Synthetic A Priori Principles: Does Metaphysics Exist?

Hey Veeky Forums, I am writing a paper on the validity of synthetic, a priori principles. Most of what I know comes from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and "Prolegomena."

I critique Kants' proofs from a logical viewpoint; mainly via the framework used in Oliver A. Johnson's "Denial of the Synthetic, A Priori."

I will need to field questions from my class and then in a one-on-one with my professor. I was hoping some of you well-versed in the subject could toss up possible problems/challenges/interesting implications/general discussion regarding my argument or the topic/philosophical works in general.

I will update the string of my argument in separate posts, accompanied with the diagrams/proofs I'll be writing on the board during my presentation.

Does reading exist? Where is reading?

It's about the same question.

Part I: Kant's Synthetic A Priori

We should begin with what Kant considers a ‘judgment.’

- Judgment: “I think [subject + predicate]” = A statement or assertion

RE: ‘I think' ...

"The ‘I think’ must have the ability to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or at least would be nothing to me (Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, Part 16).

- A judgment may either be analytic or synthetic.

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought, this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicateBbelongs to the subjectAas something that is contained in this conceptA; orBlies entirely outside the conceptA, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case, I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic (Critique of Pure Reason, 6-7).

- Analytic: “true just in the virtue of how the subject relates to the predicate”

- Synthetic: “something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of body in general” (Critique, 7).

Knowledge comes from judgment and is classified as either empirical (a posteriori) or a priori.

Judgment --> Knowledge

a posteriori: grounded in experience

- Limited in its application

- Susceptible to contradiction

a priori: based upon reason alone

- Independent of sensory experience

Before Kant, knowledge and judgment are categorized as follows:

1. All analytic truths are a priori

2. All empirical knowledge is synthetic

These categories were described by Hume as "Relations of Ideas" and "Matters of Fact," respectively.

Kant disagrees with Hume, and his major task is to bridge the gap between the two categorizations and prove that synthetic a priori principles exist.

He uses geometry to try and show an example. Namely, he brings to the fore a triangle.

(1) After seeing a triangle, we know that it has three sides. (Analytic, a priori)

- We can conjure the form of a triangle independently of experience

- If someone tells you there is a shape in the other room that does not have three sides, you need not see it to know it is not a triangle

From this knowledge of a triangle, we may deduce the following:

(2) A triangle forms three angles. (Analytic, a priori)

- This statement is vacuous; it tells us nothing new about triangles; we cannot conceive of a triangle with three sides that does not necessarily form three angles

The sum of a triangle’s angles is equal to 180° (a priori, but synthetic?)

Kant didn’t think it right to think of this knowledge as analytic. A priori, yes, but not analytic.

- the subject ‘triangle’ does not relate to us as ‘having the angular sum of 180 degrees.’

Part II: Leibniz’s Synthetic, a priori

In the Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice, Leibniz’s primary question is “whether justice and goodness are arbitrary or whether they belong to the necessary and eternal truths” (Political Writings, 45).

- Principles of Right = Principles of Mathematics/Logic
- Universal, Necessary, and Intelligible

- God’s Justice = Man’s Justice

“There is a great difference between the way in which men are just and [the way] in which God is: but this difference is only once of degree” (p. 48)
His conviction is that the ‘principles of right’ are, in fact, just like the principles of mathematics.

Humans may recognize and know that which is good “like the other necessary and demonstrative sciences which depend not at all on facts, but solely on reason.”

If this is so, then perhaps we may find some semblance of Kant’s conviction that synthetic, a priori principles exist in Leibniz’s Conception. Leibniz, like Kant, references a mathematical proof:

It doesn’t seem that there is anything in the original, analytic concept that allows us to know that the difference between successive square numbers will be equal to the difference of successive odd numbers.

Part III: The Logical Empiricist’s Response

There has been huge debate over the possibility of synthetic, a priori truths. Logical empiricists, who believe that synthetic judgments belong solely to empiricism (derived from experience), also, consequently, believe that a metaphysics dependent on synthetic, a priori truths is bologna.

Oliver A. Johnson in Denial of the Synthetic A Priori (1960) says “no one has succeeded in providing anywhere near a definitive answer as to whether or not there are truths of reason” (Denial, 256).

He believes the rationalists (Kant) have not proven that something can be I) Informative and II) Necessarily True.

