What's the most logically coherent system of philosophy?

>megafoundation.org/CTMU/Articles/Langan_CTMU_092902.pdf
tldr?

nihilism :)

William James of all people...

Probably Kant's philosophy

Max "Spookbuster" Stirner's system

Thomas Aquinas remains absolutely unstumpable to this day

pic revelated

>it's all about intentions, any action done purely for the sake of duty shines on its own
>except when these intentions dont pass through my Three Categorical Imperatives[tm]

lmao @ your life

my man

I typed up a tl;dr for Veeky Forums at their request. It was positively received.

pastebin.com/WknXipZ0

>reading comp

The language is very obtuse, care to clarify what he means even more?

I'm very sorry, but it is irreducible beyond that. It may sound arrogant, but unfortunately, that is truly the simplest way to explain it. It fundamentally requires intuitive synthesis of graduate-level mathematics. The original paper took me years to understand. You can take my word that some on Veeky Forums understood my explanation and said it was "fucking fascinating", but asking for simplification beyond that is just impossible.

Jesus is actually quite a bad example as he didnt really create a coherent philosophical system outside of do what I say because I am God. It fell to the theologians that came after him to make his teachings coherant

t. Feser

>intuitive synthesis of graduate-level mathematics
my sides

if it " fundamentally requires intuitive synthesis of graduate-level mathematics" then you'd actually be presenting the theory mathematically, not in prose.

Fuck yea.

Is there supposed to be a logical justification for the model described here? All of it just sounds like imaginative bullshit. Like someone creating their own fictional world. Self-consistent but unproductive gibberish.

It utilizes ideas from that kind of mathematics in a philosophically abstracted way. It cannot be mathematically modelled because its primitive notion of a unit of information, duality principles, and notion of intrinsic definition are fundamentally philosophical.

Then, can you explain what these notions mean or are?

The logical basis is:

a) Reality like a model of some mathematical theory
b) That theory must transduced (a term from automata theory that means undergo read-write operations) homogenously throughout reality in the course of its evolution
c) That theory must be isomorphic to, and thus essentially identified with, its model
d) Ergo reality is like a mathematical model isomorphic to its own syntax that distributively undergoes its own transduction -- a "self-modeling self-processing language". Thus we necessarily have both the notion of the described unit of information and its distributed transduction by the homogenous medium.

Thus we have the primitive notions, and the theory developed follows by necessary closure principles and dualities.

>its primitive notion of a unit of information, duality principles, and notion of intrinsic definition are fundamentally philosophical.
All mathematical axioms are philosophical: they are ontological postulates, commitments, assumptions, beliefs. Call them whatever you want. So strictly speaking they are not true, but "intuitively true" (because "true" is a 'reserved' or 'taken' concept; it is already defined by model theory). In that sense, I don't see why Langan or your summary for that matter, give explicit axioms of the theory. And some rules of inference whereby one could derive some interesting consequences, too. Though the theory is undeniably dense, it *does* look interesting. But it needs a more thorough and meticulous elucidation: I guess, at least conceptually, I want it to be couched in not just mathematical terminology, but philosophical as well. You talk about philosophy, but orthodox, anglophone analytic, philosophical concepts and terminology is nowhere to be seen in your summary.

>In that sense, I don't see why Langan or your summary for that matter, does not provide with explicit axioms of the theory.
Typo

The elementary ones. An isomorphism is a structure-preserving one-one correspondence. And automorphism is an isomorphism of a structure to itself. An endomorphism is a homomorphism of a structure into itself, where a homomorphism is a structure-preserving map that may collapse some features. An ectomorphism is the semi-philosophical dual of an endomorphism (the mechanics of such a duality are made clear in category theory). A sheaf is... much more difficult to explain. Think of it like corresponding to each subset of space a unit of information, such that restriction maps of a larger region of space to a smaller region correspond to reverse structure-preserving embeddings, and such that a collection of subsets and their associated units of information structurally "glue together" and are coherent on their intersections to form the unit of information corresponding to the union of the subsets. A transducer is an automaton in a cybernetic system that read-writes as a function of both its current state and the state of other transducers both its own state and the mechanism by which it read-writes itself. This concept is used abstractly, with transducers corresponding to units of information distributively arranged in a sheaf. This notion is then done away with on the other side of a duality, which is necessitated by the closure principles of a unit of information as being completely self-contained.

I hope that gives enough to understand the gist.

Yes. I am not versed in orthodox philosophy; I study mathematics (obviously). I am glad that you think the theory looks interesting.

