Henri Bergson appreciation thread

reminder that this guy got closer to solving the hard problem and uniting realism with idealism in 1911 than anyone in the next 107 years

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Remind us further please. As far as I can recall Bergson wasn't that successful in even criticizing Kant's rationality. He sounded like the kind of person who would be a "lul random" philosopher just like Taleb if he lived nowadays, but I admit to have only a very superficial reading of his essays.

Can someone give me a good companion t5o Bergson? I find him even more confusing than people like Derrida, Heidegger or Nietzsche.

He describes in full detail a derivation of consciousness in chapter 1 of matter and memory. His portrayal of pure idealists (religious fundies) vs pure realists (most of modern day people/science) and how they both error in thinking of thought as knowledge rather than potential action is the most interesting and seemingly fruitful perspective for framing the hard problem that I've come across.

Sorry if I can't explain fully, I'm still reading, just got excited after one quick read through

his thinking is similar to jung in that it is based on images/archetypes, but he explores them and their implications more lucidly and in greater depth

he's only able to do this by reducing the entire universe to 'images'
this is very compelling, metaphorically rich, but ultimately as dogmatic and arbitrary as declaring that 'ideas' or 'matter' are the 'primary substance'

>reminder that this guy got closer to solving the hard problem and uniting realism with idealism in 1911 than anyone in the next 107 years
No he didn't.
he was Peirce's contemporary so even if his work wasn't obfuscatory wankery you would still be wrong.

>Peirce
what the hell did he do to solve the hard problem?

Plato, the God Idealist, doesn’t conceive of thought or knowledge that way

What does he mean by images? Because intuitively we think of images as being images of something and thus an image in the ordinary sense would be the image of an image of an image, if that makes any sense.

I do like Bergson, for the little I've read of him, but even Deleuze, a total weirdo, admitted that Bergson was a weirdo who attracted all kinds of new ages folk to his side (for what that's worth).

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Sign relations.
He didn't have a hard problem and didn't run into the realism/idealism, mind trapped in a brain problem of modernity.

will respond when i get home and Havre a chance to thumb through my copy of m&m

*demystifies consciousness*

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It's weird. He was the most important philosopher of the 20th century and then suddenly everyone forgot about him.

*jargonifies the whole subject into incomprehensibility*

>incomprehensibility
Maybe if you're a brainlet

ooh got me dang

So are these axioms all permanently valid simultaneously or are they mutually exclusive or just hypothetical?

They're a description of observed phenomena so they're permanently valid simultaneously, whatever permanently means.

Peirce did this better 100+ years prior.
Bio/cyber semiotics does it better now.

Intergreated information theory is way too particular and trys to ignore autopoesis by reducing it to probability, when it's really logical abduction. also fails to capture the dynamics of sign relations. I do think it might be useful for modeling with some work.
All in all it's a shit tier joke triad.

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>semiotics
This has nothing to do with explaining consciousness you absolute brainlet

>it's really logical abduction
All science is abductive

IIT will establish physical/informational correlates to mental states which is a complete explanation of consciousness, therefore it's a god-tier theory.

So he copied James?

Naming a process or aspects of a process does not explain a process. Actual barebone mechanisms are necessary — point me to the neurons, to the ion channels, to the synaptic vesicles.

Additionally, even if this were a sufficient explanation of the manner in which visual perception and experience generally operate (which it isn't; Veeky Forums is illiterate in psychology and has no idea what actual researchers have been up to since Descartes) it would not be a sufficient explanation of the manner by which consciousness arises from matter, which is the actual hard problem of consciousness.

Christ

>point me to the neurons, to the ion channels, to the synaptic vesicles
Why, we already know what's happening there in a general sense. Particular relationships between actual neurons and thoughts will be made apparent with better technology and more research, IIT offers the comprehensive perspective through which this will happen.

>it would not be a sufficient explanation of the manner by which consciousness arises from matter
No, it would be sufficient. The information constituted in the material relationships of neurology can be understood mathematically according to IIT which makes it possible to reveal correlations between observations about mental states and physical states of the brain.

>autopoesis

What the fuck are you going on about? This is even tangential to conscious experience, which could in principle exist in an artificially constructed system which isn't self maintaining, or in which its self maintaining features are contingent to the nature of its operation, and as such not strictly fundamental to consciousness.

>Semiotics has nothing to do with explaining conciousness
Except it totally does, particularly biosemiotics. Why are you pretending to know what you are talking about?

> physical/informational correlates to mental states which is a complete explanation of consciousness
No it is not.
Also biosemiotics studies physical/informational relationships for all actions of life from cell division to consciousness using the same generalization.
Pic related Peirce established a link between reals and feels in the 19th century, and he did it far better than intergreated information theory, Umberto eco did it better than intergreated information theory ffs.
In using ~probabilistic~ abduction to explain that link IIT is missing the logical process that produces that relationship, that is that that that information means something to the "concious state"(semiotic agent) it's still nominalism and it's still has the mind trapped in a brain problem. It doesn't explain evolution, and certainly doesn't explain intentionality.

