Bundle theory

Hegel's interesting because he rejects the Kantian notion of cognition as an instrument, on the grounds that its lazy. Once this is rejected, his system is mostly consistent.

I don't think Hegel is correct though, simply because different self-conscious beings often perceive the world in contradictory ways. Hegel talks a good deal about the problems of perception in that we perceive objects as single objects with many properties, but he doesn't talk about the incongruity between self-consciousnesses.

Furthermore, Hegel assumes that consciousness is capable of thinking about itself in it's entirety, that when we think about ourselves we think about an object that is literally us. Based on the fact that different self-consciousnesses are unable to perceive the same event the same way, it seems strange to believe that all people are able to perfectly able to think about themselves. We would be forced to say that some people are not as self-conscious as others, but that would force Hegelians to admit that cognition is not always true.

The only way to reconcile this reality with Hegel's thought is to speak of some over-arching Spirit which humans are participants in, which he does. This Spirit is thus the only true consciousness; humans are simply parts of it.

And I would point out that this Spirit, in its entirety, is outside of human experience, and is thus no different than Kant's Noumenon.

lol my dude, how many philosophy courses have you taken?

I thought I was tripping balls for assuming Hegel meant that, thank you for clarifying so shortly

Hegel is definitely not saying that. Hegel’s answer to noumena is: what could be noumenal that isn’t just phenomenal?

It’s a good answer.

le read nietzsche once face

>how many philosophy courses have you taken?
that's the meanest thing you could think of?

>Furthermore, Hegel assumes that consciousness is capable of thinking about itself in it's entirety, that when we think about ourselves we think about an object that is literally us.

Wait, what do you mean by this? Where does he say this? You don't mean the transcendental unity of apperception, do you?

>transcendental unity of apperception
That's in Kant. The person you're talking to is talking about Hegel. FFS

>Do you believe things-in-themselves actually exist?
This question is a matter of interpretation/semantics I think mostly. But no I don't think as you phrase it things-in-themselves exist.
>Or are objects just a collection of properties with nothing else to them
Define objects. What do you think of atomic theory?

You'll probably never understand why this is a bad post, but it is.

thanks knowing one

Of course things in themselves exist you brainlets. "durr durr we just say that's a chair because we DECIDE it is what about a stool vs a chair durr durr"
Fuck off faggots.

Rationalists ridicule themselves when they talk about consciousness

define: things
define: exist
define: objects
define: properties
without those a priori's there is nothing to discuss here

In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel speaks of consciousness considering itself as an object. This object has the ability to think about itself, thus both consciousness and the consciousness it is considering are self-conscious.

Implicit in all of that is that consciousness is capable of thinking about consciousness to the point that that consciousness is self-conscious

What part of that is Hegel not saying?

The thing-in-itself is not a thing. It's the ground of existence.

I believe without proof that independent, objective reality exists, that I'm one small part of it, and that my senses convey to my brain some tiny amount of more or less accurate information about it, that I vaguely comprehend in some more or less accurate way.

Things exist, and their purpose is to approach perfection. God wills it.

It's just different ways of categorizing the same thing. Like when Plato calls us furry quadrupeds or whatever.

My argument for this is dreams. Dreams are inherently things-in-themselves. I believe Nietzsche said that dreams are the source of the study of metaphysics.

Hegel doesn't say >consciousness is capable of thinking about itself in it's entirety

he says that consciousness has no way to know itself but through itself. in terms of the noumena, this means all noumena are only phenomenally known to be noumenal - i.e. they are just more phenomena.

>We would be forced to say that some people are not as self-conscious as others, but that would force Hegelians to admit that cognition is not always true.

he does say that some people are more self-conscious than others and that people advance to and stop at different stages of the dialectic. he also doesn't say cognition is always true, he says only that it is always true for itself because what else is truth but an act of cognition?

>The only way to reconcile this reality with Hegel's thought is to speak of some over-arching Spirit which humans are participants in, which he does.

this he does say, though.

>I believe that the only thing we can ever be sure of... Is I think therefore I am.
>we can be sure of
I wouldn't go that far...

>t. NPC

If you believe there is one base particle that everything is constructed from (and you must) then the universe is just one big dark inert thing.

Our perceptions create the life and experience in it. Your head makes the universe.

I have this idea that all of us are part of the same thought stream in some way, and it's not the universe we are experiencing, it's US moving or "perceiving" things that is actually what makes reality from otherwise nothingness.

No, I'm genuinely curious.

>what could be noumenal that isn’t just phenomenal?
But user, Hegel is the "The real is rational" guy.

>exist

There's that pea-headed concept again.

here's a (you)

do you think, for anyone who says that the noumenon is the ground for existence of an object, that the notion then becomes similar to Spinoza's True Idea of a mode? perhaps this is the same thing as the Hegelian 'Concept'?

>Do you believe things-in-themselves actually exist?
The classical (two-object) interpretation of Kant reads his transcendental idealism as answering positively, it's a form of metaphysical idealism, the noumenon is not in space and time.

The other reading (two aspects) answers negatively, the thing in itself is what lies beyond the current limit to our understanding of a given thing, we simply don't have the complete picture with our human limitations, it's an epistemological idealism with a realist ontology, the noumenon is the unknown from which further knowns will come from, for instance DNA wasn't known in Kant's days, but it was there. Now we know, and knowing is half the battle.

Think of the competing interpretations of quantum mechanics: Copenhagen, many worlds, Bohm, Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber... some are deterministic, others indeterministic... (Read Quantum Ontology by Lewis) if you take a peek in the direction of the noumenon, the ultimate structure of nature, as of now, looks at lot like theoretical physicists yelling at each other, like anons do.

Their discoveries challenged our everyday view of how things work ever since heliocentrism, yet the yelling doesn't cease. Knowing something as fully as God can is quite the ambitious goal. Sapere aude.

I dont think they do.

>the noumenon is

you

>the noumenon is not in space and time.

What do you mean?

Is the noumenon not both inside space and outside time?

'no'

In the Two Objects reading, phenomena are appearances, appearances are mental, the mental depends on the perceiver, whom introduces time and space. Noumena are absolutely real, exist independently of minds and perceivers, and of time and space.

I wish they made a philosophy board so all you pretentious useless fags could go on about semantics for centuries.

Imagine a universe containing just two big qualitatively identical, indiscernible spheres, 1 mile in diameter, 1 mile away from each other. The spheres have all their intrinsic and relational properties in common (each is one mile from a 1 mile wide sphere). The bundle theorist can't distinguish between the two spheres - they're committed to saying the two indiscernible spheres are in fact one and the same sphere. They can't count accommodate qualitatively identical but numerically distinct particulars

Are you talking about God's testicles?

Even from the vantage point of "no" this abnegation of Self requires an indestructible and irreducible Self.