Just a day before, in Stonne south of Sedan...

>Amateurs think tactics. Professionals think logistics.

i want reddit to leave

do you REALLY think his post warranted you advertising their site, user?

>Most French tanks had a horrible operation range, meaning the distance they could move and operate away from their fuel depots and maintenance staffs was very small.
>
>Germans went anywhere they wanted with no supply worries and ran circles around the superior French tanks.
>
>Amateurs think tactics. Professionals think logistics.

>logistics meme

logshittics dosent mean shit if your k;d is that bad

>sheer luck.
>Lol let us surrender anyway just because they are near the capital.

>This is where Rommel first turned his 88mm Anti-Aircraft guns and pointed them at the enemy tanks. It was a desperation move that worked miracles.

You do realize the Condor legion had been doing this since the Spanish Civil War, and that the 8.8 CM guns of WW2 were designed with lighter carriages so they were easier to tip over and point at tanks, right?

Rommel didn't invent the tactic, he was just really good at figuring out where enemy armor was going to make an appearance and having his 88s ready for them.

You're a fucking moron

"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."
- Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Commandant of the Marine Corps) noted in 1980

"There is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war."
- Carl von Clausevitz

"The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…"
- Sun Tzu

That's true Rommel gets credit for that and he shouldn't.

Aww. Boo hoo. Someone used big words and made you scared so you posted a fedora pic?

What a fucking shit stain. Nice shit post fuckface.

Well, that and it wasn't a desperation move. They had literally re-designed the guns to make them better anti-tank platforms. It was a pretty standard tactic by 1940.

Hell, later on the Americans and the Soviets would be doing it too with their own anti-air guns. Anything that's designed to shoot hard enough to hit a plane at like 2-3 kilometers more or less straight up, and push your shell through a (probably) metal fuselage has a hell of a lot of power behind it. It's exactly the same characteristics you want in an anti-tank gun.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#German_forces_and_dispositions

>The main tool of the German land forces was combined arms combat. German operational tactics relied on highly mobile offensive units, with balanced numbers of well-trained artillery, infantry, engineer and tank formations, all integrated into Panzer divisions. They relied on excellent communication systems which enabled them to break into a position and exploit it before the enemy could react. Panzer divisions could carry out reconnaissance missions, advance to contact, defend and attack vital positions or weak spots. This ground would then be held by infantry and artillery as pivot points for further attacks. Although their tanks were not designed for tank-versus-tank combat, they could take ground and draw the enemy armour on to the division's anti-tank lines. This conserved the tanks to achieve the next stage of the offensive. The units' logistics were self-contained, allowing for three or four days of combat. The Panzer divisions would be supported by motorised and infantry divisions.[69]

>their tanks were not designed for tank-versus-tank combat

>draw the enemy armour on to the division's anti-tank lines

German Kill to Death ratios done by anti-tank guns

>The units' logistics were self-contained, allowing for three or four days of combat

Logistics rule all

Not him, but it's always funny when people defend this, but then turn around and try to point out kill to death ratios in favor of the Germans vis a vis, say, the Americans to prove that the Sherman tank was shit.

Doubly so since again, if you really look at the breakdown of American tank losses, it's again anti-tank guns and mines that are killing most of them, not German tanks.

I mean the Germans bouncing all their other caliber rounds off French and German tanks made it feel pretty desperate to the German gunners.

Wouldn't ya think?

>Fuck Heinz is anything going to penetrate this thing?

Sure you're running laps around a Char B in your wolfpack of Panzer IIs and IIIs but all your shots are bouncing.

Right. Or even using Artillery pieces as a direct fire weapon against tanks.

