Is it just me or are some of Nietzsche's arguments *really* fucking facile?
Check this shit:
> If self defence is in general held a valid justification, then nearly every manifestation of so called immoral egoism must be justified, too. Pain is inflicted, robbery or killing done in order to maintain life or to protect oneself and ward off harm. A man lies when cunning and delusion are valid means of self preservation. To injure intentionally when our safety and our existence are involved, or the continuance of our well being, is conceded to be moral. The state itself injures from this motive when it hangs criminals. In unintentional injury the immoral, of course, can not be present, as accident alone is involved. But is there any sort of intentional injury in which our existence and the maintenance of our well being be not involved?[129] Is there such a thing as injuring from absolute badness, for example, in the case of cruelty? If a man does not know what pain an act occasions, that act is not one of wickedness. Thus the child is not bad to the animal, not evil. It disturbs and rends it as if it were one of its playthings. Does a man ever fully know how much pain an act may cause another? As far as our nervous system extends, we shield ourselves from pain. If it extended further, that is, to our fellow men, we would never cause anyone else any pain (except in such cases as we cause it to ourselves, when we cut ourselves, surgically, to heal our ills, or strive and trouble ourselves to gain health). We conclude from analogy that something pains somebody and can in consequence, through recollection and the power of imagination, feel pain also. But what a difference there always is between the tooth ache and the pain (sympathy) that the spectacle of tooth ache occasions! Therefore when injury is inflicted from so called badness the degree of pain thereby experienced is always unknown to us: in so far, however, as pleasure is felt in the act (a sense of one's own power, of one's own excitation) the act is committed to maintain the well being of the individual and hence comes under the purview of self defence and lying for self preservation. Without pleasure, there is no[130] life; the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life.
I don't see how you can wriggle out of this argument being shit by saying I've 'misinterpreted' or 'misread' him.
His point stands alone with out any need for prior reading, and it sucks.
He's basically saying:
We can't know how much pain we're causing people unless we share their nervous system, so when somebody attacks someone else they're exempt from guilt because they don't know wtf they did.
This is just such outrageous reaching, I can't even.
>I don't see how you can wriggle out of this argument being shit by saying I've 'misinterpreted' or 'misread' him.
But you have absolutely misinterpreted and misread him. At one point is this passage talking about guilt? To say that an act is not one of wickedness is not the same as saying that act is permissible.
Adrian Parker
If harming somebody in self defense is morally justifiable, then many things considered immoral becomes morally justifiable.
If harming somebody innocently/accidently is morally justifiable, then many things considered immoral becomes morally justifiable.
Jordan Lewis
In general, the people Nietzsche is responding to believe the act of causing pain, injury, or death to be immoral so long as the act a. is intentional -- exempli gratia, you are not at fault if somebody dives in front of your car and paints the pavement. b. is understood to be causing harm -- if you play a game of football and kick around the ball, but later learn that the ball was filled with small, fluffy animals, you have not done anything wrong, as you didn't know what was in the ball. c. is not intended to do good -- if a surgeon breaks your ribcage and rips out your organs, you are caused severe injury and pain and are at a significant risk of death, but generally, these procedures are done for your eventual benefit. Nietzsche takes it for granted that, if an individual harms another to save himself from pain, injury, or death, then he has not committed evil, even if he causes more harm to another than he prevents in himself. If a victim cripples her rapist or murders his torturer, it would be argued, she or he has done nothing wrong, even though more harm has been done than would likely be done otherwise.
His response, then, stems from a number of observations: 1. We always learn that others feel pain, die, etcetera by analogy. We feel pain ourselves, and we in turn assume that when others exhibit the same symptoms that we do when we are in pain, that they feel pain as well. Nietzsche conjures the image of a child who tortures an animal but does not understand that the animal is in distress. Is the child at fault if it can't identify the symptoms of distress in a species that isn't even its own? Of course not! The child hasn't even been taught. Imagine a more colourful example: a creature that exhibits pain and terror by laughing uproariously and stating in plain English it's absolute pleasure, and which is driven to agony whenever fed chocolate and given sexual favours. How could you be at fault for torturing this creature if every bit of information you have learned about it informed you that it felt the opposite of pain? 2. Extending this somewhat, the child itself experiences a great deal of pleasure from tormenting a kitten, and you would feel a sense of pride and charitableness at torturing the faux-masochist. There is no biological reason at all for you to believe that you are inflicting pain.\ 3. Humans have a capacity for sympathy. That is, when another individual feels pain, we feel pain also. However, we, as far as seems reasonable, don't feel as much pain as they do. Since we cannot be certain of how painful their injury is any more than a very young child can gauge the degree of a kitten's pain from the loudness and intensity of its screeches, we cannot be at fault when we misjudge the application of pain against the weighted benefit. (1/2 Cont . . .)
Luke Murphy
(. . .2/2 Cont.)
4. Since humans in general are not given to self-harm, we will only hurt ourselves in order to gain a greater benefit or avert a greater harm. Since we do have a capacity for sympathy, we will not hurt others unless we perceive that additional benefit might arise from the harm that we inflict. A bank robber, for example, holds up a bank because he has financial needs, social debts, and so on. He may require money to pay for his medical bills, to put his children through school, or to feed his large family or to pay massive gambling debts. We cannot know his reasons. What is important is that he has them. If he had no self-interest he would not rob a bank, and he would not rob a bank if he perceived the harm he does to be greater than the harm that he prevents or the benefit that he and those around him receive. A human committing a so-called "evil-act" is no more at fault than would be a lioness feasting on a gazelle. The human is merely capable of sympathy.
The quoted passage is best read as a response to (a) Christian morality as perceived by Arthur Schopenhauer and (b) utilitarianism, specifically Mill's. I do take some issues with his approach, for example, humans do cause themselves harm intentionally without real benefit (suicide, self-harm, addiction, ad infinitum), but remember to read this aphorism within the context of the thinkers (J.S. Mill and Schopenhauer) that Nietzsche was replying to.
Reading your objections, you don't seem to have misread Freddy, but you do seem to have misrepresented him, summarizing his paragraph-long aphorism into a single, incoherent blurb. Try again.
Adam Sanchez
Seems more like he's pointing out flaws with the blanket argument than condoning it. Maybe I misread it
Carson Diaz
I'm the OP but this is a really good analysis.
Have you ever taken the LSAT?
You seem like the type who'd do good on it.
Chase Nguyen
The LSAT is too fucking easy. You have no business in academia if you can't score 175+.
Jeremiah Ross
Nietzsche never really made a dent in utilitarianism. He was effective again Christian morality, but that's like shooting fish in a barrel.