Why? Because he claims that all prior proofs of synthetic, a priori principles rely on intuition when they should be proven logically.

The problem with proving synthetic, a priori principles logically is that the logical definition of ‘analytic’ is a proposition whose contradictory is self-contradictory. Consequently, it would seem that all a priori truths are analytic.

>I critique Kants' proofs

So, using the triangle reference:

(1) a triangle has three sides (proposition)

(2) a “triangle” has four sides (self-contradictory)

So, on one hand, Kant wants universally true metaphysical principles that can be ascended to synthetically; he uses mathematics to show they are possible.

Oliver A. Johnson’s response is that these proofs rely on intuition, not logic, and are therefore inconclusive. At first sight, the proofs are convincing. But still inconclusive.

Johnson is a fair man and admits he is asking, technically, the impossible:

“Here, though, many defenders of the synthetic a priori would protest. I am, they would say, asking the impossible. For a proposition whose contradictory is self-contradictory is, by definition, analytic (or vacuous)” (Denial, 257).

“I should insist [that we not accept the logical impossibility] as a starting point for our discussion of the synthetic a priori” (Denial, 258).

He changes the fundamental question.

‘Are there synthetic a prioris?’ ‘Are there necessarily true informative propositions?’

Johnson then dedicates the rest of his work to more closely examine why the logical empiricists deny synthetic, a priori knowledge.

He starts with their proposition no synthetic propositions are a priori.

Is this proposition a priori or a posteriori?
If a posteriori it is an empirical hypothesis capable of being disproven.
It would be disproven if we could find a synthetic, a priori proposition.
To this, Johnson asks ‘but would it really?’

Empirical Disconfirmation:

“All swans are white” --> Wait, this swan is black!

The original proposition is therefore empirically disconfirmed.

The original hypothesis is disconfirmed because it “predicts the experience of a certain colour sense datum when we view swans but in fact in the disconfirming instance the observer experiences a different sense datum” (Denial, 259).

Main point: this disconfirmation relies on sensory data.

Would it be possible for an observer by means of sense observation to confirm that a synthetic proposition is also a priori?

Johnson says this is intrinsically impossible: just by the notion that the proposition is a priori it cannot be proven or disproven by empirical data.

Can’t we just write a synthetic, a priori truth on a piece of paper and show it to everyone?
Johnson: “Sure.”
“God is two-headed.”
What if someone writes “God is three-headed”?
The original, written statement is disconfirmed. This is, obviously, useless.

“The objection rests on a confusion, between a proposition and its empirical manifestation” (Denial, 259).
We cannot observe a synthetic a priori proposition as we do the black swan.

Therefore, even if it were possible for a synthetic a priori proposition to exist it could not disconfirm empirically the proposition “No synthetic propositions are a priori.”

In order for a proposition to be a posteriori it must be possible to disconfirm it empirically. Therefore, “No synthetic propositions are a priori” is an a priori proposition.

Next:

Is the proposition “No synthetic propositions are a priori” analytic or synthetic?

If it is analytic, it is non-informative. Any conclusions logically derived from it would also have to be analytic. But, empiricists would like to use this proposition to say “metaphysics does not exist,” “empirical science alone can give us knowledge of the world,” and other informative statements.

So, Johnson concludes that the statement must be synthetic.

Hilariously enough, Johnson ends up with a synthetic, a priori proposition if we are to put his results together.

This seems ludicrous. Johnson writes “it itself refutes what it itself asserts” (Denial, 261). It is self-contradictory. Therefore, it cannot be accepted.

Johnson’s Solution:

The proposition we have ended up with is self-contradictory. But, the contradictory of a self-contradictory proposition is, logically, necessary.

So, what is the contradictory of “No synthetic propositions are a priori”?

“Some synthetic propositions are a priori” (Denial, 261).

Are the logical empiricists wrong?

Johnson’s demonstration seems to provide a proof that they are, and that metaphysics exists.

I'm a right pleb so I'll bump in hopes that you find what you are looking for OP. That being said trusting Veeky Forums to anything in the actual proximity of academic rigor is not a wise choice. This place is more suited for doing things in one's own time and not trying to get help for actual coursework.

Johnson's argument is garbage. The sentence is analytic.

Btw: Metaphysics exists, and is synthetic.

If the sentence was analytic wouldn't that imply all synthetic proportions are priori? cuz thats crazy.