>Just dip that 150MM howitzer straight down and blast that sucker

they won it by superior strategy desu fampai, the blitzkrieg was completely different to how you were supposed to fight wars, the Germans knew they'd have lost against France, the biggest and most modern military in Europe at the time, if they'd fought conventionally and attempted to consolidate and defend, so they just kept fucking going without holding the ground like you were supposed to (according to everyone else's idea of strategy at the time)

the bulk of French troops and tanks and everything else were fucking surprised by the Germans before they could deploy, in Rommel's journal he writes about how they'd encounter huge traffic jams of French troops and armor and just capturing them because the French couldn't attack them, but that when they did engage the French that they got mauled

the "french surrender" thing is a fucking meme doe, if your choices are get massacred ineffectually because your column is stuck behind fleeing refugees or whatever the fuck and 7 panzer IIs and shitloads of german soldiers suddenly roll up on you, or surrender, you'd surrender

no they won through ingenuity and because the French high command was staffed by actual genuinely retarded men

At least according to wiki, there were only 405 Char B1 tanks built. I doubt most German soldiers had ever even seen one.

That limits the scope of "desperation", you know? Especially since you could take out a lot of them by aerial bombardment of the support facilities (or even get really lucky and bomb the tank itself), and wait for it to fall apart, which happened often to armor of the defensive party in a WW2 offensive.
Pardon me for my extreme autism, but didn't the Germans use a 155mm howitzer, not a 150mm one?

>Amateurs think tactics. Professionals think logistics.

dumbcunts think one is more important than the other.

Rommel's performance in North Africa offers some pretty compelling evidence that superiority in logistics trumps superiority in tactics.

>Germans went anywhere they wanted with no supply worries

one man turret
>TC is in charge of guiding the crew
>finding targets
>servicing the target
>handling the main gun
>handling secondary armament
>guiding the rest of the platoon when higher rank
>servicing the radio where available

wew lad, it is a whole miracle that the tanks were able to fight at all

logistics and tactics are both integral to effectively making war, trying to say one is more important is fucking dumb
>"general what's our tactical outline for this attack?"
>"dunno lol, you seen our supply lines though? perfect!"

Yes, but not all powers will be equally adept at one or the other.

And from the record of the various theater conflicts, especially marginal theater conflicts in WW2, it seems that the faction with the superior tactics and doctrine (usually the Germans) pretty consistently lose to the faction with the superior logistical tail.

Hence North Africa, which is almost as perfect experiment box as you can find. You have German forces consistently outmaneuvering British ones, inflicting considerable losses, advancing to the point where they can no longer fuel and supply themselves, and then getting kicked back to El Agheila after each advance.

It's not like you reach into a box and pick either tactics or logistics which prevents you from taking the other choice; but it does seem pretty clear that a marginal improvement upon logistics counts for more than a marginal improvement upon tactical acumen.

>Amateurs think tactics. Professionals think logistics.
Based on my experience on the internet, there's nothing amateurs love to talk more than logistics. Or rather they love to say that quote.

German forces had two winning streaks and each time coincided with British forces being stripped bare to be sent elsewhere. First streak happened when Churchill sent everything except a few brigades to Greece. Second streak happened when Churchill sent the RN to the Indian Ocean.
Also Rommel's success depended heavily on Germany being able to read British code.
As expected of a rank amateur, you have an extremely simplistic view of military history.

>Operationally the Germans were dominant with artillery, air power and logisitical range.
Germany had fewer artillery pieces than the French alone, and had overall something like half the artillery pieces of the combined Brit+French+Dutch+Belgian forces.
Luftwaffe was weaker in absolute quantitative terms than French air force, and was again almost doubled up by its enemies when compared to the combined air forces of its enemies.
German logistics was garbage. They had barely half the number of motorized vehicles that the French had.

German logistics were superior because of doctrine and communication, not because of size.
Had the French been organized they would have whipped the Germans good, but when troops are regularly out of supply and communication takes hours instead of minutes because your asshat commander didn't want to use telephone lines, you're going to get run circles around by the Germans who have radios everywhere, self contained supply reserves allowing units to operate offensively independently, and the training and security clearance even for low level officers to be granted in depth plans for operational goals, you have a very immobile, slow reactionary force fighting a very mobile, proactive force. And although pound for pound the reactionary force has
More men
Better vehicles
Better artillery
And arguably more competent soldiers at the grunt level
It's all for naught because it's not how big something is but how you use it that truly matters.

