The biggest contribution of Hegel & Marx to western philosophy is the concept of "praxis", which they expanded from its ancient connotations to something that fundamentally alters the limits and methodologies of philosophy as a discipline. Yet, I very rarely see this concept adressed, particularly in non-continental circles.
To my knowledge, Marx was the first to clearly articulate the view that many so-called philosophical problems are not in reality questions of theory, which are to be solved with intellectual contemplation. He held that philosophy was inseparable from social practice - that the very context in which we pose these questions depends on the way humans relate to nature and themselves in their historically specific form of social existence. Hegel's concept of dialectics, often derided as obscurantist or incoherent, was to be most properly applied to social dynamics as a whole - the historical process of human ideas that become a concrete, material force as they affect social conditions.
An important antecedent to this can be seen in Aristotle, who seems to have believed that ethical concerns cannot be separated from political ones. Namely, he held that proper rearing of children that would enable them to become virtuous people depended, first of all, on a proper organisation of society. Many later philosophers would attempt to create a neutral, universally applicable ethical system that individuals could in principle follow, but if we take this argument seriously, those attempts are seriously limited.
Does Veeky Forums think that philosophy can still be practiced in a more-or-less traditional way, by precise formulation of concepts and logical reasoning? Or would you agree that contextual, social practice and historicity present serious challenges for a supposedly "neutral", scientific approach to philosophical issues?
Philosophy of Praxis
I don't feel smart enough to respond to this but I'm interested in what others will think so I'll bump this to the front page for ya
One of the problems this idea stumbles upon is that, in making impossible the "outside" position, it ironically fails to account for those very same positions. The result (if not the motivation, to begin with) is hostility against these stances. Adorno makes a good case for why trying to bring art to the practical is kind of a bad idea, and gives a good summary on why the specific art movements that tried to do it failed. Overall, it's a bad idea to feel an obligation to realize each and every one of our aspirations, and it might be extremely dangerous to try. In our current times, where one is constantly told to make your dreams come true, rarely do people actually take the time to consider seriously why most people don't, and if they wanted to in the same place. Perhaps they know their dreams are impossible, or they think they would do wrong, or they only care about dreaming. Not to say one should repress oneself. Regardless, I believe changing the world is something that should be taken with sensibility and respect.
I'm not familiar with applying these ideas to art, personally. For me, what Hegel and Marx signify is an impossibility to do philosophy in isolation from social science and historical methodology. I see continental philosophy, sociology and political economy as very much related disciplines which suffer from attempts to formalise into distinct concepts. For example, modern sociology has tried to create a "conflict theory" which supposedly originates in Marx, but it's a theory that neuters the whole foundations of Marx's socioeconomic analysis, since it's not properly a materialist theory.
Also, I don't outright reject fields such aa metaphysics as a valid pursuit for philosophy, like many, but it is a radically different project than what traditional ontology attempts to do. Really, I'd say continentals have mostly suffered from not applying the same kind of rigour that late Marx did to analysing socioeconomic phenomena.
You're replying too slowly for me to care about this thread.
Materialism is viscerally disgusting
>reality hurts my fee fees
>I see continental philosophy, sociology and political economy as very much related disciplines which suffer from attempts to formalise into distinct concepts.
But isn't it just natural for them to split? What size does a human community have to have for single indviduals to be capable of grasping all the knowledge it has with some semblance of throughness?
In the beginning not only philosophy, sociology and economy but pretty much all realms of human activity were accessible to individuals. But nowadays, isn't that impossible?
>The biggest contribution of Hegel & Marx to western philosophy is the concept of "praxis
Didn't start strong OP, but I'll read through it
>Does Veeky Forums think that philosophy can still be practiced in a more-or-less traditional way, by precise formulation of concepts and logical reasoning? Or would you agree that contextual, social practice and historicity present serious challenges for a supposedly "neutral", scientific approach to philosophical issues?
Both approaches bloomed in the 60s, I'm more keen on Continental, specifically the post-structuralist shift that happened after 1968, when they realized that a Marxist praxis doesn't actually lead anywhere, and reverted back to theory, a lot of which was about Hegel incidentally, specifically the Master-slave mutual self-conscious- not the historical dialectic. I'd say that, atleast the modern philosophy I like to read, addresses history, or acknowledges its position in social/historical context and orientates itself accordingly. Not much else to say OP, pretty long post for a pretty short question. Also I wouldn't describe Hegel like
>the historical process of human ideas that become a concrete, material force as they affect social conditions
That's an annoying implict marxist phrasing that goes completely against the concept of Geist
The problem with handling problems in this way is that it begins in the world of common sense. It makes assumptions about what exists and how we can know it.
>dude do things lmao
(((praxis))) is just a meme signal for lefties.
>Does Veeky Forums think that philosophy can still be practiced in a more-or-less traditional way, by precise formulation of concepts and logical reasoning?
Yes, I generally find foundational criticisms based on a supposed inability to incorporate one's own historical context or personal experience, lacking.
I prefer what you are calling the more-or-less traditional way, since the problem with this other way, this way of subversion, is that it falls into many of the problems of the other method. One in particular is that it attacks its own foundations, and requires roughly what this user is getting at
Which is the method appears to be outside of the very thing it says surrounds everything.
However you lose the benefit of the other method, which is roughly a commitment to there being an independent world. An independent world is simply helpful in attempting to make justifications. A glass castle of concepts that rests upon and supports itself midair, is not a good base for justification, and is why idealism is rightly seen as obscurantist or incoherent.
