Epiphenomenalism makes me feel uncomfortable

Epiphenomenalism makes me feel uncomfortable.

What are some good arguments against it so that I can dismiss it?

It doesn't solve the hard problem of consciousness, but tbf neither has anything.

Pseudoproblems don't need to be solved.

OP's problem is a pseudo problem.

Put yourself on parenteral nutrition and get into a sensory deprivation chamber for a couple decades. Prove all those bastards wrong.

It seems to me it assumes some sort of pretty primitive dualism.

This. Experimentation gives way to progress. Let us know when you can move shit with your mind, OP.

It drove William James insane too, to the point of driving him to suicide almost. I believe it was Renouvier who gave him the idea that if the subjective experience of consciousness epiphenomenal, i.e., if a p-zombie is indistinguishable from a subjectively experiencing human in terms of causal relationships with the rest of the world, it could not have evolved - it could not possibly have a relationship with matter that could be selected for (or against), because it would not have ANY causal interrelationships with anything. Ipso facto that doesn't make any sense. It's like saying "this flower evolved to have a longer stem that allows it to reach sunlight better, and also to subjectively experience a panorama of dancing elves as it grows." If the flower's elf-dream, and all its earlier iterations in the iterative process of natural selection, isn't causally efficacious, isn't somehow changing the flower's interaction with the world, then how did it evolve in the first place?

Not just how did it "pop into existence," but how did it EVOLVE, iteratively? Because we can clearly see (or infer, at least) all gradations of consciousness and awareness, of deliberation, etc., in animals, even insects now that a few experiments have shown some improvising and not behaving mechanistically on instinct. We can see the gradations of incredibly sophisticated umwelten and lebenswelten in the primate family and in humans. All that is epiphenomenal? It just happens "alongside" the mechanisms? Makes no fucking sense.

The fact is, subjective experience has ontological status, it has to be accounted for. It's a "something" that's there. Materialism tries to backpedal from the patently absurd claim that it doesn't exist at all, by saying "fine, it's something, but it's only a ghostly after-image of the mechanism!" In truth, you don't even have to accept this on first blush. It's as much a claim as anything else - why should it be the "default" opinion, in the absence of "other evidence?" If you press this question to its roots, you find the a priori "Cliffordian" presumption of evidentialism, which already takes the "parsimonious ultra-materialism" hypothesis completed for granted and which is setting the conditions for the question of whether you're allowed to believe - a priori - in anything other than materialism. Again with William James, his response to Clifford is relevant: evidentialism makes no sense. It's a fine way of doing things IN CERTAIN CONTEXTS, it produces "regional," experimental, ontical confirmations of more foundational ontological structures, but it certainly isn't a self-grounding foundationalist epistemology. We take things on faith as a matter of course, in every statement we make and every thought we have - all thought is intentional, it "intends" some content, and that intending always presupposes certain metaphysical verities and possibilities that we cannot possibly know. To go into a scientific (in the true Wissenschaft sense simply of rigorous inquiry seeking after truth) with the foregone conclusion that any conclusion must justify or bear out materialism in the end is simply putting the cart before the horse, it's unscientific dogmatism.

But let's suppose we want to work with the materialists at least a little bit, by assuming that they aren't just matter-and-mechanism fetishists but are just looking for parsimonious explanations of phenomena. Granted, it certainly seems odd that "mind" stands out and against matter, as a distinctly irreducible and qualitative "stuff" in a universe that otherwise seems to tend toward law-like regularity of operations grounded in a very few elementary principles and particles. But doesn't that just suggest the question of: Maybe "mind" DOES fit into the grand scheme of things, the parsimonious, final, general theory of everything? How can we solve this puzzle? Maybe what appears to us as "mind," in the only place we can see its most obvious and particular manifestations, is related at the base of reality to "intelligibility" or "rationality" within the natural laws? Maybe some variant of intelligible teleology or entelechy or panpsychism could actually be part of the general laws of reality? Why ONLY Newtonian regularity and mechanism? Why a "watchmaker's" pre-ordained vision of what the engine-at-the-heart-of-everything looks like? Isn't the point of scientific inquiry to suspend judgment until you REACH the actual heart?

Questions like these don't immediately suggest an experimental program that can be tautologically confirmed with reference to its own pre-ordained success/failure conditions within 10 years. Any answer to the question would obviously presume a radical reshaping of how we view fundamental aspects of reality, and any questioning would therefore be dialectic and self-negating in a sense, would embody the Meno-esque paradox of how you can seek after a conception only by means of "wronger" conceptions that by definition cannot yet behold the correct conception. In short, that is, to ask about the ontological status of mind, in the conventional sense, would be an ontological project, in the phenomenological sense. So the scientists who want to work within the comfort of normal science, or "ontical" science, don't pursue them. But many more philosophically inclined particle scientists, e.g., have asked plenty of questions like these as a matter of course, because they aren't Neil de Grasse Tyson and obsessed with a vulgar instrumentalized techno-utilitarian image of science that doesn't want to expand its own foundations but only wants to take them for granted and positivistically confirm them.

