Make fun of him, but you know he is right and Nietzche and Stirner are just memes

Make fun of him, but you know he is right and Nietzche and Stirner are just memes.

Stirner is a meme. Nietzsche not so much.

Nietzsche is Stirner with extra edgyness.

the other way around senpai
sage sage

>Nietzsche
>edgy

top kek

That's not Schopenhauer.

Metaphysics is built upon a shitload of false premises.

Kant knew this, hence why he tried to 'save' it from Hume's empiricism.

Learning about metaphysics is on par with learning astrology/homeopathy/etc. Difficult? Maybe, but still fucking useless.

*tips!*

Not false; 'antimonous'.

Kant left us with the best attempt at a systematic philosophy of any human being and his thought will remain as such for a long damn time.

My old professor wrote about Kant's antimonies. Idk wtf he said though.

'muh duty'

a u t i s m
u
t
i
s
m

>thinking is autistic

Aristotle is the correct philosopher

Kant literally thinks that we only know the contents of our own minds and the world outside the mind is inaccessible. Literally an idiot.

>Kant left us with the best attempt at a systematic philosophy of any human being and his thought will remain as such for a long damn time.

No. The scholastics were a lot more systematic and technical. Modern philosophers like Descartes, Hume, and Kant were literally amateurs, they didn't have much formal philosophical training.

Literally read the scholastics from the medieval period right up to modern times. They had a system that was developed over centuries, not just thought up on the spot by one guy.

protip: no philosopher is 'correct'

Wrong. There's truth and some philosophers revealed it whereas others obscured it.

Yeah? Truth like what, ser?

Only literally speaking.
One of them wrote as flowery as possible in order to get his dick sucked by the general public. The other punned. Stirner is not the edgier one.

Hint : when you can deform your basic moral rule to make up anything, you have a pretty bad moral system.

I universalize x maxim. It doesn't work. Ok, I universalize x maxim in y situation only. Wow it works. Thanks Kant.

Existence exists.

Camus is best writer

OP didn't say 'correct'. He said 'right'. There's a big difference.

The Scholastics should have listened to Ockham.

>muh analytic truth

Is this bait?

We DO only know the content of our own minds. Name one thing you know thats not from within your own mind.

So much EEEEEEEEEEDGE! EDGE, EDGE, EDGEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!!!!!!!!!11111

Nietzsche is a life affirmer and a humanist. Not exactly "edgy" unless we have a different understanding of that word.

Could you recommend anybody in particular, user?

... Or a particular course of reading?

He's bullshitting

Nietzsche was misogynist.

Stirner wasn't.

Him and Hegel were awesome. This dude was way ahead of everybody's time. He was way too good.

Him, Focault, Rand and Megrite were all really amazing.

Inb4 Rand troll

underrated (as fuck)

Kant was an Aristotelian senpai

>Ok, I universalize x maxim in y situation only

Then it isn't 'universalized'.

why is Kant more well known than the black german philosopher Amo?

Why is it not universalized? If I want to murder someone, the maxim of my action is contradictory ; but if I want to kill someone in self-defense, that action (murder in self-defense) is not contradictory. If everybody, in self-defense, committed murder it wouldn't end up in a contradiction. How is that not universal?

This is one of those annoying arguments. The inner contents of mind are all that is known to consciousness, BUT those inner contents of mind are entangled with the outside world and preserve it in information via code, thus allowing the mind's navigation through space.

So, yes and no.

If murder is wrong then any subset of murder is wrong. 'Wrongness' is fully extensive or murder; it covers the entire domain.

But as to why you cannot universalize the murder-in-self-defense maxim: it would be making a particular exception to a general case within a maxim about a general case. So, deriving the negative from the logical impossibility of murder-as-maxim, we get "Murder is always [i.e. universally] forbidden--except in self-defense [i.e. in this particular instance]." This is not formulated as a universal law, but a universal law with a rider, which is not them demand of the categorical imperative.