When the Germans faced opponents who had more numerous logistical lines and deeper pockets, they came up short. The US ran circles around the Germans in France once they broke out oft heir beachhead because American logistics were far superior to the largely horse drawn supply and transport the Germans had. The Russians overwhelmed the Germans because they had more men, tanks and artillery and by '43 the trucks to maneuver them to where they were needed. The Russian logistics were superior to German logistics by then, and they used their superior size and logistical ability to sustain one of the longest and widest push if not the longest and widest push in war's history.

>German forces had two winning streaks and each time coincided with British forces being stripped bare to be sent elsewhere.

Mid-East command never dropped below 340,000 at any point. The limiting factor wasn't "being stripped to the bone, but again logistical; it's hard for the British to project force away from their ports and railroads in Egypt proper. And I could point out the Brits also only had 2 winning streaks, both of them when DAK was terribly overextended.

In 1941, Sommenblume faced the equivalent of 2 divisions and a seperate armored unit, not "a few brigades"

in 1942, Royal Navy being committed elsewhere is literally meaningless given that the Italians still held the routes to Tripoli and El Aghelia, and didn't try to go further east. And the "stripped bare" British fielded well over a hundred thousand men.

>rommel's successes depended heavily on reading British code.

Bullshit. I would suggest you read this.

amazon.com/Path-Victory-Mediterranean-Theater-World/dp/0374529760

German tactics, especially armor/anti-armor coordination was WAY ahead of the British.

>baseless ad hominem

Have fun.

>through sheer luck
Yeah, they rolled a 20 for their attack.

Fun fact: several Char B1 bis tanks were actually recaptured by France in 1944. These tanks were put into 2nd Company of the 13th Dragoon Regiment, where they were used to great success in the attack on Royan in 1945.

But look at all his medals tho

>the blitzkrieg was completely different to how you were supposed to fight wars

The blitzkrieg was literally Napoleon's tactics adapted to tanks, cars and warplanes
Had WW1 not corrupted the minds into an attrition mindset, it wouldnt have succeeded that crushingly

>Pardon me for my extreme autism
No

Eat a dick.

>Can we agree that Germany won the Battle of France through sheer luck and French misapprehension of the situation more than anything?

No

and people wonder why revisionism is a thing.

everyone likes to be the special snowflake who comes up with the new, revised perspective and undercuts the dominant paradigm.

and then we wonder how WE WUZ and other teleological nonsense takes root.

>everyone likes to be the special snowflake who comes up with the new, revised perspective and undercuts the dominant paradigm.

Indeed, the ONLY way to get ahead in politically correct academia nowadays is to attack existing data and theories, even if the counter-theories make absolutely no sense at all...

>Mid-East command never dropped below 340,000 at any point.
That's relevant how? The forces actually opposing German-Italian forces in Libya dropped to a couple of stripped-down brigades. The limiting factor was literally the fact that they were facing several armored divisions with a couple of underequipped, undermanned infantry brigades.

>In 1941, Sommenblume faced the equivalent of 2 divisions and a seperate armored unit, not "a few brigades"
You really have no idea if you actually believe this.

>in 1942, Royal Navy being committed elsewhere is literally meaningless given that the Italians still held the routes to Tripoli and El Aghelia
Yeah the control of the seas is meaningless. What was that saying about the amateurs talking tactics and professionals talking logistics again?

>Bullshit. I would suggest you read this.
I suggest you read a book, any book, before ever posting again.

>German logistics were superior because of doctrine and communication, not because of size.
It wasn't superior. It was decidedly inferior even to French logistics because doctrine and communication can't make up for having 60% of the trucks the other side has. However you decided before you knew any of the facts that German logistics must have been superior and now you will stick stubbornly to that conclusion no matter the facts that get thrown at your ugly face and you will repeat your baseless, factless assertions until the other side gets tired of your retardedness and stop responding to you. At that point you will claim that you 'won' and pat yourself on the back.

>That's relevant how? The forces actually opposing German-Italian forces in Libya dropped to a couple of stripped-down brigades. The limiting factor was literally the fact that they were facing several armored divisions with a couple of underequipped, undermanned infantry brigades.

There was one armored division, and itself understrength.

And yes, they did not have the entire command at the point of focus, BECUASE OF LOGISTICAL ISSUES. Libya has no railroads. It's very hard to get the material you need for that many forces to actually fight where you need them. But those existed at every point in the campaign, and the fact that the British forces were light in Cyrenica weren't due to "stripping the forces to bring troops to Greece". It was that they couldn't fuel, arm, and feed them.