I'd like to add that at the heart of this is the concept, or adherence, to certainty.
Idealism is noble in that it doesnt want to move forward without being absolutely certain that it has justification, but what it chooses as its foundations are simply worse than the other method. Husserl bracketing the world and taking personal experience as foundation is one example, with Heidegger really doing the same is another
>Praxis
Triggered
>and is why idealism is rightly seen as obscurantist or incoherent.
Get off my board marxists
Kant was like a Copernicus + Jesus- he's better than both
Kant is generally the exception when people make that claim about idealism, since idealism is seen as the reaction to Kant. Its a reaction to his attempt to criticize reason.
>reality
nigger there is no reality to materialism it breaks down completely under analysis and responds with "well it works and we make accurate predictions" but it has no truth, its anti-knowledge
>Does Veeky Forums think that philosophy can still be practiced in a more-or-less traditional way, by precise formulation of concepts and logical reasoning? Or would you agree that contextual, social practice and historicity present serious challenges for a supposedly "neutral", scientific approach to philosophical issues?
no, i think that between hegel and heidegger philosophy can never return to a pre-hermeneutic standpoint. with phenomenology and historicism we ate from the tree of knowledge. the concept is now and henceforth porous.
Nobody is an idealist in actual practice, that's the fucking point. You can contemplate an extra-sensory world all you like, but miraculously, everyone is a materialist when you have to survive in the here and now by consuming commodities and using your labour-power. The true "philosophy" of a society is revealed in the way people relate to others and themselves in a social system, not in their idle contemplations that are supposedly separate from any context.
Marx presented a very formidable challenge to traditional philosophy but your main reason towards not taking it seriously, are political biases against dirty communists - ironically proving his point.
this argument says nothing against an idealist ontology though.
No, but nobody really takes ontology to be an authority or a valid criterion of truth. It has lost its meaning, its embeddedness in social practice. Like the user above said, we have already ate the fruit - it is impossible to go back, say, to a standpoint of scholastic metaphysics where debates about substances and forms held a genuine position for human knowledge and understanding of the world. The modern attempts to do it are little more than pretense for specialist philosophers. Structurally, the historical position we are in is fundamentally different. This is the proper materialist position.
plenty of people take ontology to be a valid criterion of truth. In fact, I would say most people do.
>specifically the post-structuralist shift that happened after 1968, when they realized that a Marxist praxis doesn't actually lead anywhere, and reverted back to theory
In other words, the capitulation to bourgeois ideology that already happened in Western Marxism several decades ago. They have abandoned the basic marxist concepts but kept some of the language to appease the liberal academics. Marxist praxis follows from an actually existing socialist movement, it isn't created by academia who don't even believe in the organisation of the working class. Today's marxists are followers of Foucault, not Lenin.
>You can contemplate an extra-sensory world all you like, but miraculously, everyone is a materialist when you have to survive in the here and now by consuming commodities and using your labour-power.
Except any action of any kind taken by individuals relies on the assumption of something extrasensorial. You can go back and forth checking your instruments to tell me I'm wrong, but you don't know if I'm still going to be there when you come back.
>people take this shit seriously
If you stopped believing in the production of human necessities, do you think this would effect their power over you as a material being?
what people do, and statistical "truths" do not make materialism truth, does not mean that someone cannot be an idealist
not all idealists are solipsists you big retard
That's not what I said. But in fact, "the production of human necessities" as a whole that you speak of is precisely something that extrasensorial to you. You base your position on the fact that your personal belief doesn't come into factor when it comes to its existence, but you can't talk about it in these terms without believe they are real, and you can't disclose or conceive all of it all at once. So your idea of a material being is already a mental reification.
I disagree. A sufficient foundation for human understanding is the social reproduction of human life, and, technically before that his biological make-up that enables him to sense, perceive and transform the world through creative work. There is nothing extra-sensory about any of it, it doesn't need philosophical justification of "assumptions" to ground the existence of the world. Idealism posits a radical separation of the perceiver from the perceived, but this is not at all necessary to explain human perception and activity, it just stems from an incomplete understanding of nature, particularly neurological patterns, before modernity.
Are you saying that personal belief must come into factor when it comes to its existence, and because of this, you cant talk about an independent world?
>A sufficient foundation for human understanding is the social reproduction of human life, and, technically before that his biological make-up that enables him to sense, perceive and transform the world through creative work.
And all of these positions and proofs are based on people having looked for them. It's all post-fact.
>it just stems from an incomplete understanding of nature, particularly neurological patterns
Explanation is not equivalence. Even if you managed to describe natural phenomena perfectly, that doesn't change their existence hic et nunc.
I'm saying the world exists in a state of indeterminacy, not because it's up for grabs, but because the mental capacities with which we grasp it can be turned against themselves. Existence is simply not "done" yet, it can't be limited in that way by the mind.
bump I'll read OP later
>Does Veeky Forums think that philosophy can still be practiced in a more-or-less traditional way, by precise formulation of concepts and logical reasoning?
Yep
>Or would you agree that contextual, social practice and historicity present serious challenges for a supposedly "neutral", scientific approach to philosophical issues?
Nope.
If I want to know what the physical content of minkowski geometry is, a philosophical question through and through, I do not believe the answer lies in a consideration of my social context, but purely on whatever metaphysical conclusions I can derive, through argumentation, from empirical work that has been done. And so on for most other philosophical questions. (some) Ethics and political philosophy might be a different story.