>if a p-zombie is indistinguishable from a subjectively experiencing human in terms of causal relationships with the rest of the world, it could not have evolved - it could not possibly have a relationship with matter that could be selected for (or against), because it would not have ANY causal interrelationships with anything
The fuck? A p-zombie still interacts with its environment, it's just that it's totally physical.

Bad grammar on my part. The latter could not have evolved, the "p-zombie plus consciousness."

The main issue is the notion of a causal connection between physical events and the corresponding mental events.
The relationship between the two is not one of causality, but one of identity. Physical "events" and their corresponding mental "events" are actually two different ways of looking at the same event, two manifestations of the same phenomena, two sides of the same coin.

A mental event is the consciousness of a physical event which in itself is also a physical event.

a physical event is the embodiment of a mental event which in itself is also a mental event

P being true makes me sad.

I am not sad.

P is false.

Why would the universe permit mental events to occur if they don't have any effect on anything? It would be completely superfluous and go against the Occam's razor principle which materialists love so much.

Everyone is a p-zombie until the Godhead (You) occupies it for a time.

You cycle between the infinite number of p-zombies an infinite number of instances in the land beyond time (5d probability plane).

I'm you in a life you've lived before, and will live again, telling you this, as a p-zombie machine. Because I love you, and I just wanted you to know.

If subjective experience is a necessary side effect of having a brain that works the way ours does (which is obviously advantageous), then it would evolve along with it. Of course that would imply true p-zombies are not possible, that there is something about the way our brain works that necessarily produces this epiphenomenon. Problem being we don't know what/how that would be.

The subjective experience belongs to the Godhead alone, which you are, and will always be
but you will not always be your body, and current identity
metempsychosis is real, and interminable

Ask an epiphenomenalist why a person chose flight over fight in a given encounter. If they say its entirely down to the physical ask if its possible that the two impulses are "equal" in power, aka that there's a 50% chance for flight or fight. Then start with that example. Why does a person choose one over the other? Either they have to give a probabilistic answer, which defeats the purpose of epiphenomenalism by failing to reduce things to determinate causes, or they have to say that something deterministic caused it which we just don't know about yet, at which point you can safely tell them they don't know what they're talking about.

>if its possible that the two impulses are "equal" in power
This is what happens when people freeze up in dangerous situations instead of taking either action. Also wow, what a stupid fucking argument.

The most powerful argument againstepiphenomenalism is that it is self-contradictory: If we have knowledge about epiphenomenalism, then our brains know about the existence of the mind, but if epiphenomenalism were correct, then our brains should not have any knowledge about the mind, because the mind does not affect anything physical.

>universe
>permit
>go against the Occam's razor principle

Christ

Guess how I know you're religious.

Or that flight won, but it just resulted in overwhelming the person so they froze up. Also wow, what a stupid fucking argument

Because of my high IQ

But you can only verify YOUR epiphenomenon

because you're the godhead

Good posts.

I mean, maybe I didn't express it as well as I could have but the meaning is pretty clear I think. Do you have any actual counterarguments?

In the first place the Occam's Razor is not a principle or anything like that. It's a rule of the thumb at best.

>Experimentation gives way to progress.
this is what scientists believe

>self-contradictory
>brain
>mind
>correct
>physical


The state of materialist-rationalists. jajajajajajajajajajjajaajja

>The state of
>materialist-rationalists
>jajajajajajajajajajjajaajja

The state of trolling retards. harharharhar

epiphenomenalism is really dumb if you think through the neurobiology even a little bit. We don't know exactly how the brain produces conscious awareness but specific areas are clearly implicated (e.g. the reticular nucleus in the thalamus). To claim that consciousness is epiphenomenal is tantamount to saying that it requires no ATP to produce, it just turns on alongside some other unrelated process without costing anything. epiphenomenal consciousness is a free lunch

since consciousness requires energy to produce it must be doing something, otherwise its a harmful mutation and we would have all been out-competed by zombies.

>he doesn’t know about cryptic selection purging people with souls from the gene pool
oh user, i’m sorry

That is one of the more retarded things I've read recently.

That...is not right.

>epiphenomenalism is wrong because it's wrong

great argument Mr. Dennett

there doesn't need to be a strict causal connection for you to know about something

Anyways: phenomenal properties have a tight correlation with psychological ones. It definitely doesn't follow that they are psychological properties, because nothing we know about psychology entails any phenomenal properties at all. This could be responsible for our knowledge of phenomena.

Would me, a zombie version of me, and a me that sees red when I see green act any differently? I don't really think so.

Occam's razor only applies when two theories explain things equally. Considering materialism doesn't even verge on explaining phenomena at any point (despite what some would tell you), it doesn't apply here. Also it's best not to think of physical laws as being "binding." Me not being able to go past the speed of light is nothing like me not being able to smuggle cocaine into china. That's just horrible intuition in general

Can someone explain to me how causal closure is so well-accepted? We can split atoms for teleological reasons, and I don't think you can divorce this at all from the higher-level functions in the brain. It seems to defeat anything that isn't total eliminative materialism, which in turn defeats itself

There. Now you can skip 99% of pragmatist* debates

>Also it's best not to think of physical laws as being "binding." Me not being able to go past the speed of light is nothing like me not being able to smuggle cocaine into china.
What did he mean by that?

