Hello, Veeky Forums I'm looking for some help with Frege's Sense and Reference

Hello, Veeky Forums I'm looking for some help with Frege's Sense and Reference.

This bit:

>What is intended to be said by a=b seems to be that the signs or names "a" and "b" designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold between the names or signs only insofar as they named or designated something. It would be mediated by the connection of each of the two signs with the same designated thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something. In that case the sentence a=b would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would express no proper knowledge by its means. But in many cases this is just what we want to do. If the sign "a" is distinguished from the sign "b" only as object (here, by means of its shape), not as sign (i.e., not by the manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of a=b, provided a=b is true.

Other urls found in this thread:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/
docs.google.com/presentation/d/1h0G9ciMQg6LOQpfs4zB3rsibriudK8ahvauiDei3lzE/edit?usp=drive_web
twitter.com/SFWRedditImages

I don’t get it, if ‘a’ is distinguished from ‘b’, looking at them only as objects and not as symbols how will these objects ever be subjected to a relation of equality? I mean, how can one, going by Frege’s definition of equality, ever imply that “a is the same as b” only looking at a and b as objects (physically presumably), given that as objects they are different (in shape).

If objects are themselves different (due to their shape or whatever reason) why would a statement of equality that expresses proper knowledge ever be made, since, by virtue of the fact that they are different, we perceive them as separate? In general won’t a statement of equality that expresses proper knowledge only be made if those two things were "equal" somehow and given that they are not equal as objects then, they would only ever be equal as signs.

For example, consider the letter 'a' written in Times New Roman and 'a' in Arial. We would say a = a in no other context than that both the ‘a's, as signs, refer to the same referent of 'a' the letter in the English language that is used in words. The ‘a’s then are very much symbols.

How can a statement (using Frege’s example now) such as a=b ever have any cognitive value if a and b are not looked at as symbols and are different as objects?

>they would only ever be equal as signs.

Should have added a bit here, it seems that in Frege's case a and b are neither the same objects nor are to be looked at as signs, which is why I don't see how he can say that a=bwould have any:

>cognitive value

Btw I know this is a very small part of the whole shit.

But still, this bit tripped me up and I am curious about what he was trying to say here.

>I don’t get it, if ‘a’ is distinguished from ‘b’, looking at them only as objects and not as symbols how will these objects ever be subjected to a relation of equality? I mean, how can one, going by Frege’s definition of equality, ever imply that “a is the same as b” only looking at a and b as objects (physically presumably), given that as objects they are different (in shape).

Frege is saying that the sentence "a = b" means that the names "a" and "b" are co-referential - that is, they refer to the same external object. So the names "a" and "b" are not distinguishable based on their referents, but only based upon their shapes (or, their sound patterns when pronounced, etc.) and senses.

>If objects are themselves different (due to their shape or whatever reason) why would a statement of equality that expresses proper knowledge ever be made, since, by virtue of the fact that they are different, we perceive them as separate? In general won’t a statement of equality that expresses proper knowledge only be made if those two things were "equal" somehow and given that they are not equal as objects then, they would only ever be equal as signs.

Both signs refer to the same object. The signs only differ from themselves intrinsically - by shape or sound pattern. For example, the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent" differ in that they are different sequences of characters (or phonemes), but since they are co-referring (refer to the same object), the sentence "Clark Kent = Superman" is true.

>For example, consider the letter 'a' written in Times New Roman and 'a' in Arial. We would say a = a in no other context than that both the ‘a's, as signs, refer to the same referent of 'a' the letter in the English language that is used in words. The ‘a’s then are very much symbols.

Whether you write the name using Times New Roman or Arial is semantically irrelevant. The meaning of the name remains the same. Your use of the equality sign between font face inscriptions in order to create equivalence classes of letters is not the relation of Identity that Frege is discussing.

>How can a statement (using Frege’s example now) such as a=b ever have any cognitive value if a and b are not looked at as symbols and are different as objects?

Not sure what you mean here. The names "a" and "b" designate the same referent, but differ in "sense". That is how a statement of identity can be informative.

This is not the usual, simple thing, Frege says about a and b though.

You seem to have assumed Frege is talking about a and b as signs, when he is not:

> If the sign "a" is distinguished from the sign "b" only as object (here, by means of its shape), not as sign (i.e., not by the manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of a=b, provided a=b is true.

>not as sign (i.e., not by the manner in which it designates something)

Clearly, a and b here are the same in the "manner in which (they) designate something"

They even have the same cognitive value, not different cognitive values as with the example he started with wherein a and b did infact have different "modes of presentation".

Tackling your points directly:

>Frege is saying that the sentence "a = b" means that the names "a" and "b" are co-referential - that is, they refer to the same external object.. So the names "a" and "b" are not distinguishable based on their referents, but only based upon their shapes (or, their sound patterns when pronounced, etc.) and senses

>"a" and "b" are co-referential - that is, they refer to the same external object

>Quoting Frege: In that case the sentence a=b would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation

There is no external object or subject matter referred to here there is only a "mode of designation" referred to. I believe Frege, making a mention of the many arbitrary signs one can use, has here used a and b as "arbitrarily producible events or objects" that are not "mediated by connection" to a "designated thing".