>You really have no idea if you actually believe this.

It is quite literally in the order of battle

fireandfury.com/orbats/dessonnenblumeaustralian.pdf

>Yeah the control of the seas is meaningless. What was that saying about the amateurs talking tactics and professionals talking logistics again?

Do you like beating up strawmen? You claimed in post that

>Second streak happened when Churchill sent the RN to the Indian Ocean.

Which is bullshit, because the redeployment of a mere 2 battleships out of the Med and into the Indian didn't affect the larger logistical situation. The British were still bringing in supplies through the Indian via Suez, and the Germans and Italians were sticking to where they had air cover over their convoys.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348413.pdf

>I suggest you read a book, any book, before ever posting again.

>WAAAH, he won't believe my baseless assertions!

Were you born this stupid, or did you take some getting hit on the head course?

> While in command of a Tiger I tank, he destroyed up to fourteen tanks and fifteen personnel carriers, along with two anti-tank guns, within the space of fifteen minutes

>Hurr durr can we agree that the germans just lost because of bad luck

kys OP the battle of france leaves little room for this mind of bullshit revisonism. France was raped because their military was anachronistic. Ofc they had some good equipment (better than german equipment) because they weren´t limited to a small army like the germans before the Machtergreifung. This stuff is the same bullshit wehraboos try to pull with their mindless muh superior tanks shit.

*mindless bullshit revisionism

>because the redeployment of a mere 2 battleships out of the Med and into the Indian didn't affect the larger logistical situation.
You do realize that more than 2 battleships went to the Indian Ocean, right?
But then it shouldn't surprise anyone to see you struggle with the facts.

>It is quite literally in the order of battle
The link you quoted shows the Australian TO&E, not OoB, but then it's not like you have any idea what you are talking about.

>You do realize that more than 2 battleships went to the Indian Ocean, right?

You do realize that only the ones transferred out of the Mediterranean matter for "naval control of the mediterranean" yes?

But it shouldn't surprise anyone to see you struggle with cause and effect.

My mistake. Here's an actual order of battle.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sonnenblume#Orders_of_Battle

>Cyrenaica Command

1st King's Royal Rifle Corps
1re Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marin (1 BIM)
2nd Armoured Division
143rd Field Park Troop, RE attached from 7th Armoured Division
4th Field Squadron RE attached from 7th Armoured Division
1st King's Dragoon Guards
2nd Armoured Division Signals
2nd Support Group
9th Rifle Brigade (renamed from 1 Bn, Tower Hamlets Rifles, 15 January 1941)
1re Compagnie, 1re Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marin (1 BIM)
'D/J' Battery, 3rd Royal Horse Artillery
104th (Essex Yeomanry) Royal Horse Artillery
1st Company, Free French Motor Battalion attached
3rd Armoured Brigade
3rd The King's Own Hussars
5th Royal Tank Regiment
6th Royal Tank Regiment
16th Australian Antitank Company attached
1st Royal Horse Artillery attached
9 Australian Division
2/3rd Antitank Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery (9th Battery only, 10th & 11th Batteries detached to 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, 12th Battery in Palestine until 5 April 1941)
51st Field Regiment, RA attached
2/13th Field Company, Royal Australian Engineers
2/3rd Field Company, Royal Australian Engineers
2/7th Field Company, Royal Australian Engineers
1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers attached.
One company detached to 9th Rifle Brigade from 26 March 1941

1/2

2/1st Australian Pioneer Battalion
20 Australian Infantry Brigade
2/13th Australian Battalion
2/15th Australian Battalion
2/17th Australian Battalion
20th Australian Antitank Company
24th Australian Infantry Brigade
2/28th Australian Battalion
2/43rd Australian Battalion
24th Australian Antitank Company
26 Australian Infantry Brigade
2/23rd Australian Battalion
2/24th Australian Battalion
2/48th Australian Battalion
26th Australian Antitank Company
3rd Indian Motor Brigade
18th King Edward VII's Own Cavalry
2nd Royal Lancers (Gardner's Horse)
Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (11th Frontier Force)
2/3rd Antitank Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery
10 & 11 Batteries attached from 9th Australian Division

>You do realize that only the ones transferred out of the Mediterranean matter for "naval control of the mediterranean" yes?
You do realize that all but Howe saw extensive action in the Med prior to being transferred out, right?