We could even formulate the maxim differently to make the case stronger, and it would still fail to meet the demands of the categorical imperative. So something like "it is only ever permitted to commit murder in self-defense". But this would entail the use of another person as a means to an end, i.e. saving your life, with no respect to their status as an end in themselves, i.e. a rational agent capable of determining ends (in this case, the end of murdering you). Seems a little silly, but this capacity for practical reason is the 'grounding' of morality as such, so even if it can be used to evil ends it must still be respected if there is to be any possible morality whatsoever.

The wrongness of murder, comes from that it cannot be universalized as a maxim, correct? But the action of murder requires certain conditions to be fulfilled (such as the intent of killing someone, and the action of doing so), and would equate to the set of those conditions. Therefore, if I was to agree with you, everything with at least the set of those conditions plus some others (like murder in self-defense), would be immoral, correct?

But, then, from where does the wrongness of murder in self-defense stems from, since, by adding more conditions to the action of murder (that it be done in self-defense), it removes the contradiction, which is the source of the wrongness of the original action (murder)?

Also, since all actions could be understood as conditions needing to be fulfilled for an action x to be action x and not another one, how you distinguish which conditions need to be universalized, and which are riders? Put more simply, how do you distinguish that you need to universalize murder, and not murder in self-defense? Why not need to universalize ill-intent since ill-intent is a condition for murder to occur (intention to kill)?

waaaaah misogyny

Quite literally, slit your wrists

>Nietzsche was misogynist.

Confirmed retard.

Doesn't the duty you have to preserve yourself as a being of reason (i.e. not die) supersede the duty you have towards others to not treat them as simple means?

>this triggers the autists

...

>this triggers the reddit

>Misunderstanding the quotation this hard

Go ahead, link the one with the whip. Leave us in no doubt of your stupidity.

I don't understand that quote. Is he saying they're too deep to understand, which means he's not a misogynist, or that they have no depth whatsoever, which means he is one?

haha nice one man, gg

*sheathes katana*
gg, surrendering was a smart move on your part... this could have ended badly

The later.

He has hundreds of misogynist quotes.

>le 'you just can't understand what it means' meme

okay then you're a faggot
literally who gives a shit if he was a misogynist or not
how weak of a chin do you have?

Nietzsche was a devoted anti-misogynist, dumb shit.

...

...

both out of context

>le context meme

...

okay he was a dumb faggot who couldn't make up his mind, all his philosophy is absolutely trash
Better?

you deserve to be drawn and quartered

...

>The wrongness of murder, comes from that it cannot be universalized as a maxim, correct?

No. There are a near infinite number of maxims that cannot be universalized, but this doesn't necessarily mean the actions of those maxims are wrong. I can't will that everyone use 300 thread count Egyptian cotton sheets as a universal law, but that doesn't mean using such sheets would be evil. The wrongness of murder would for Kant stem, I would think, from the nature of the character that would will such a maxim to include murder. To will the destruction of the humanity in another person would make one an enemy to humankind, and so an enemy to morality.

The 'wrongness'--really, inaptness, at the level we're talking about--of conditioning a universal statement is that it is no longer a universal statement once conditioned. This has nothing to do with the content of the statement--it could be about murder or gummy bears or whatever--but it's form. The categorical imperative demands the maxim take the *form* of a universal law. A maxim with conditions cannot take the form of a universal law, as it is conditioned.

Duty is to the law as such and not to any particular facet of it, though Kant gets kinda loose with the word sometimes. In any case, the reason you must not treat as merely as means but also always as an end in themselves is precisely because they, too, are rational beings capable of determining their own ends. Respect for humanity, i.e. the rational capacity to determine oneself, is just respect for this capacity. So there is no conflict between the 'duty' of self-preservation in so far as one is a rational being and respect for the humanity in another, because they one and the same duty.

Learn to write.

I'm stoned as balls, but I don't see any glaring grammatical errors--do my hyphenations annoy you?

In the Groundwork, Kant states that only maxims which fulfill the test of the categorical imperative (be it the first or second formulation) - in this case, universalization - can be moral ; those maxims which fail the test are immoral. Therefore, it would seem that it is because a maxim is contradictory that it isn't moral. Even Kant uses the contradiction of a maxim to show it is immoral. Moreover, when Kant universalizes maxims, he universalizes them with the situation in which the action was thought of : for instance, he says that lying for a loan is wrong, because it undermines the practice of loaning. Similarly, he says that suicide for self-love (to avoid suffering) is wrong because it would contradict the law of self-love. Again, he does the same when he talks about the maxim of leaving talents undeveloped because of laziness. As you can see, Kant universalizes the situations of the actions, not simply the actions, to show their morality.