>and senses

I believe Frege in this example is tackling the very case of a and be being equated when they do not have different senses but are only different as objects, which I contend is not possible and that being a different object (be it due to the shape of the letter or pronunciation of the word) has to carry with it a different sense.

>Whether you write the name using Times New Roman or Arial is semantically irrelevant. The meaning of the name remains the same. Your use of the equality sign between font face inscriptions in order to create equivalence classes of letters is not the relation of Identity that Frege is discussing.

>If the sign "a" is distinguished from the sign "b" only as object (here, by means of its shape), not as sign (i.e., not by the manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of a=b, provided a=b is true.

But he is, this is not the type of identity he got famous talking about, but it is the one he is talking about here.

The shape, as with the font, is what concerns him and his point seems to me akin to yours in that "the shape does not matter, they would both mean the same thing", in that for the 'a' and 'b' here, a = a has the same cognitive value as a = b (cont.)

(cont.)

In the usual case, a = a would have a different cognitive value from a = b, quoting him:

Frege from earlier in the work when he was talking about things differing by means of it's "sign" or "the manner in which it designates something".
>a=a and a=b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value

Frege now, when he is talking about things different only as an object (by means of its shape, in my example, by means of its shape too, since fonts are nothing but differing shapes)

>If the sign "a" is distinguished from the sign "b" only as object (here, by means of its shape), not as sign (i.e., not by the manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of a=b, provided a=b is true.

>the cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of a=b, provided a=b is true.

>For example, the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent" differ in that they are different sequences of characters (or phonemes), but since they are co-referring (refer to the same object), the sentence "Clark Kent = Superman" is true.

Nope, I believe this is wrong.

Clark Kent and Superman are not just different as shapes of letters. They are different as modes of presentation. Clark Kent has a certain personality, Superman has a different Personality.

Clark Kent is a journalist, Superman is a superhero, these are all different ASPECTS as Frege calls them.

Using his example of the lines:

>Let a, b, c be the lines connecting the vertices of a triangle with the midpoints of the opposite sides. The point of intersection of a and b is then the same as the point of intersection of b and c. So we have different designations for the same point, and these names ("Point of intersection of a and b," "Point of intersection of b and c") likewise indicate the mode of presentation; and hence the statement contains true knowledge.

Over here the intersections are different not just because of the letters in " the intersection of a and b" different from the letters or characters in "the intersection of b and c". Note how he says those phrases just "indicate the mode of presentation", emphasis on "indicate".

The morning star is not different from the evening star because the word is spelt differently, it is different because the sense is also different in terms of the position of the star and what not.

Frege however, in the example I quoted, seems to be only talking about the case where the a and b are not actually used as "signs" to refer to something, but a and b, as the very literal "a" and "b" as these shapes, in which case, a=a and a=b have the same cognitive value.

I suppose a much simpler example of what he is saying here is:

color = colour

In that, there is no "reference to subject matter" as such, there is no knowledge "expressed". The equality just refers to the "Mode of designation".

My contention is that, even if only the object is different, I do see that saying a=b is saying something, it has some cognitive value distinct form the cognitive value of b=b.

So, in color=colour, sure, it's not like Clark Kent and Superman where the modes of perception are very different and people very much have a different "sense" of Clark Kent then of Superman but, say for someone from America, reading something in British English, the equality color=colour would give him information not conveyed through color=color.

As such, color=colour is also combining two different "senses", and it is impossible to have an identity of two different objects (even if they only differ in shape or pronunciation and such) that does not add cognitive value.

>Nope, I believe this is wrong.
>Clark Kent and Superman are not just different as shapes of letters.

Neither Clark Kent nor Superman contain any letters. "Clark Kent" and "Superman" do. It may seem pedantic, but it's important to separate use from mention here so we're not confusing referring terms with their referents.

>They are different as modes of presentation. Clark Kent has a certain personality, Superman has a different Personality.

You can say that, or you can say that the concept of "Clark Kent" and the concept of "Superman" differ in their associated personality traits.

The important point, thought, is that it must be true that Clark Kent = Superman. That's because Identity holds when and only when the two referring terms refer to the same object -- regardless of differences in mode of presentation. Otherwise, no nontrivial statement of mathematics could ever be true. If you required that senses must also be identical, then you couldn't say that 2+2=4 since the expression "2+2" differs in sense from the expression "4".

>Clark Kent is a journalist, Superman is a superhero, these are all different ASPECTS as Frege calls them.

Journalist and superhero are just two roles taken on by the same individual (Kal El, or whatever the fuck). Likewise, this individual is referred to by the names "Clark Kent" and "Superman" depending on context. The assertion that Clark Kent = Superman is just the acknowledgment that this one individual is what people are referring to when they use either name.