Langan is completely shit at explaining himself and his CTMU comes off as gibberish, but I recognized that he was probably trying to say something deep and devoted the time to understand and partially translate it. He tries to list the dualities and axioms explicitly, but explains them poorly. I plan to write a thorough translation of his ideas at some point that's actually intelligible (with things laid out in a more organized fashion than the pastebin, but necessarily still just as dense due to a certain irreducibility.)

I am sorry, and I'll try to re-read that, but it seems complete continental gibberish with no grounding in reality. It sounds like Badiou had sex with Hegel and they had a kid. That kid would write such things. Things which are ''grounded'' in a shaky understanding of set theory and philosophy. At best, it seems coherent in itself, but not corresponding to reality, and, at worst, it seems incoherent gibberish. No one can read that honestly. Even with a degree in math.

The terms I explain there have precise meanings in mathematics, and are concepts universal and intuitively understood in modern mathematics. I did my best in that post to translate them for the layperson.

>I plan to write a thorough translation of his ideas at some point that's actually intelligible
Nice, but you might wanna set up a blog (or some digital space that allows you to write, edit, and update your content and generate a specific URL to it) so that those interested in what you have to say could bookmark it, otherwise you risk loosing a potential audience

Godspeed

That's not what I meant. I understand the mathematical terms ; what I don't understand is how they related to the theory. They seem like empty gibberish that refer to no sensible reality. I'll admit, though, that I completely fail to grasp what a unit of information is and what a transducer is, how they related to each other, and to reality.

The only answer is pyrrhonism you fucking proles.

Thanks for the suggestion. There are definitely people intrigued by CTMU who would be interested in something like that. I'll do that.

Yeah, to be honest it's almost like the theory of an autistic genius. Sometimes I worry it's a huge mind-loop that cannot be internally recognized as such. But if you don't grasp the specific way that "unit of information" or "transducer" (and their identification) are used in this context, you don't grasp the concept -- taken as a primitive concept -- that forms the basis of the entire theory.

Usually theories are built on primitive concepts from the ground up. CTMU is unique in that it deconstructs a primitive concept from the top down.

STOP SPAMMING THIS GARBAGE

First, I posted before the negative reception in the other thread. I wouldn't have otherwise.

Second, people in this thread aren't knee-jerk biased against it by Langan's stupefying inability to explain himself, because they read my explanation first. This thread is not derailed; it is only having a discussion.

Holy cow! It's absolute gobbledygook!

They are just as stupefied by your 'explanation' because it is equally incomprehensible, but don't care to appear foolish and so are feigning interest to save some face, whatever face they have on an anonymous image board.

It is the only coherent basis for a theory of reality.

The universe obviously follows some natural law. If we wish to think of the nature of this natural law (syntax) and its relationship to configuration (state, or model) in any coherent way, that is the absolutely natural way. Notice that the state of the reality is a model of its syntax. However, this syntax must be read within that selfsame model. The limiting version of model theory is the necessary and obvious concept.

Mathematical prose is inextricable, though I did my best in to explain some of it, but as I admitted in it is possible that the whole thing is literally autistic.

Pyrrhonism can't be stated logically. It's more of a belief than a logical philosophy.

>The universe obviously follows some natural law. If we wish to think of the nature of this natural law (syntax) and its relationship to configuration (state, or model) in any coherent way, that is the absolutely natural way. Notice that the state of the reality is a model of its syntax. However, this syntax must be read within that selfsame model. The limiting version of model theory is the necessary and obvious concept.

All this seems to say is that it is possible to model 'reality' because 'reality' itself is 'isomorphic' with its own model--and at some earlier point in the thread, you said this isomorphism can be taken as an identity, which is ludicrous. What this entails is very uninteresting metaphysical realism.

In mathematics, things are always identified up to isomorphism.

Philosophically, the identification can be regarded as necessary from the identity of indiscernibles when form is content. Moreover, this is a philosophy of reality. "Reality" is isomorphic to either/both; ergo in referring to reality, the two are identified.

However, we tease them apart as two halves of a "dual-aspect monad" when exploring its properties, re-uniting the halves to extract dynamical consequences. This is exemplified in my explanation by the emergence of telesis as dual to the dynamics of TD self-containment when syntax and state are re-identified. Telesis is also reified as dual to the homogenously-distributed cybernetico-transductive view of the sheaf when semi-classical global transduction is hologically internalized.

The metaphysical system is fascinating.

>telesis is also reified as dual to the homogenously-distributed cybernetico-transductive view of the sheaf when semi-classical global transduction is hologically internalized.
goddamn, you're just as crazy as Langan is.

Read up on your MacIntyre
>In this classic work, Alasdair MacIntyre examines the historical and conceptual roots of the idea of virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence in personal and public life, and offers a tentative proposal for its recovery.