Also, universability can lead to contradictory results. For instance, you can universalize the maxim that everyone ought to be able to own property and use it ; but one could not universalize the maxim that for enjoyment I could eat some animal that is going extinct, because if I universalize it such that everyone would want to eat that animal, it would turn out, because of the limited numbers of that animal (limited resources), not everyone could actually eat it, which is contradictory. Therefore, it would be wrong, although using my property seems morally permissible.

>i have never read nietche

"Immoral" in the sense that they cannot be of moral worth, not that they are necessarily wrong. Any number of actions can be unworthy of moral praise, but that doesn't make them wrong. There's nothing wrong about me choosing to eat oatmeal for breakfast, even though I can't coherently, i.e. without 'contradiction', will that everyone do so as well. For the examples Kant provides in the Groundwork, I think he is specifically interested in demonstrating in common sense terms how the principles of universalizability and non-contradiction work within the framework he's setting up, which is why they relate immediately to the categorical imperative and the problem of proper formulation. And again this is all to show what makes a maxim morally worthy, not what makes it morally wrong, though Kant overstates his case and ends up trying to do both.

And absolutely universalizing a maxim may lead to contradiction--that's how you know you have an improper maxim!

If you had read Kant you would know he based much of his thought off Aristotle vis. the categories, not-quite-empiricist obtaining of knowledge, etc etc.

Daily reminder cucking is the Kantian thing to do, and you CAN'T reasonably argue against it.

For Kant, the only thing of moral worth is the good will, the will to act out of duty for the moral law. That is what is morally praiseworthy.

What would be unworthy of moral praise, but not immoral, would be acting out of determination (like reflexes) ; because no will is involved, you could have not chose to do otherwise. Hence, it is not an action that would be subject to morality because, following Kant's law : if you must, you can ; and, because free will is a condition of satisfaction of the moral law, you need to be free to be subject to the moral law. Therefore, an action that is not morally praiseworthy, but not immoral, is an action that cannot be willed.

On the other side of the spectrum, if an action is worthy of moral praise in proportion to how it was caused by the will to follow the moral law, then, you could say, that an action that is willed and that disregards the moral law (i.e. an action that does not respect or go against the categorical imperative - like, an action that cannot be universalized) is worthy of moral blame or is immoral. Kant explicitly says this. Just as an example, he says that cutting your hair in order to sell it is immoral because you consider yourself as a mean (for money), and not as an end, and therefore is morally dubious and blamable.

Finally, just like you mentioned, an improper maxim is one that cannot be universalized, one that cannot satisfy the categorical imperative. An improper maxim is one that is not morally permissible, because moral permissibly is determined by the capacity of a maxim to satisfy the categorical imperative. Therefore, if a maxim is not morally permissible, it is morally wrong to willingly follow it.

I'm a huge individualist but I kind of agree. It'd be great if everyone else was moral as heck and I'd be free to use their morals for my own good.

Well, that is kind of how it already is, but even more would be nice.

I know I'm probably stupid, but I never got Kant's moral stance.
As far as I know, if you want to see if something is good or bad, universalize that and see how it goes. So, for example, if I want to rob people, I should universalize that. Then everyone would be robbing each other, I would be robbed too, so that's bad.
What if someone is suicidal, though? He wants to kill other people. He universalizes this - other people want to kill other people. That means maybe someone will kill him too, but he doesn't care because he doesn't care about his life.
To me, his moral system seems like relativism, except differently stated.
I'm probably wrong and didn't get this at all (I haven't even read any book of his, just some summaries), I'd love if someone could explain it to me.

>What if someone is suicidal, though? He wants to kill other people
Huh?

I meant that he's a suicidal guy who wants to kill other people, maybe you understood it as "He's suicidal so because of that he wants to kill people". Sorry for phrasing it badly.