What are thoughts and how do they relate to the physical realm?

What are thoughts and how do they relate to the physical realm?

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>the physical realm

Well, how are abstract thoughts related to the tangible world?
Please no bully

/thread

electricity my dude

So if thoughts are the result of physical interactions between chemicals, neurons and other physical structures, does that mean that there is a limit of what thoughts can be thought?

Short Answer, we don't know

Some Positions (warning: this is going to be extremely watered down):
>Eliminative Materialism (e.g. Dan Dennett, WVO Quine)
>>Thoughts, as you usually "think" of them, don't actually exist. They're just a short-hand term for neurons firing, and the "internal, subjective world" that you experience is a delusion. Talking about what you're thinking is fine for conversations, but it's incompatible with science since thoughts don't actually happen.
>Reductive Physicalism (e.g. Hilary Putnam)
>>Thoughts emerge from neural processes in the brain, and can be fully explained in terms of their physical processes.
>>Subviews: Computational Theory of Mind (brain = hardware, thoughts = software), Type Physicalism (Thoughts, Pains, Feelings, Qualia = Some Neural process with a 1->1 correspondence, the Mind = the Brain)
>Non-Reductive Physicalism (e.g. Donald Davidson, John Searle)
>>There's nothing over-and-above the physical, but mental states can't be explained in a straightforward manner from physical ones. This is a diverse view, and has a lot of overlap with several other positions.
>>Subviews: Emergentism (mental states emerge from physical ones, and this can't be explained by really studying the physical states of the brain), Anomalous Monism (Donald Davidson. This a tough one to describe, but i'll try. Basically it's opposed to Type Physicalism. Every mental state is a physical one, but there's no clean correspondence or identity like pain = c-fibers firing, and mental events can't be simply explained in terms of physical evens), Biological Naturalism (John Searle. Opposed to the Computational Theory of Mind. Brain = Hardware, Mind = Also hardware, but there's no type-identity between the two. The mind is causal, and has an effect on the natural world. Consciousness is fundamental, in some sense, that it can't be explained in terms of lower-level physical processes, and it's more of an emergent state than a software function)

If I'm not butchering these positions I'll get to Dualism, Neutral Monism and Idealism next

...

Thank you, user

>Substance Dualism (e.g. Descartes, Early Leibniz, Religious People)
>>The mind, or in some views the soul, is a separate "thinking thing" from the extended, physical world. Either the two are capable of interacting (Descartes, a huge problem for this position is explaining how they do so), or they don't (Leibniz, God sets everything in motion)
>Property Dualism(e.g. David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, Karl Popper)
>>Closely linked to Non-reductive physicalism. There's no substances over and above the physical, but brains, and maybe some other stuff, have extra mental properties.
>>Subviews: Epiphenomenalism (e.g. David Chalmers, only physical properties have effects and physical properties, and therefore mental properties are a byproduct of physical ones. You, a version of you that sees blue instead of red and vice versa, and a zombie version of you with no real mind or thoughts, would all act the same exact way, but have different mental states). Panpsychist Property Dualism (e.g. Thomas Nagel and arguably Aristotle, mental properties are fundamental, and act in law-like ways. More stuff that just humans or even animals might be conscious)
>Neutral Monism (e.g. Bertrand Russell, Baruch Spinoza, Galen Strawson (sort of))
>>The world is made up of neutral stuff that's neither in itself physical or mental (for Spinoza, it was manifestations of God). Typically mental events are thought of the "subjective" side of phenomena, while physical events are the opposite "objective" side, but fundamentally they are one and the same. For example, the subjective mental feeling of pain is what you perceive, while c-fiber stimulation is the physical process that a neurosurgeon might observe.

Yes of course. To put it in the most basic of terms, you cannot visualize more objects than you have connections in your brain. There is simply not enough there to represent that much information.

Of course we can think of numbers all the way up to infinity, so what gives? We conceptualize those numbers. We reduce their meaning to something easier to work with, but at the cost of their reality.
The thought, "one hundred dogs" exists in your head (probably) as the juxtaposition of 100 and an image of a dog. You understand what I said, but you lose whatever information that could distinguish one dog from another.

Now that we know our thoughts are limited, that doesn't mean we know where they are limited.

This is horrible delete this

These next ones are going to get really butchered and oversimplified:
>Subjective Idealism (e.g. ): only minds and mental stuff exist, material things don't actually exist outside of experience. Thank god for god watching out for us.
>Transcendental Idealism (e.g. Kant, Schopenhauer): the mind shapes reality as we know it, and gives order and structure to a world that may not have it in itself. The world we experience is the world of phenomena, as experienced by are minds, and the unknowable world-in-itself is the world of the noumena.
>Objective/Absolute Idealism (e.g. Hegel, Schelling, arguably Plato if you really want to stretch it): Reality at it's core is mental and objective, and this is responsible for the logical structure of the universe. According to Hegel, there's an unclear unity of existence and thought, that's not one of identity. Opposed to Subjective and Transcendental Idealism since it focuses more on the objective whole rather than subjective experience. This is way too complex for me to explain in a Veeky Forums post so I'm just going to leave it at this

If thoughts are limited are there then even such abstract ideas that cannot even be thought of or began to be thought of?