Aristotle said that all knowledge begins in the senses and he was the greatest metaphysician of all time

the scholastics agreed with Aristotle, and they were collectively the most advanced metaphysicians of all time

the scholastics said that in order to have knowledge, you need the object of thought (through the senses) and the faculty of thought (reason)

empiricists are those that affirm the senses but deny the faculty (reason)
rationalists are those that affirm the faculty (reason) but deny the senses

both are dumb and modern philosophy is a complete farce

What?

The original sentence “No synthetic propositions are a priori” is analytically true.

Your sentence "All synthetic proportions are a priori" is not only false, it is analytically false.

>The contradictory of a self-contradictory proposition is, logically, necessary.

I don't know why the contrary of a self-contradicory proposition is necessary. Take "This statement is a lie".Its contrary is "this statement is true", which i guess isn't falsifiable but also isn't intrinsically true.

>empiricists are those that affirm the senses but deny the faculty (reason)
>rationalists are those that affirm the faculty (reason) but deny the senses

Complete and utter horseshit.

>trying to dismantle Kant

"This statement is a lie" isn't self-contradictory.

Yes it is because the statement can neither be true or false.

>The original sentence “No synthetic propositions are a priori” is analytically true
The concept of synthetic, by definition, does not contain the concept priori. If a statement is analytically true that means the subject and predicate are always connected. (I.e All bachelors are unmarried, All triangles have three sides)

>Your sentence "All synthetic proportions are a priori" is not only false, it is analytically false.
Which is proof the original statement "No synthetic propositions are priori" is synthetic.

You could look into Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction. I just skimmed through your work - it is a bit much for me to read through right now.

>Yes it is because the statement can neither be true or false.

Think through what you just said.

If the statement were neither true nor false, then it would not be false.

With me so far?

Now if the statement were self-contradictory, then it would be false.

In other words, if the statement were not false, then it would not be self-contradictory.

Hence, if the statement were neither true nor false, then it would not be self-contradictory.

You follow all that, or do I need to go slower?

Okay, then what would we call such a statement?

>Which is proof the original statement "No synthetic propositions are priori" is synthetic.
No. It means the original statement is analytically true.

If "All even numbers are divisible by 3" is analytically false, then "No even number is divisible by 3" is analytically true.

It has no truth value.

I don't think your using Kants definition of "analytic statement". See

It's not false though, and the statement says it is false, but it can't be true, because of the statement itself. So is it false?

Is "this statement is a lie" false? Or is it true?

Where does "truth value" come from? What do i read?

It is neither true nor false. It lacks a truth value.

It's like asking whether "wew lad" is true or false. It's not the kind of linguistic expression that can have either property.

Have you ever taken a logic class? It doesn't sound like you have.

Having a 'truth value' = being either true or false

Which means it is a contradiction.

No, I am using his definition. I just don't agree with all his conclusions.

>Which means it is a contradiction.

Are you fucking with me? We just went over this Self-contradiction ==> false
Lacking truth value ==> neither true nor false

No I'm a math major. I wasn't the one you where talking to btw. I was expecting a multi-value system.

>"No even number is divisible by 3" is analytically true.
Well then your using it wrong.

Why does it have to be a self contradiction? Why can't it just be a contradiction?

I think Kant is dismantlable (is that even a word?), but I agree on this way being useless.

It may be more correct to say my opinion is it's possible to see Kant's project as narrow and so expand it.

Yeah, you can address it in various ways with multi-valued logics. Paradoxical statements like the one discussed cannot be assigned truth values in classical bivalent systems.

>Have you ever taken a logic class? It doesn't sound like you have.
>Having a 'truth value' = being either true or false
You're pissing about the law of excluded middle there, and it often doesn't apply.

For example Kierkergaard liked excluded middle and Hegel did away with it. But the reasons for excluding the middle are never themselves logical afaik. If anyone thinks different by all means chime in.

>Does reading exist? Where is reading?

it's in berkshire user. i passed by it on the M4 just the other day.

Because we talking about a single sentence. If it doesn't contradict itself, then there is nothing else for it to contradict.

Put another way: a contradiction is a set of inconsistent sentences. If the inconsistent set at issue is a singleton, then the sentence it contains must be a self-contradiction.

Typo: should be "Not all..."

Its self-contradictory because it proposes and contradicts the same idea in the same sentence.

>You're pissing about the law of excluded middle there, and it often doesn't apply.
Nope, the principle of bivalence has nothing to do with the law of excluded middle.