I'm talking about intentionality at a general scale.

>In using ~probabilistic~ abduction to explain that link

And how exactly would you avoid this? The 'signals' in our brain are 'noisy', and ITT potentially takes this into accounts, as our minds aren't a lump distinct from what might be considered the 'environment', even considered in their internal mechanisms represented in some particular way. I'd be happy to hear some explanation from you as to why this can be discounted, but ITT is designed as a practical theory that works on actually existing systems in the world.

>It doesn't explain evolution

Why is this a downside? Why should it explain evolution? Why would it make sense to be this general?

>and certainly doesn't explain intentionality

This is arguably a more complex, emergent feature of our consciousness on some level, and a more fundamental aspect of reality on another.

I'd argue that ITT is really tackling a 'middling' problem of consciousness, not trying to directly assign laws to qualia or understand why consciousness arises, but to provide a practical way of researching connections that could lead to this. This is really more valuable at this point.

>pure idealists (religious fundies)
Holy...

> The 'signals' in our brain are 'noisy', and ITT potentially takes this into account.
For example, this may account for how waves of light bouncing off of a 'tree' take the perceptual form of a 'tree'. What it doesn't explain is how that preception is known to be a taken as a tree. It doesn't provide the link that explains how we become conscious of a tree, nothing about probability connects knower to known. I'll come back to that.
On a foundational level using probability theory to explain preception doesn't make sense, that would mean that human reasoning is a product of a formal system of binary relationships, which is very unlikely. To let you know Peirce how fucking invented predicate logic devolped his semiotic to account for human reasoning and viewed logic as a formal semiotic, he didn't think that binary relationships could account for it, getting into that is beyond me.
>Actually existing systems in the world.
more nominalist bullshitery. The screenshot I linked sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0079610715001261
There are better things to read on the topic.
>Why is this a downside? Why should it explain evolution?
Because consciousness evolved from something obviously. Going back to the tree example we come to know that perception as a tree because we come to relate it to the symbol "tree" and continue to relate it to everything associated with a tree, thus the sign for tree evolves and devolps the same way the signs carried in genes do, meaningful relations connect knower to known, information is vacuous, the meaning information is given is what does the relating. There is an intereflexivity in consciousness that allows the knower to know, ITT doesn't account for that, it's semiotic.
Why would it make sense to be this general?
Because it is that general.
>not trying to directly assign laws to qualia or understand why consciousness arises, but to provide a practical way of researching connections that could lead to this.
Any empiricist should be ashamed of such behavior.

About time my nigga Henri got some more attention on here. Reminder to follow-up with Sorel and Benjamin.

>Except it totally does
No, it doesn't. Consciousness is the result of neural states that can be represented in binary and mathematically translated to modes commensurate with phenomenal descriptions of consciousness according to ITT after which applied semiotics is redundant.

>link between reals and feels
Dude, I don't know what you're talking about but this has nothing to do with consciousness. None of this 19th century shit comes close to the level of understanding we're going to get through neuroscience in the coming decades, what you're arguing is totally retarded and pitiably impractical.

>IIT is missing the logical process that produces that relationship, that is that that that information means something to the "concious state"(semiotic agent)
Your complaining that IIT can't explain concepts from some arbitrary framework. "Logical process" "agent" "means" none this has nothing to do with consciousness, you're using a bad framework to understand a straightforward process so it appears incomprehensible. If you were right you would have posted its knockdown explanation of consciousness, but bio-semiotics doesn't have one so instead you've bloviated about your hard on for Peirce while denigrating IIT without substance.

We can explain what consciousness looks like from the inside and we know where it exists, an explanation of the physical substrate of mind as individuated particulate of relative states commensurate with corollary phenomenal states through comprehensibility is the full extent of consciousness as a material and emergent phenomenon.

>still has the mind trapped in a brain problem
This is only a problem for you in your semiotic framework. The mind's relationship with the brain as a naturally emergent phenomenon isn't a problem in IIT.

>It doesn't explain evolution
>certainly doesn't explain intentionality
Allostatic regulation and predictive processing are central to IIT.

>I'd argue that ITT is really tackling a 'middling' problem of consciousness, not trying to directly assign laws to qualia or understand why consciousness arises, but to provide a practical way of researching connections that could lead to this. This is really more valuable at this point.
You would think such an ardent pragmatist would realize this on their own lmao

Shit taste. He didn't come close to solving anything. His "consciousness" philosophy consisted of crying about how "experience" is real and science and rationality are bad.
The only valid position on the "hard problem" is that there isn't a "hard problem." Behaviorists got it right. What you really have when someone reports an "experience" is the behavior of reporting, not some magic non-physical "qualia" ghost. The fact we believe we're "experiencing" is similarly just a belief. Nothing mysterious or beyond the scope of physical cause and effect relationships. The brain doesn't need to literally conjure up "experiences," it just needs to make you believe you have them and get you to behave in response to the abstract concept of them as pseudo-objects, a lot like what we do more deliberately with the pseudo-objects that are numbers or language.