>A "field" aka pure extension
>Substance Dualism

>A PHYSICAL property of matter
>Property Dualism

>ALL matter has a psychic part
>Panpsychism

>The sensation of your most significant thoughts being highlighted
>Cognitivism

What the fuck??????

I don't know if this question cam be answered

It's kind of like a question of what if, it's kinda banal now that I think about it. It's the rationalist version of the question "What if there was a sixth sense separate from the five in which to perceive the universe?"

Our senses pick up the individual sensation and our intellect abstracts the immaterial concept. Abstract thought is immaterial.

prove it

>Consciousness is just thoughts about thoughts
Doesn't thought imply consciousness?

As this user said it is not in imagining the abstract but in imagining the concrete that thought is limited.

What a garbage thread

What a garbage post

We could be talking about literature and actual books on, you know, the literature board, but whatever, let's just discuss OP's retard question instead

How can we say that abstract thought isn't limited when it's a product of a finite amount of physical structures with a finite number of interactions? Would that not be a physical limit on thought both abstract and concrete?

I am not sure what you are trying to say. Are you?

If there are only 26 letters does it mean that there is a limit to what can be written?

this thread sucks but i wish phil of mind was discussed more on Veeky Forums

To simplify, there are a limited amount of brain cells in the brain, if thought is the consequence of these cells interacting, would there not be a limited amount of possible thought simply because there's a limited amount of cells? If you have a finite set of numbers, there's a limited number of combinations and permutations of the numbers.
There's only 26 letters and you have only 500 pages, is there then a limit to what can be written?

2 letters doesn't even limit what can be written

the key word is "500 pages" but you can keep adding pages

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How would one increase the pages in regards to the human brain?

THE ILLUSTRIOUS
THE IRREFUTABLE
THE IMMATERIAL
GEEEEEEOOOOOOOOORGE
BEEEEEEERKEELEEEEYYYYYYYYY

get more brain duh

more seriously tho, you can if you belive in radical externalism

If we take thoughts to include relatively simple psychological representations, no.

Why is Dan Dennett so radical about sticking to behaviorism and eliminativism?

There are billions of dollars spent every year to better understand the question you are asking. You won't find answers here except for the theoretical.

*Lim x->0

>solipsism is entirely correct in what it says
what did he mean by this

>Anomalous Monism (Donald Davidson. This a tough one to describe, but i'll try. Basically it's opposed to Type Physicalism. Every mental state is a physical one, but there's no clean correspondence or identity like pain = c-fibers firing, and mental events can't be simply explained in terms of physical evens)

To assist user with this explanation.

Anomalous Monism is a position where the the brain determines mental states, however the mental states you actually experience are token representations of the physical states of the brain (the anomalies).

You can only know the things which happen inside of your head.

Have you read any Wittgenstein?

No. I'm just providing the necessary impetus for the discussion and guessing.

Well, it's fun to mentally masturbate sometimes

Well,for some people "masturbate" is in a vector of the ontological "mental realm", to the detriment of physicaly maturbating, which is for all intents and purposes, an illusion. In fact, all sins and degenerative actions are reduced to ill-thinking.

>not believing in what doesn't exist (AKA vague, baseless abstractions that people use to avoid actual inquiry and instead sit comfortably in their cultural/literary rhetoric) is """radica""""l
he is a bit of a retard though

It's very unlikely that in the measly ~80 years of your life you are going to need more than even half of those "500 pages".

Could you develop on your last point? How are transcendental and absolute idealism different?

Transcendental Idealism casts a rigid split between the world-in-itself and the world of perception. What the world is actually like is unknowable since we invariably shape it into phenomena when we perceive it.

Absolute Idealism does away with this distinction

But how?
After all we can only know the world through our senses and there's no way for us to know the world-in-itself, and also how does this relate back to thoughts?

Aren't consciousness and thought by definition subjective. We have to deduce objective experience from subjective experience.

first of all absolute idealists deny that consciousness and ideas are necessarily subjective. I wouldn't be able to explain the answers to these questions in a Veeky Forums post, so you should probably look up Kant and Hegel yourself

>We have to deduce objective experience from subjective experience.
D I A L E C T I C S

Yes. And?

>so you should probably look up Kant and Hegel yourself
Well, yeah but..
Let me try it this way: aren't consciousness and thought the definition of subjective experience.
If consciously thinking about your experience is not the definition of subjective experience then what is?

I had like, 4 pages, and I already used them up

:( I miss old Veeky Forums

*kicks stone*

Behaviourism seems the most logical if you ignore your subjectivity, but at the same time I'd go with functionalism.

The brain is an analog system user. Each and every neuron can be "activated" in infinitely many ways.
One other interesting thing is that since the brain always changes, you probably never will have the same "thought" twice. This kind of invalidate the idea that thought are brain configurations since you clearly can have the same thought twice.