Either way the it doesn't fit an analytical statement. "divisible by 3" is not in the definition/concept of "Even number",

I disagree, but let's not veer into the philosophy of mathematics. Use the example of "No bachelor is married" if you prefer.

See your formatting is still wrong. Its "all bachelors are unmarried" because "unmarried" is in the definition of "bachelor". "Priori" is not in the definition of "Synthetic".

>Consequently, it would seem that all a priori truths are analytic.

It is a common assertion that you are making, but the devil is in the details. You cant just make a trivial analytic statement about the meaning of analytic, and say it is a consequence of that.


This. The sentence is self-contradictory. OP should immediately recognize it as analytic given the number of times they have repeated that the contradictory of analytic is self-contradictory.

To be honest with OP, your approach is flawed, and you are not critical about what you are saying and what you have read. I'm sorry that you caught a terminal case of philosopher and are now a human parrot.

I think i get you. Take this sentence "no sentences have five words"
Per Johnsons proof the reverse must be true. "All sentences have five words" which clearly isn't true. Therefor the contrary to a self-contrary isn't logically necessary.

Both sentences are clearly not true. Now, based only on the information in this single post, what would you do if I posited that " some sentences have five words."

>"Priori" is not in the definition of "Synthetic".
I agree. I'm arguing the opposite. The concept of "a posteriori" is contained within the concept of "synthetic". That's why it is an analytic truth that all synthetic propositions are a posteriori (i.e., "No synthetic propositions are a priori").

The negation of "no sentence has five words" is "at least one sentence has five words" (not "all sentences have five words").

All a posteriori propositions are synthetic, but not all synthetic propositions are a posteriori. Some synthetic propositions are a priori.

We've been over the fact that its a self contradictory statement,

Well thats true, but I'm arguing against johnsons solution >" some sentences have five words."
isn't self -contradictory.

I know Kant believed that, but he was wrong. He didn't understand mathematics very well. Which is to be expected - it wasn't until the 19th century that mathematics was made logically rigorous.

What is?

I think philosophy was invented to torment actually working minds

Haha I'm literally putting the finishing touches on my Kant paper, just took a writing break and saw this thread.

"No synthetic propositions are priori" is self-contrary

I get the feeling conversations got crossed. But...why?

OP doesn't get it, but what exactly do you think Johnson is doing? You're missing something.

Can you name a posteriori proposition thats analytic? Or at least why you know it isn't true.

It is people with actually working minds writing books to torment idiots, who then go on to publish idiotic books of their own. You only need a few non-idiots every generation or so to counteract it.

See who does not understand Kant or the function of logic.

Hes arguing that the contrary of a self-contrary proposal is a logical necessity.

Is it fair to use the triangle as an example, though? People made up mathematics, so when we had a triangle in mind, we set the rules for it. It's not something that's universally known, you can find people who don't know the sum of all the angles of a triangle.
Doesn't this come off as empiric, as people get to learn that the sum of all angles is 180° in school?

Have you ever learned a new word, or found out what a word means? If I thought that No Bachelors live with married women, and then I learned that no bachelors live with married women because all bachelors are unmarried, I just technically produced an a posteriori analytic truth.

[A] The contradictory of an analytic truth is self-contradictory
[B] The contradictory of a self-contradictory is a logical necessity
[C] All analytic truths are logical necessity.

This is not actually what Johnson is doing by the way, it is tautology to obscure a different conversation entirely. He has pedagogical intent.

You're wrong
t. KV NEET who lives with his parents

I think its more fair to say people discovered mathematics. In reality all the sum of all angles of a triangle is 180 degrees, regardless of how we measure it (I.e counting base ten vs counting base five doesn't matter). It still counts as a priori because you haven't seen ALL the triangles.

>In reality all the sum of all angles of a triangle is 180 degrees, regardless of how we measure it
But didn't we make up the measurements ourselves? The only proof you need is children, they don't know that the sum of all of the triangle's angles is 180. Hell, they don't know a lot of "analytic" truths. Isn't this proof that empiricism is 100% true?

>No Bachelors live with married women
Im not sure "No bachelors" and "married women" are analytically paired.

And where did you pull those [ABC] rules from?

It doesn't matter if babies understand it its objectively true. Its impossible to draw a triangle with angles that don't add up to 180.

WTF is "self-contrary"?

