Tfw you realize he was right about everything

version 1.0 or the evolved form?

there's playing the game while not being aware of it.
there's being aware of it then deciding fuck this.
then there's playing it while being aware of it.

Youre a fool.

Can someone give me the tl;dr on what this guy is saying?
Doesn't he discredit tractatus much later in his life?

>watched school of life once

Usually, we intelligent people can distinguish when we're talking about things and when we're talking about the name of things.

Analytic philosophers is not in this category of people :^)

>then there's playing it while being aware of it.

You mean, believing you're aware of *It*. An awareness that is not composed of it that knows seemingly more than what *It* can know - yet is impossible, (as of yet), to be transcribed or transmitted to another.

>tfw an individual within an ancient species becomes aware of the groups communication and begins to harness others because of this awareness.
>mfw I look through an opening in the forest towards a plain with prey and water and sunshine.

Not really, he was more concerned with things being misinterpreted and spread around like that.

The Tractatus:
The world, it exists
You can make statements on it, but only it, nothing outside the world, because if you could then that would be part of the world; questions are also limited to your world: they are statements, as are negations
Everything you can say about the world is based on a couple elementary statements, or deduced from them rather
God, a higher being, the point of life, whatever, they're all from outside this world (I don't remember if he had something to base this on, someone might want to elaborate on this) and as such, asking about them is impossible -- you're actually asking about an idea that you came up with inside this world -- meaning it's impossible for us to answer them, for we do not even know the question, nor could we possibly

Obviously it's easy to go "Haha that sounds silly, Veeky Forums was right with the autism," but you don't want to get caught basing your opinions on anonymous brainlet's Veeky Forums post now do you

>I'm smarter than these guys lol

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, to be double-fisted with Sein und Zeit in the subway.

Wtf, sein und zeit gets BTFO'd by wittgenstein

Hyperautism

He definitely takes a looser, more exploratory approach in his later philosophy. My Proff's thought he contradicted it, not sure though. Philosophical investigations is a much more playful approach.

>Doesn't he discredit tractatus much later in his life?

The standard opinion is yes, he is overturning the logicism of the Tractatus in his later work.

What Wittgenstein saying is very close to what Heidegger, the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition, and Derrida were saying. Being (a world, "what is," and all the ways of being and thinking within that) is given to us through language, but language is never "adequate" (never "ultimately refers") to some perfect anchor of "meaning," whether you want to try to make Platonic forms your anchor, or some other God-given essences which we "receive" from the world, or a naive realism, or a Kantian/Hegelian a priori perfect transcendental deduction, or meticulous logicist carefulness, or whatever.

Language refers to language, language explains itself through language, and language is always moving. We are IN language, language is not in us, in that all that is given to us is given by our ways of describing it and conceptualising it. There is no transcendental signifier, no meta-philosophical and immutable north star, to which we could subordinate all our language usage, and be assured of truth forever. Communication and conceptualisation are a dialectical miracle, always moving, always in time.

Logic fails, or rather is ultimately uninteresting, because it tries to take something fundamentally fluid and treat it like a solid by artificially constraining it and forcing it to behave as one (or rather, pretending it is doing so). What logicians don't realise is that the techniques for doing this are themselves a form of language, therefore fluid, and are themselves grounded in even more fluid, more basic linguistic realities. The "grammatical" (regional-ontological) basis for logic is not reducible to logic.

Wittgenstein doesn't have some grand mission to end philosophy. If anything he wants to end the naive forms of metaphilosophy, and exactly like Heidegger and Derrida remind us that we are in language. That has a lot of ethical and practical ramifications, but it's not an end to philosophy. If anything it's the beginning of philosophy in a way that is more open and exciting than it has been since the Greeks. In many ways we're back in Ancient Athens thanks to these dudes.

Some people also take it too far and say that these thinkers are making metaphysical claims, e.g., that "thought is identical with language." This is just an easier formulation for a lot of academic epigones to understand, because they want to think in terms of drastic oppositions and ironclad systems. Rather than Wittgenstein as the anti-metaphilosophy philosopher, who is silent on the metaphysics of consciousness, they want to think of him as a kind of anti-metaphysician who only wants us to do practical philosophy for eternity.

Is that it? I mean I dont want to sound like a dick or anything, I'm an illiterate brainlet, but thats the kind of thought I've casually been having all by myself when I cant sleep at night

>In many ways we're back in Ancient Athens thanks to these dudes.
Well we were for most of the 20th century.

But philosophy is moribund now.

Perhaps you've been influenced by their ideas in ways you aren't aware of.

Why cant you just like ground language in something like formal logic?

He lacked the foresight to predict the use of emojis as language enhancers.

Emojis correspond to words not objects in the real world.

Because formal logic is (guess what?) a part of language. You can't express anything without a system of signs, therefore a language.

>pro-tip: he wasn't

>Logic fails, or rather is ultimately uninteresting, because it tries to take something fundamentally fluid and treat it like a solid by artificially constraining it and forcing it to behave as one (or rather, pretending it is doing so)
This reminds me of that beautiful Faust bit about logic.