What's your opinion on the Mind-Body Problem?

Where's the problem?

Thank you for noticing my oxymoron

>biological naturalism
But that's physicalism

I think that's the joke.

I could buy that.

>physics will have to posit some sort of immaterial substance
calling subatomic particles "material" is really stretching it

That was the point of changing the name of materialism for physicalism, physical can means basically anything in the universe that is not outright a supernatural, metaphysical, mental or spiritual substance.
Technically panpsychism and property dualism are probably unusual forms of physicalism but it's obvious that physicalists are arguing for a somewhat "scientific" material universe.

>Where's the problem?
no problem... just rush hour

Kek.

It's a false antithesis, since our idea of mind relies on the body, and our idea of body relies on the mind. Schopenhauer solved it in about three pages, two hundred years ago.

>Schopenhauer solved it in about three pages
Where can I find this?

Parerga and Paralipomena, in the section titled "On Various Subjects"

He probably touches on it in WaWaR as well but I'm not even close to finishing that yet

Thanks

>Technically panpsychism and property dualism are probably unusual forms of physicalism
I've thought this too.

I'd have to disagree with those ideas.

Panpschism allows one to buy into and utilize the theory that all things are God(Brahman) and that a hierarchy idealogy of existence is no different from the current standing of things. (Numbers synchronised with order of things, and the power)

But using the idea of God is all things also gives us a system of duality to split ideas into (living, non living)
But still using the idea that which God is all, and totallity devolopes from the existence of God.

Some actual philosophy 101 for you scrubs:

Type-identity theory: Mental properties are identical to neural properties. So, for example, the property of feeling pain is identical to the property of being in a particular brain state.

Classic objection to type-identity theory: Surely it's possible that a Martian could feel pain (hence, have the property of feeling pain) and yet not have a brain at all (they may, for instance, have some entirely different kind of biological organization). Since the mental property can exist without the neural property, they are not identical.

Token-identity theory: Although mental properties are not identical to any physical property, any EVENT that is picked out with a mental property is identical to some event that is picked out with some physical property. So, for example, the event of my feeling pain right now is identical to a neural event. There is, so to speak, one single event that has two properties: a mental property (feeling pain) and a neural property (describable in a vocabulary proprietary to a complete neuroscience).

Classic objection: I feel a pain right now. Let P be a name for that event of feeling pain. I can conceive the following circumstance: P exists, but no neural events exist. What's conceivable is possible. Therefore it's possible for P to exist without any neural event existing. But then P cannot be identical to any neural event.

[Insert huge literature in analytic philosophy about when, if ever, conceivability entails possibility.]

If you accept those two objections, then the game is on for the physicalist to identify a relationship between mental events/properties and neural events/properties that is weaker than identity but strong enough to satisfy our intuition (and scientific evidence) that the mental depends on the physical in a robust way.

I hate gnostics so god damn much.
>I can explain anythin with magic

>I can't take reality for what it is so i resort to some magical non-sense to escape from the fact that I'm a piece of meat born to existense because my dad felt like cumming into my mom

Consciousness is a synthetic experience by the joining of two things: The material/idea impresses by God on this experiencing consciousness it creates and the transcendent consciousness which is actualized as individual but distinct in itself from the impressed consciousness.

The mind is an abstract object pulled out of the abstract realm into the real one by physics. This was solved years ago m8.

>gnostic
I'm Christian and my post, if anything, represents that. I don't have the best understanding of Gnosticism but I am not a dualist and I don't believe in transcendence through non-physical means. If you don't like the word God then ignore it.

>neutral monism
came here to say this

I have a problem specifically with Descartes' method for arriving at Mind-Body dualism. What kind of brainlet would think that doubting everything around him leads to the natural conclusion that the one thing he cannot doubt is thought? Of course you can't doubt thought -- doubt is a product of thought. For this to have been taken seriously for so long is just pathetic.

>solved years ago
By who?
>abstract realm
What in God's name are you talking about?

I don't disagree with the second part of your statement. You could describe this body as just a piece of meat that is the product of sperm and egg, though that is quite reductionist. I prefer to look at it as an alchemical combination of elementary particles that happened to produce a temporarily stronger consciousness. If you don't like the word God then ignore it.