>Im not sure "No bachelors" and "married women" are analytically paired.

I am making two synthetic claims, one of which, proposing that unmarried men do not live with married women, is implicit. Within the example, I am unaware of this, and the only way for me to find out is either by examining the relationship between both claims, or being told what a bachelor is. Either way, I come to an analytic claim a posteriori, What interests me is that if I gain this knowledge by examining the relationship, I think utilize an a priori synthetic judgement to produce an a posteriori analytic.

>And where did you pull those [ABC] rules from?

Just a syllogism.

>The only proof you need is children, they don't know that the sum of all of the triangle's angles is 180
They don't know that bachelors are unmarried, either. But that's only because they lack the appropriate concepts and vocabulary. Analytic truths are known by anyone who fully understands the constituent concepts.

I don't understand your example. Bachelors can live with married women. So the observation of living arrangements is irrelevant here. The point is that if someone is a bachelor, then he himself is unmarried - and knowledge of that truth is implicit in knowledge of what the term "bachelor" means.

>unmarried men do not live with married women
What is the other synthetic claim? Are you saying "unmarried men living with married women" is the subject and "bachelors are un-married" is the predicate?

> Bachelors can live with married women.

Did I not mention this example takes place in 17th century Prussia?

Bachelors are the subject, not living with unmarried women and not being married is the predicate.

Bachelors do not live with married women. Why? Because Married women live with married men. Which means, all bachelors, in light of their not living with married women, are not married. It may be ridiculous but it is logically sound.

I am abusing the relational character of synthetic judgement to perform slight of hand and produce an a posteriori analytic judgement. Logic is a magic trick.

you can't exactly measure the sides of any imagined or drawn triangle, therefore there can't be exact measurements for the angles adding up to 180. For all we know straight lines don't even exist, maybe duo-dimensional planes don't exist either.

Mathematics is an a posteriori bastardization of a posteriori sensuous knowledge. I.e the oversimplification of humans [that humans make] with respect to a priori sensuous data.

with respect to a posteriori* sensuous data

What you are describing is a person who doesn't know what the term 'bachelor' means. The specific process (=language learning) by which he eventually comes to understand what the term means must of course involve an a posteriori process, but that is irrelevant here. To understand the term is to understand its necessary conceptual connection with the property of being unmarried. So the end result for competent users of the concepts is an a priori analytic judgment.

Read "Two Dogmas".

Beyond Good & Evil 11 is very interesting as well, but from a very...different perspective.

>it is time to grasp that, for the purpose of preserving beings such as ourselves, such judgements must be believed to be true; although they might of course still be false judgements! Or more clearly, crudely and basically: synthetic judgements a priori should not ‘be possible’ at all: we have no right to them, in our mouths they are nothing but false judgements. But belief in their truth is, of course, necessary as foreground belief and ocular evidence belonging to the perspective optics of life.

You've never known a word and not known what it means? Are you a natural born poet or a dictionairy? The analytic truth is there, but since the scenario requires it to be discovered in an a posteriori process, it becomes analytic a posteriori.

You keep saying it is irrelevant ,but since all that I was asked to do is sophist my way into an analytic a posteriori , it couldn't be anymore relevant.

Also, competent use? The point was never to simply come to an understanding of the concept, but to come to an understanding in a specific analytic a posteriori way. Not only does it require competence as you see it, but it also requires the competence to manipulate and play with the concepts at hand.

I can promise you there is something wrong with it. Start figuring out what that is. A good place to start is figuring out why what I did is relevant.

> since the scenario requires it to be discovered in an a posteriori process, it becomes analytic a posteriori.

The key part here is the 'a posteriori process' (i.e. Empiricism). You are correct in saying this knowledge is acquired empirically. The problem with calling this 'a posteriori analytic' knowledge is that the ability to logically confirm the truth is a priori.

Follow me?

Once you know the truth (whether or not you were informed by pure reason or empirical findings) you know it ASIDE from an empirical confirmation.

How is this possible? Because you know this knowledge a priori. To be romantic about it, you know the knowledge "within you," or innately.

I suppose a natural question to this is 'so can't it be both a priori analytic AND a posteriori analytic?'

The human ability to reason (your ability to be rational) is *what allows you* to know something AKA know an analytic truth.

ex. Trees need sunlight.

Where does the "truth" in this situation exist? To the tree? To the universe? Yes, in an objective sense.