>en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sonnenblume#Orders_of_Battle
Typical amateurish response. You read an OoB and think literally everyone was there at the same time. The truth is neither the German OoB nor the British OoB for the months-long operation was present in the first months when Rommel made his rapid advance. That was done against a couple of brigades. If you hadn't stopped your frantic google searching at the OoB you would've found that out somewhere, maybe even in a wiki article.

>You do realize that all but Howe saw extensive action in the Med prior to being transferred out, right?

You do realize that is COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT, RIGHT?

Because, you said, and I quote from your original idiotic post

> Second streak happened when Churchill sent the RN to the Indian Ocean.

That "streak" had NOTHING to do with the transfer of naval assets out, because the shipping of land troops was not affected by it. The Germans and Italians never took advantage of the reduced naval presence to widen their own shipping, staying to the same relatively safe (and coverable by air) corridor from Sicily and southern Italy to Tripoli and ports around it.
>You read an OoB and think literally everyone was there at the same time.

No, I don't. You once again have failed basic literacy, because none of that supports your original claim that

> First streak happened when Churchill sent everything except a few brigades to Greece.

Now it's "Oh wait, not all of those troops were there at the point of contact". Which I never once disputed. But you know what? There were about 2 divisions in Cyrenica. NOT IN GREECE. The whole "no railroads" thing ensured that you couldn't have anything more than a strung out force without months of building supply dumps, which they did not have post Compass. I said as much in literally the response to your idiocy. Go back and re-read it

>The limiting factor wasn't "being stripped to the bone, but again logistical; it's hard for the British to project force away from their ports and railroads in Egypt proper

Learn. To. Read. You. Fucking. Idiot.

So what you are saying is, you basically agreed with what I was saying the whole time, but nevertheless put on a shitshow for the sake of forcing an internet argument? You sound like a classy guy.

Nvm I answered without reading your dumb post.
You are a retarded faggot who learned some quote about logistics and now you think it makes you some kind of an expert. Here's a fun fact for you. The Brits had 2 infantry divisions and the 7th armored when they were chasing the Italians. In Cyrenica. That's right, you dumb faggot, it was perfectly possible to project force when you had force to project. Eat shit and die, it would save some internet bandwidth and make the world a better place.

No, I am not agreeing with what you were saying the entire time. You, however, are an imbecile and can't understand basic diction.

Your claims, as enumerated in posts Were that tactical factors, not logistical ones, such as the transferring of assets out-theater, were the causes of German successes in North Africa, as opposed to my contention, outlaid in poststhat logistical issues were paramount, and that tactical ones were secondary; that the British Commonwealth actually had quite a lot of force, and the transfers to Greece and the Indian Ocean paled in comparison that except in very limited circumstances, usually when they were thrown against their own bases, the British couldn't bring their full force to bear anyway, so the transfers out had negligible impact on their battle performance, being restricted solely to the quality differential to the troops out vs the troops remaining.

That isn't agreement at all; and most of my successive posts were trying to correct you on your extremely retarded statements, many of which didn't actually address what I was saying.

Except the Mid-East command was a hell of a lot more than 2 divisions. Remember how you claimed, and I will again repeat it that

>German forces had two winning streaks and each time coincided with British forces being stripped bare to be sent elsewhere. First streak happened when Churchill sent everything except a few brigades to Greece

And that was completely wrong, which you are now admitting, since

>The Brits had 2 infantry divisions and the 7th armored when they were chasing the Italians. In Cyrenica

And they have those same forces, again strung out, in Cyrenica for Sonnenblume?

>Indeed, the ONLY way to get ahead in politically correct academia nowadays is to attack existing data and theories, even if the counter-theories make absolutely no sense at all...
[citation needed]
It seems like you're engaged in the exact same thing you are criticizing

that poor gun barrel

>And they have those same forces, again strung out, in Cyrenica for Sonnenblume?
No, most were in Greece for the early part.