It means he's real fucking stupid.

No one cares about philosophy. No one important anyway.

We'd all be living in caves and hunting swamprats otherwise cocksuck.

i don't understand this is methodology. how is this supposed to prove anything?

youre* real fucking stupid

the traditional language of stating the epiphenomenal problem as "mental events" vs "physical events" presupposes dualism so you might as well ignore it if you aren't hot on dualism, which i am not

something something Wittgenstein all philosophical problems are language problems

>the traditional language of stating the epiphenomenal problem as "mental events" vs "physical events" presupposes dualism so you might as well ignore it if you aren't hot on dualism, which i am not
well it is dualist, in a light sense but still...

Also why don't you think mental events exist?

>why don't you think mental events exist?

the concept "mental" is here defined by what it excludes, which apparently is "brain events" or "physical events"

nobody using these words knows their real boundaries. maybe the very act of trying to trying to separate a "mental event" and a "physical event" is a clumsy linguistic presumption (i think it is, and must be particularly if you're a monist which i also am)

This whole monist vs.pluralist distinction kind of bothers me because it presupposes substance.

dang..

There is no reason to think of causality, evolution, iteration, etc. and of Time itself as Ontological givens axiomatic in their preceding of you and your knowing. In fact, there is no reason to think of them at all. Such thinking is absurd even within the confines of its alleged explanation. The more convoluted and abstract Positivist Phenomenology is in its delimitation of Phenomena and its cartography of their alleged hierarchies and interactions, to the point where no single person can even pretend to understand any of it, the more this thinking affirms itself as proof of the initial premise. It has no method or conclusion other than absolute ignorance. It's Numerochristianity.

>e
neo pythagorasism on my /lit. How suave

Sobsrance is axiomatic because otherwise: falling through space forever as a notthing

i think you're dismissing the many tangible inventions that proceed directly from "Positivist phenomonelogy". people have figured out how to manipulate the material world in ways that no amount of philosophical circlejerking could ever accomplish. The fact that you're posting your ideas on a computer over the internet etc. is entirely due to science.
>no reason to think of causality, evolution, iteration, etc. and of Time itself as Ontological givens
no there isn't. other than the fact that they are useful constructs for explaining the state of the world. where to begin....

>tfw you realize most people can't even wave function in hilbert space

prove that what you call ''explanation'' is indeed an explanation

>prove that what you call ''explanation''
the only proof i or anyone has to offer is the ability to predict natural phenomena including the behaviour of subatomic particles. along with the ability to apply abstract principles to shape the world to create things like rockets that visit other planets.
perhaps you're looking for an explanation on the level of personal truth? in that case i suggest that neither science nor any verbalizable philosophy can adequately express or explain subjective reality

The fact that I'm posting ideas on a computer over the internet is entirely due to me having them.

ok let me spell it out for you
According to epiphenomenalism:
>mental events exist
>mental events have no effect on anything
For what fucking reason would mental events exist if they haven no effect on anything? They would be completely superfluous. They could disappear altogether right now without anything changing.
Why would the laws of the universe be such that allow purely physical processes to produce non-physical mental events which have no effect on anything?

I didn't know Pythagoreans believed this?

Why wouldn't they? In fact nature is pretty well known for superfluousness.
Consciousness could just be a random side effect of our biological functioning.
You could only argue that it is required by the laws of nature if something was contingent on it. There is no rule that something useless can't exist.

Basically your argument is identical to OP's:
>If something superfluous existed it would make me feel bad.
>Therefore superfluous things don't exist.

Physicalism is invalid ideological nonsense

This isn't like some vestigial extra tooth that you'll never need to use. Nor is it anything like the redundancies that several natural systems have.
Vestigial structures are there for a reason, even if that reason doesn't apply to us anymore. They were at some point useful for our ancestors.
Redundancies help prevent catastrophic results in case a part of the system should fail.
This is a whole plane of existence which according to epiphenomenalism has no effect on anything at all and thus has no reason to exist.
You might as well claim that all mirrors are windows into a mirror reality in which causality and the laws of physics don't exist and all apparent changes in it are actually just reflections of changes occurring in the "real" reality.

>epiphomena don't exist
>lol wtf is magnetism

>>epiphomena don't exist
who are you quoting?

Explain how we could not only know about mental events, but also know which mental events we were experiencing, if mental events have no effect on physical reality.

OK, I think I've got it figured out, you're "quoting" me. It took me a while to figure out because I never said or implied the thing you think I did, but once I remembered who I was dealing with I began to understand how your pitiful excuse for a brain might have interpreted what I actually said as something completely different.

Magnetism is nothing like the supposed epiphenomenalism of mental events. Magnetism is an emergent phenomenon which naturally follows from the known laws of physics. It's simply the behavior of subatomic particles seen from a macroscopic perspective.
Mental events do not in any way follow from any known law of physics, are in fact not physical at all, and according to epiphenomenalism, they have no effect on anything at all, unlike magnetism which clearly does have an effect on anything.