>people are just now realizing that intellectual achievements hit their peak in the early to mid 20th century

Quantum physics, engineering, economics, and psychology/philosophy. Now look at us. Maybe we’ll be the change. Maybe were the rennaissance, Veeky Forums.

>Consciousness is the result of neural states
That statement is uncontroversially wrong.
>that can be represented in binary and mathematically translated to modes commensurate with phenomenal descriptions of consciousness
So can my shits, take epistomology seriously. Do you want to know what can't be represented in binary? The ternary relationship connecting nueral states to consciousness, information has to be taken to mean something in order for it to be concieved of.
>Dude, I don't know what you're talking about but what you're arguing is totally retarded and pitiably impractical.
Dude.
>Your complaining that IIT can't explain concepts from some arbitrary framework.
IIT is arbitrary, it is a completely arbitrary association between information and consciousness with no explanation of how that information is taken to mean anything.
>Your complaining that IIT can't explain concepts from some arbitrary framework. "Logical process" "agent" "means" none this has nothing to do with consciousness, you're using a bad framework to understand a straightforward process so it appears incomprehensible. If you were right you would have posted its knockdown explanation of consciousness, but bio-semiotics doesn't have one so instead you've bloviated about your hard on for Peirce while denigrating IIT without substance.
>Dude, I don't know what you are talking about
>explanation of the physical substrate of mind as individuated particulate of relative states commensurate with corollary phenomenal states through comprehensibility is the full extent of consciousness as a material and emergent phenomenon
By this same reasoning computer processing can be taken to be phenomenal, meaningless information doesn't give rise to meaning (as in knowing consciousness) that doesn't do dick to explain how phenomenon can arise from material, let alone how consciousness comes to be.
>This is only a problem for you in your semiotic framework. The mind's relationship with the brain as a naturally emergent phenomenon isn't a problem
That is the biggest problem IIT has you idiot.
>Allostatic regulation and predictive processing explain evolution and intentionality

Fuck off psued.

>That statement is uncontroversially wrong.
How's that?

>take epistomology seriously
Why? The assumed epistemology of such science is uncontroversial for most people.

>information has to be taken to mean something in order for it to be concieved of.
>how that information is taken to mean anything
The meaning of a given material arrangement in brain matter in the ambition of discerning an explanation for consciousness is the corollary conscious state and the relative states of physical particulate at a given point within an established frame of reference. The relationships among the material is communicable to the conscious through mathematics which derives meaning through predictive capability.

>By this same reasoning computer processing can be taken to be phenomenal
Artificial processing sufficiently similar to the human mind is necessarily phenomenal.

>completely arbitrary association between information and consciousness
No, it's predictive and it actually begins to explain consciousness unlike anything you've presented.

>meaningless information doesn't give rise to meaning
This is necessarily wrong because all information can be reduced to its components which are in themselves meaningless.

>That is the biggest problem IIT has you idiot.
>it's still nominalism and it's still has the mind trapped in a brain problem
This is wrong, you don't understand IIT.

>>Allostatic regulation and predictive processing explain evolution and intentionality
The development of consciousness within an evolutionary framework, yes.

could you guys please stop this
when you're at the point of line-by-line greentext deconstruction, you've gone beyond any possiblity of fruitful dialogue and the whole conversation is reduced to a sniping match

Not true. This is unironically the best way to discuss things

no, it's not
it's serial contradiction with little or no elaboration of the underlying ideas, so no one leaves with a greater understanding, neither of their own nor the opposition's
nor is any kind of dialectical synthesis possible, because both parties are set on digging their heels in and defending their turf, lest they concede any ground by finding some commonality between the opposing viewpoints
it's ego-stroking
it's debased
and it's fucking pathetic; you're not even pissing with your own dicks

I agree.
I disagree

>philosophers
>solving anything than pseudo-problems they invented

Epic troll bro

That’s just simply not the case. I have been a part of many post by post debates where people have conceded points. You do these sorts of things to analytically separate the points the opposing person is making. Not everyone who does it is as butthurt as you or these two, for that matter.

He is trying to say that it is not oriented towards consensus. As one of the participants who has also been a part of many debates like this I agree. I lose interest quickly in these kinds of debates, it's has nothing to do with the methodology, it has to do with where the agruments are oreintated, which is toward the epic BTFO.
these are a waste of time, im better off arguing against myself.
Personally I don't know about the particular qualities of IIT, just that i reject it at it's foundations and the other guy has made it clear that he doesn't get that or a damn thing about biosemiotics, this debate was doomed ab intito.

that was bad wording on my part. strongly religious/spiritual people would be a subset but they may or may not be fundamentalists. This would also include hardcore platonic realists as well