But KNOWLEDGE OF this objective state of affairs (i.e. the universe and its natural laws) is only possible through the capacity of reason in that noggin of yours.

What if a priori is just a spook? What if conventional logic is just ideology or is false or incomplete due to the limits of the human brain?

WHY CAN'T A BACHELOR BE MARRIED!!!!?!?!? I say they can and who are you to stop me!?

Bachelors surely can get married; they're just not bachelors once they do.

Empiricism is synthetic a posteriori. The knowledge I am talking about acquiring does not need to be empirical. The relation between my two synthetic claims is an analytic truth which can be obtained on the experiential grounds provided by the relation between these claims.

>Once you know the truth (whether or not you were informed by pure reason or empirical findings) you know it ASIDE from an empirical confirmation.

Once I observe the relation and find that all Bachelors are not married, I can not go back in time to know it aside from an empirical confirmation.

> Because you know this knowledge a priori
Except I explicitly dont. I have a subject without any knowledge of the predicate contained within. I only discover the content of this subject by observing the relation of two predicates between the relation of two synthetic claims.

>you know the knowledge "within you," or innately.
People do not innately know the meaning of words.

>I suppose a natural question to this is 'so can't it be both a priori analytic AND a posteriori analytic?'

Not a good question at all. Can something be both A and not A?

>The human ability to reason (your ability to be rational) is *what allows you* to know something AKA know an analytic truth.

Understanding the meaning of words, their analytic truth, does not require one to be rational or capable of reason. In an analytic statement, the predicate is contained within the subject, so what would there be to reason toward?

>ex. Trees need sunlight.
>Where does the "truth" in this situation exist?

It does not exist anywhere, because your claim is not true. All trees need light. Pedantry aside, these are contingent naturalistic claims. If you want to take another shot at this approach, replace the word need. You're never going to get the current example to reach a point of objective truth.

>But KNOWLEDGE OF this objective state of affairs (i.e. the universe and its natural laws) is only possible through the capacity of reason in that noggin of yours.

I can know Universal Law? Quick, make a positive substantive normative claim, and make sure you define all the normative concepts within. Reason may not be as helpful here as you think.

> I only discover the content of this subject by observing the relation of two synthetic claims.

Okay, so you admit you 'discover the content of [the] subject' AKA you know and understand the relation of the predicate to the subject.

So how can you say

> Except I explicitly don't [have knowledge a priori]. I have a subject without any knowledge of the predicate contained within.

That's self-contradictory. Either you know something or you don't.

>People do not innately know the meaning of words.

I do not mean people are born knowing words. I mean once you learn something empirically you carry that knowledge with you a priori.

> Not a good question at all. Can something be both A and not A?

It looks like it is a good question because you still don't seem to understand the answer.

> Understanding the meaning of words, their analytic truth, does not require one to be rational or capable of reason.

Name something without the capacity of reason that knows/understands. Please, let's not continue this discussion until you prove this.

Me: Trees need sunlight.

You: your claim is not true. All trees need light.

Do you read what you write before you post?

> Pedantry aside, these are contingent naturalistic claims.

You are missing the point completely. Replace my example with one of your choosing if you wish.

>Okay, so you admit you 'discover the content of [the] subject' AKA you know and understand the relation of the predicate to the subject.

All I said there was that I discover the trivial analytic claim "all Bachelors are not married" in an a posteriori way. Predicate contained in subject. It is not that I know, it is how I know.

>. I mean once you learn something empirically you carry that knowledge with you a priori.

That is not what those words mean, and that is not how this works. Just because something is grounded in experience once, does not mean it becomes a priori. It remains a posteriori

>It looks like it is a good question because you still don't seem to understand the answer.
kek Dont start throwing a tantrum now.

>Name something without the capacity of reason that knows/understands. Please, let's not continue this discussion until you prove this

My dog knows my scent, he knows who I am, he knows what the words " walk" and "food" means. He knows that when I grab his leash he is going on a walk. The tree outside my front door knows when winter is over. Seriously? We just got done talking about a priori and a posteriori judgements and you forget knowledge gained through the senses?

Anyways, you seem to be getting a little tense, and I don't want to tank the thread when someone else may potentially come in and have something to say, so feel free to exit gracefully.

prove it

There are other sources of light besides the sun which are suitable for photosynthesis. You're getting hostile and boring. You think I am missing your point when I really just think it is not very good.