And replaced with OTHER forces of roughly equal numerical strength. So unless your argument is that the 4th Indian 7th armored, and the 6th Australian were so much better than the 9th Australian, 2nd armored, and the conglomerated Corps troops, I don't see what your point is. Furthermore, given that the forces in Egypt outnumbered the ones in Cyrenica many times over, I'm not sure where you're getting this idea that it wasn't logistical constraints keeping the British from fully employing their forces, since those guys DO show up when the Germans push further east where it's possible to deploy them, a la Crusader, when the British suddenly have 6 divisions and another 5 independent brigades, I'm maintaining that it's really the logistical issues in pushing out into the desert with no railroads and extremely limited port capacity.

(and to guard against your incredible autism, I'm well aware that the Indians went to Sudan and then Ethiopia before returning to the "main" African Front, only the Aussies went to Greece. The 7th armored never left the theater at all, simply rotated to Egypt.)

Those replacements were not there you imbecile. They came later.
Jesus christ I'm fucking done.

Well, I hardily disagree. Logistics are not superior if you do nothing with them, and the French did nothing with theirs. A force, a unit, an army, a navy is not superior just because it is larger. Use and application of said armies and navies is what determines their usefulness.

The French did not use their on paper superior logistics at operational capacity. The Germans used their inferior on paper logistics at full capacity. You can plug your ears and cry la la la all you want but the fact of the matter is the French were a disorganized mess. Pound for pound they could beat the Germans. But so many French units ended up surrounded, cut off, unsupported and unsupplied that it makes perfect sense why a superior force was defeated so quickly.
Because in reality, the only advantage the French had was at the individual level. At the tactical, strategic, logistical, communication and initiative level they were inferior.

I'm interested at why you think more trucks means better logistics. I mean the Soviets had more trucks in Barnarossa than the Germans did, but the got shitfucked and caught completely off guard. Many tank units were abandoned because they ran out of fuel. Many infantry units were captured when they ran out of ammo because they were not properly supplied.
Do you have any actual evidence to support superior French logistics? Everything I've read, including the memoirs of de Gaul, talk about how their logistics and communications were an absolute mess.

>Churchill

what a fucking shithead

how he got any position after Gallipoli is beyond me.

I think that's the important part, yeah. Logistics are only usefull when you have competent commanders doing things with the supplies and troops. However, most military writers stress the importance of logistics because there's been many cases throught history where neglecting logistics in favour of "decisive" victories and such lead to huge messes. After all, the entire point of scorched earth is to bait the enemy into a logistical nightmare.
However, if you lose every battle even if you have superior logistical capability you will lose the war. The reasons to why battles are lost go beyond mere "tactics" and is multifactorial, even down to luck sometimes. Nowadays military operations have such a well formed chain-of-command that the man planning the logistics of an operation is rarely the one planning a combat, even if he will hold constant meeting with the men in charge of actual fighting forces to ensure they get the supplies they need.

you're mom handles my main gun

The OP isn't a S35 you retard. You can see the second 75mm gun.

"EDIT:Wow, thanks for the gold!" - Sun Tzu

One lucky French tank crew doesn't prove anything about the Battle of France, OP

The Germans brought to bear the first mechanized zerg rush and this caught the French and British completely off guard with no immediate method of reversing their fortunes, just accept that it happened.

>meme meme meme meme
>meme?
>meme meme

I think so, but then again the Germans pressed pretty much any captured or strange caliber into usage at one point or another

why did I read that in Zap Brannigans voice?

>At least according to wiki, there were only 405 Char B1 tanks built. I doubt most German soldiers had ever even seen one.
well don't forget that 400 tanks is a very sizeable number in the context of early war western front - the germans only had like 2,5k tanks total

Are you saying the quote is bad? I'm pretty sure Alexander the great, Eisenhower, and sun tzu all said similar things.

>At least according to wiki, there were only 405 Char B1 tanks built. I doubt most German soldiers had ever even seen one.
Germany had 300 Pz IIIs for Battle of France. I doubt most German soldiers had ever even seen one. So much for muh massed armor blitzkrieg.