Natalism is the ultimate failing of the categorical imperative

if what you're doing would have negative consequences if everyone did it then don't do it

its not very good but I'm not op

If I were to explain it i'd say that is is something we ought to do unconditionally and eternally, i'd make a distinction with the hypothetical imperative, and I'd quote the passage from groundings that summarizes it into "act as if the maxim of your action were by your will to be applied as a universal law"

No.

>act as if the maxim of your action were by your will to be applied as a universal law

I don't like this rendering, but it's close enough. Now how do we draw implications about natalism, and vice versa, from this?

we presupposate that non-existence is better than existence which honestly is hard to defend but then it would be ez pz

I don't see any maxim, let alone one that takes the form of a universal law. I also don't see how you ground the presupposition that non-existence is "better" than existence.

>Now how do we draw implications about natalism, and vice versa, from this?

How would either be proven 'superior' than the other if not by the acceptance/actions of those willing to support the perspective?

no, to build the maxim you'd have to build it from the presupposition i talked about

and no I don't ground it cause im saying its hard to do and also im not op nor do I share his view

Because it informs no decisions, it only precludes other decisions.

Say what you want about the Nazis, but it's an ethos.

>I don't see any maxim, let alone one that takes the form of a universal law.
Kant and most of the world did. This was an attempt to base Christian morality purely in reason. It failed, but it's still a useful tool.
>I also don't see how you ground the presupposition that non-existence is "better" than existence.
He didn't, read the post.

>it's a "define philosophical concepts you are only hazily aware of" thread

ok here goes no peeking

the categorical imperative is a filter to apply to your actions i order to determine if those actions are moral. The filter is thus: that the action must be generalizable to the entire population of people in all situations such that it is universally moral

now do postmodernism

Could you formulate the maxim, please?

well thats not the categorical imperative per se (by that i mean that the filter isnt the CI) but the main idea is here

no idea wtf pomo is lol

Is this the most Veeky Forums cartoon? Xavierfags need not apply.

Not exactly, no. Moral actions are those that are initiated by a good will in conformity with the moral law. We cannot know the content of moral law, only its form, which is one of universality. All the categorical imperative really does is hold your maxim under the law of non-contradiction, which is a necessary precondition for its lawfulness.

>will in conformity with the moral law.
Not in conformity !

acting in accordance to morality =/= acting morally

For what exactly? For anti natalism? No, because it wouldn't be a maxim that made sense, but
I will abort my child
Everyone aborts all their children
Human race is dead
Therefore the maxim is giving birth... Or not depending on your views. I don't have a superb knowledge of Kant so I might be wrong. He really needed an editor.

(because an act in accordance could be a hypothetical imperative)

Sorry, I should have a good will that submits itself to that which it has legislated for itself, which is just that maxim which takes the form of universality.

Ok I think that's correct now

categorical imperative? sounds spooky

I could have also just said "out of and only from respect for the moral law as law".

It's the quickest route to happiness, bubby, which is the best kinda spook there is.

I was asking you to formulate the maxim which you claim "Kant and most of the world" saw as derivable from the "[presupposition] that non-existence is better than existence".

dude are you high ? first of all there are two posters, and none claimed that such a statement is valid.

I am high, but I'm also lucid. Here are the posts in question:
>Now how do we draw implications about natalism, and vice versa, from [the categorical imperative]?
>we presupposate that non-existence is better than existence
>I don't see any maxim, let alone one that takes the form of a universal law. I also don't see how you ground the presupposition that non-existence is "better" than existence.
>Kant and most of the world did
>Could you formulate that maxim please?
>For what exactly?
>I was asking you to formulate the maxim which you claim "Kant and most of the world" saw as derivable from the "[presupposition] that non-existence is better than existence".

Are you not following?

well then the maxim that one should end life is pretty good, why do you not accept it ?

To end all human life would be to end the very possibility of not just moral willing, but any willing whatsoever. It is to will to not will, which is contradictory, and so cannot take the form of a universal law, and so cannot be a maxim for moral action.

Not just the categorical imperative, but pretty much any ethical consideration.

>It is to will to not will, which is contradictory
No, not really, since there is a temporal agent, the principle of non-contradiction isn't violated.

Introducing temporality does nothing for you here. If your maxim is to will at some future point in time to cease willing, then it cannot be universalizable, for it pertains to that particular point in time and not all possible points, so is again no maxim for moral action--it's merely a hypothetical imperative. And again, if the maxim to will to not will does take the form of universality, it is contradictory, and so cannot be a maxim for moral action.

Why does the maxim require willing ?

Insofar as we are concerned with moral worth we are concerned with the will. A maxim is a rational principle of action, i.e. an object of the will. We desire an end, we determine the means for attaining that end (we formulate a maxim), and we execute those means.

Your points have convinced me until further arguments.