Well shit. Infinitely many? Can you elaborate? I ain't no neurologist, just a brainlet

someone give me feedback on this it took a lot of effort to type this out

Well I'm OP, all I can say is that as a lay person, it was very pleasant to read and I was able to understand what you wrote. I'm glad you took the effort to explain these perspectives.

chalmers is not an epiphenominalist and i don't know why you included p-zombies in that explanation.

his argument about p-zombies is just supposed to entirely rule out physicalism, because if p-zombies are even logically possible then physicalism is false.

p-zombies having identical brains and actions to us but lacking qualia or subjective consciousness. imagine a robot who looks and acts exactly like a human but doesn't have any "thoughts"

An Analog signal means a voltage (electrical pressure) is detected, and depending on the minute decimal values it can mean any number of different things. You can look into Arduino for specific examples.

How do I get into Spinoza

t. brainlet

the greeks famalam

the greeks are genuinely underrated though. i hadn't really read them but this semester i had to take a class on greek philosophy and it is pretty astounding how ahead of their time they were.

the phaedo and the euthyphro are incredibly modern. almost astoundingly so

>patches up conclusion of unseen objects ceasing to exist with an omnipresent God
really makes you think

>logical
STEMspergery isn't logical.

>So if thoughts are the result of physical interactions between chemicals, neurons and other physical structures
Your thoughts as in themselves also interact with those chemicals. Think of something that makes you angry, see your pulse change, etc.
Determinism is pre-Video Game ideology, no level of interaction allowed. Only Movies, only Radio, only Rulers.

>it can mean any number of different things
That sounds kind of vague. Aren't neurons something like comparators?

>chalmers is not an epiphenominalist and i don't know why you included p-zombies in that explanation.
he argued for epiphenomenalism in the conscious mind

Thoughts are an hindsight explanation, ratification or justification for the thinking thing.

i like green

Sorta but the response to voltage change is mediated by a complex series of interactions between signalling proteins & messengers inside the cell, and these signalling methods are themselves tightly controlled by extracellular factors like hormones and neurotransmitters. Local factors in the brain can increase or reduce the sensitivity of neuronal synapses to stimulation, allowing for a huge degree of variation in response

I medsperg'd a little bit there, but basically neurons are capable of a huge variation in response & that leads to the complexity of the brain/mind

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>becuz i sed so
STEMspergs are absolute cancer.

>I need to feel smarter than other people so instead of learning about the way the world works, I'll just deny it

>it works this way becuz i sed so
Go learn how a buffalo jump works m8

>"w-wake up sheeple"
what do you believe mr lone wolf edgeking? what's your alternative theory I'm genuinely curious

So if I think "1 + 1 = 2" that thought is the same as electricity in my head. So the electricity is true. And for "1 + 1 = 3" the electricity is false. Ok ok, I'm just not used to assigning truth to electricity.

I'm a sociology student actually. :^)

>local solipsist chimes in

Thoughts are a combination of conceptual metaphors (or archetypal symbols if you break them down far enough) of which we have only a limited number to draw on. We match these metaphor complexes to the information we receive from our senses and a particularly good match gives us an "understanding" of a particular problem.

contd. They relate to the physical realm in that the physical realm as such is the subset of archetype complexes that match with sensory data. Pure physicalists/materialists beleive that thought only these complexes have meaning, rejecting those that match with internal/qualiatative phenomena, like you see with religion/spirituality.

That particular limit just equals 0 user the vertical asymptotic limit is supposed to be limx->0

Read this. Pauli and Jung together up in dis bitch

cogsci.ucsd.edu/~nunez/web/PauliJung.pdf

>lone wolf
No, try again.
So, a STEMsperg.

you mean DUDE WEED LMAO?

or you could actually read a goddamn book
instead of 'talking about literature' on an alt-right anime forum
fucking retard

wtf i hate porn now

let's say 'that's the joke', okay?

''''''''''quality post''''''''''
fucking retard

it's my third time reading your greentext, and i'm still not sure

I've never consumed marijuana or THC in any meaningful dosage, I'm just naturally this stupid

maybe you should try?

LSD, for the right purpose, in the propper setting, with the right mood, can be just what you are looking for.

Go back to plebbit

I'm quite sympathetic to a version of a theory called panpsychist Russelian Monism, which is more or less a kind of idealism. Basically, it states that the physical sciences only tell us about the extrinsic nature of "physical" entities, their properties and their relations, but that we ought to think that these things have an intrinsic nature, and given that we know that at least one thing, our brain, is conscious, that we have reason to believe that this intrinsic nature, the intrinsic nature of everything, is consciousness.

This version of Russelian monism is panpsychist. It can be taken further, however, constitutive cosmopsychist Russelian monism holds all of reality to be a mental state, with the mental states of particular "things" (humans, giraffes,electrons, whatever) being subsumed into the grand mental state of the universe. This being to the way that, for example, the mental quality of "redness" is subsumed into the overall mental state of my visual field (assuming that I'm not just seeing a field of red).

People interested in this view should check out Philip Goff.