>I'd have to disagree with those ideas.
I don't know what you understand by panpsychism, but it is unquestionably a form of physicalism, i.e. all things are made up of a single type (physical) of substance. It's not even a particularly weird one, contra the anons to whom you're replying.
All it posits is that the 'mind' is present in all material (although only a sufficiently complex arrangement would result in something like an animal or human consciousness). This is opposed to physicality ideas which have consciousness arise from the arrangements or mechanisms themselves.
Strawson's 'Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism' is a good read.

>he's never had a psychedelic experience

I like porn stars who crtique nietzche,stirner, and descartes while getting fucked up the ass

>What kind of brainlet would think that doubting everything around him leads to the natural conclusion that the one thing he cannot doubt is thought? Of course you can't doubt thought -- doubt is a product of thought.
That's exactly his reasoning though.

Doubt isn't a product of thought. Doubt is thought. What may seem self-evident now was not 400 years ago.

you can't conclude something (i.e., thinking/the mind) is different from something else (i.e., physical world/the body) because you can doubt the physical world, but can't doubt the mind. It's a fallacy; the ACT of doubting presupposes a mind. This isn't a proof of two distinct entities.

What is thought and what is product of thought isn't going to be a very interesting conversation. But I will concede your second point

>mind
is a myth

>This isn't a proof of two distinct entities.
It's proof there are at least 2 categories of thing: those I can doubt, and those I cannot. He equates the former with his first-person perspective (the mind) (and God), and the latter with the 'things that could exist without him' (the physical world/body). You're right in that this step isn't watertight but I don't think it's completely absurd to make it.

What's so good about neutral monism?

His method treats the act of doubting as something separate to the mind, when in fact it is a product of the mind. The theory is clearly biased towards proving two separate entities exist;
>I can doubt all things physical, but cannot doubt thinking self
>two entities

Rather than acknowledging that doubt is a mind process;
>I can doubt all things physical, but cannot doubt my thinking self
>the reason I cannot doubt the thinking self is because to doubt is to presuppose a mind doing it

DUDE

"The mind is seperate from the body" Do anyone seriously believe this? Even in Christianity your soul and body is both raised from the dead. If you alter your body with drugs, environment, or food, your mind is affected greatly.

That's a non-argument. You're confusing the word separate with distinct. The claim is that they are distinct entities, but causally interact (i.e., in the manner you have described)

you're also not properly appreciating the nuances of the distinction between the brain and the mind

They don't interact, the soul just observes the brain.

>not Hylomorphism

I'm not that user, but you're missing the point quite hard there, it's on your face.

As he said, doubt IS thought. That means, if there is a doubt, there is thought. Descartes noticed that we can think a lot of stuff on what's real or not, but regardless to the conclusion of said thoughts, if that is the case, we can't deny that we are at least really thinking and really existing because of it.

Not that I agree and there are many layers of discussion, but no wonder you think it is pathetic, you were not getting it.

...

t. Just butthurt HE doesn't have any magic powers

In what way are they separate?

its the hot new thing that all the kids are into

There is none in practice. The mind and the body are one until language comes into play. With language the problems start.

Thanks for putting some effort into your post. More people should be aware of these positions.

That said, I don't think conceivability entails possibility, but obviously type-identity and token-identity can't both be correct. I lean towards property dualism

you're not a Christian. You're a Hegelian, even if you don't call yourself that. Don't worry, Hegel made the same mistake.

>you're not a Christian. You're a Hegelian
What do you mean? I have yet to read Hegel.

He's retarded. Hegel was also a christian

>Everything shares one consciousness. Humans, with faculties for senses, possess a stronger consciousness; allowing God to fulfill His will more concisely (His will being the most impersonal force in reality). The mind is a sense. The self is a illusion. What we call our experiences are the whole consciousness experiencing itself within itself.

This is basically what Hegel lays out in Phenomenology of Spirit. His "Science" is Spirit coming to know itself.

Christianity, on the other hand, requires:
a. Spiritual-Physical Dualism
b. Individual Wills
c. Good-Evil dualism

Typically it is argued that Evil is simply the absence of Good, but whatever the case God cannot look upon something evil acts (or something losing its goodness). Thus one of the most famous lines of Christianity "My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?" shows that the whole "consciousness" stops experiencing "itself within itself."

Paradox, not oxymoron.

>This is basically what Hegel lays out in Phenomenology of Spirit. His "Science" is Spirit coming to know itself.
I've never read Hegel before but he sounds like someone I ought to read. How did Hegel see himself as a Christian even though his perspective seems so different from that of Christianity?