees other people (and conscious beings) as an end in themselves, not that other people see themselves that way.

I see the problem.
First of all, yes what I wrote was kind of sloppy, because I used the term "inherently valuable" sloppily.
"Inherent value" and "being an end in itself" isn't the same thing. In this context "value" already implies a moral judgement; that's why you're right with
>valuing other people DOES translate to being altruistic
while "being an end in itself" doesn't.
"To be an end in itself" is just the end of a string of acts, like Aristotle's motionless mover is the end of a string of causes. (I am going to NY. What for (that means: what's the end of your act)? For a job interview. What for? Because I'd prefer that job to my recent one. Why? Because I can make more money / I think it will be more fun. What for... and so on; the end of this string is always: for myself, because I myself am the ultimate end of my acts).
Therefore, if you favour another person acting in such a way that he/she treats him/herself as an end of his acts, it's not the same as if you say said person is inherently valuable per se. And I don't think the question about someone's value is even touched here.

>I am not acquainted with the context
There isn't much of a context - Kant puts it up like an axiom.

>this seems to suggest that the subject ("I") sees other people (and conscious beings) as an end in themselves, not that other people see themselves that way
German is my native language and I read this sentence 20-30 times... I really don't know which one of us is right or if we're both wrong, it's pretty hard to interpret. There are a lot of ambiguities: for example "der Mensch" (man) may mean "each human on it's own", "every human" or "the entirety of humans / humanity". You might say a lot more about this sentence but I'll leave it here.

Addition
>Kant puts it up like an axiom.
It sounds a little bit like Aristotle's beginning of the NE, btw.

>It could mean, don't lie, becuase you don't want universal lying.
>But if nazi's were at the door asking for a jew, you would be more moral to lie.
Kant doubled down on you don't lie to the nazis. Most of his responses to criticism of the CI are "even if the murderers had come to kill my family, i shouldn't lie about their whereabouts because LIES ARE BAD AND THEM COMING OUT YOUR MOUTH ARE THE SAME IMMORALITY AS KILLING YOUR FAMILY YOURSELF K?"
read before you critique [OP too]

>Tfw you've never heard of rule Utilitarianism

he argued that while you might think the circumstances warranted you lying about their whereabouts, you cannot know their whereabouts, and so could, by lying, lead the killers to your friend. rule utilitarianism assumes knowledge you would be incapable of having in the situation.

He really was hardcore autismo.
Once he received a letter from a depressed Maria von Herbert chick who clearly wanted the transcendental dick. He followed the CI and refused to give her the transcendental dick. She killed herself soon after. Kant more like cunt.

read deQuincey on his last days if you want some turboautism anecdotes
>UPON THE SPOT

Kant was so autistic about guilt he was fine with telling killers where to find his friends.
Imagine having a friend of yours telling killers your location to kill you because he doesn't want to feel guilty by lying. Valuing guilt is more important than your well being. And then going 'yeah maybe you'll just be gone, or the killer won't find you, or some police will randomly stop him' because consequences don't have causal links.
What a 'good' friend and moral code to have.

>"Inherent value" and "being an end in itself" isn't the same thing.
I already more or less suggested that I think one naturally leads to the other but before trying to explain it I'm going to explain my terminology because I don't actually know anything about Kant's ethics though what I'm saying builds on his model of consciousness, at least as I see it.
>In this context "value" already implies a moral judgement.
No. That is not how I see it. An "end" is a product of understanding. Intent (i.e. a goal) cannot exist before we can think of the object abstractly i.e. in order to think of something as an "end" we need to be able to think about it conceptually. A "value'' is a sensory perception. A value can be thought through understanding as an object just like regular intuitions can be thought trough understanding and moral judgement can be made with values, just like regular judgement can be made with regular objects given to us through intuition (facts). That doesn't mean that value is produced by understanding just like intuitions are not produced by understanding.
An end is an abstraction of understanding.
A value is an intuition of sensibility.
Now we get to the part I have to explain why a value is an end in itself and, well, I know this probably sounds like a contentious statement and I myself am not sure what I mean by it, but the short answer would be "because the way we perceive value is a priori". In this sense something that is given to us a priori is does not follow from something i.e. it just exists in itself for its own end.

In your own example you are just doing mental gymnastics. Any line of reasoning can be traced back to an axiomatic assumption. Let's look at the your argument "Because it's fun". It is a value judgement. If I asked you "Why would you want to do something fun?" there would be nothing you could answer to me other than "I like doing things that are fun". If you were to give me some sort of evolutionary explanation about why people like fun things you would be answering to the abstract theoretical question of "What is the reason that people like fun things?" and not to the practical question of "Well, what exactly do you intend to achieve by having fun". You intend to have fun. Anything else is a rationalization.

You can only say that you do things for yourself to the extent that you perceive your sensory perceptions to belong to yourself but you can't say that you are an end to your sensory perceptions.

Point out what does't make sense to you so I can try to explain it better.

>Kant puts it up like an axiom
Then I don't see anything complicated about the phrase "A human is an end in himself". Stating that a human is an end already suggests that it is an object of an implied judgement. It suggests in no way that the human is also the subject of that implied judgement. If I were to say "Fun is an end in itself" do I imply that fun considers itself important?

There is a difference between choosing not to lie because you don't want to feel guilty, choosing to lie and then telling yourself that you don't have to feel guilty because you were totally justified and choosing to lie and feeling guilty about it but someone as self-absorbed as you would know that, Alice.

lol Kant says you have to say the truth no matter what because it's your duty to always say the truth. It's not your responsibility if some killer decides to go kill your friend. You simply always tell the truth.