Literally the worst ethical theory. Even Peter Singer is a better philosopher.

Nah, I think he's just fun-posting.

That line is elucidated by the duality between the paragraph "19" (pastebin counts empty lines as paragraphs) and what paragraph 19 would read if we replace the notion of telesis with instead an external restriction of the hological potential of each transducer. It is to this that I refer in paragraph 27 as "hology together with the hybrid model." I tried to cram too much into one sentence.

Unfortunately not.

If you're trying to explain Langan to the unitiated, why have you completely adopted his goofy terminology? Even if a lot of it has meaning in other contexts, jumbled all together as it is it becomes incredibly difficult to parse and makes your supposed goal that much more difficult to achieve.

Is this akin to a sort of phenomenology? The beginning of the article mentions Descartes, but the theory seems more monistic. Could you respond, and thanks

Uhhh, no. Unless you're one of those dogmatists that arbitrarily divides axioms into a separate category while ignoring infinite regress.

It's the only logically unassailable system-- or belief, if you prefer, which is identical to the axiomatic assertions about the world which form the bedrock of every philosophical system that employs propositional logic --because it makes no assertion other than the implicit one of an agent attempting to interpret 'the world'. And even that might be saying too much.

...

refute him

autism

>The universe obviously follows some natural law.
:^)

I don't have to, moral relativism is ouroboros eating it's own tail. It collapses in on itself

congrats on proving him right then :^]

>equating pragmatism with relativism

Literally a meme rebuttal

everything's a meme :^D

I think I do a good job of building the reader up to his terminology in the explanation, and would avoid phrases like "hological restriction" to instead type a paragraph explaining that particular way of thinking about that side of the "polyality" of the model.

He completely rejects Descart's dualism. If we had to classify the philosophy as dualist or monistic, it would absolutely be monistic; however, "dual-aspect monism" would be most accurate. Dualities are... dually identified and not. The whole way of thinking differs from standard logic. It is what I would call "coherent logic" (some may laugh at this, but read on), where the word "coherent" actually refers to that dualities are cohered. Cohered means neither identified nor disaggregated, but regarded as two sides of the same coin.

How does one logically transition to another type of logic?

If you can't see how pragmatism is merely relativism in the trappings of something else you're a fool.

Color me a fool, then, and explain what you mean.

>Cohered means neither identified nor disaggregated, but regarded as two sides of the same coin.

Kinda like being able to talk out of both sides of your mouth at the same time?

That is a good question. For me, it came with sudden insight. I try to limn the transition to coherent logic in my explanation, wherein I do such things as describe TD-duality and the manner of which in re-coherence of state and syntax we extract the incipient notion of what we dub "telesis" as dual to stratified TD self-containment. In fact, throughout the explanation, we try to build the reader up to this type of thinking by presenting and identifying dualities and giving names to the cohered dual-aspect notions (e.g. conspansion), and noting how the coherence of these dualities allows a unit of information to, for instance, engage in global self-transduction without input. It might be good to preliminarily note that this philosophy fundamentally operates in this sort of coherent rather than traditional logic.

Not him, but stop spamming it you sad fuck

Stoics had it pretty figured out

>has never thought critically about aquinas

Underrated post.

Actually, he can jump into Whose Justice? Which Rationality? right away. It's essentially a rewritten, updated and more coherent After Virtue.
To simply put it, it went out of fashion. It was extremely knit with the Catholic church and the scholastic system, to which large parts of modern philosophy are a reaction to. Locke, Hume, Kant, Hobbes, all tried to remove themselves from it and create new grounds. Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard and the rest of protestant world too way trying to find a new foundation for morality, justice, connection of mind to matter etc, but as the project of the enlightenment has philosophically failed completely, it was only natural to return to Aristotle.
Hence why we now have names such as Anscombe, Geach, Feser, MacIntyre to whom the way was paved with the revival of thomism within the Catholic church in the 19th century. God, Philosophy, Universities and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? are amazing works, highly recommended.

Don't you fucking muddle and lump Aristotle together with Aquinas suggesting, falsely, that Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is in some way dependant on Aquinas and his Thomistic legacy. Virtue Ethics is best read vanilla and interpreted naturalistically, just the way Aristotle intended it, ignoring Aquinas' extension and mutation of it. That said, MacIntyre, Anscombe, and his husband Geach are still worth dipping into.

>his husband
Her*

My familiarity with modern virtue ethics has been 100% thomistic. In fact I couldn't give you someone who wasn't a thomist, but was a virtue ehicist. Of course, I'm a layman for philosophy, I study law so my contact has purely been out of personal interest and not very academic.
As far as my reading or any kind of familiarity with modern virtue ethics goes, I couldn't separate it from Aquinas if I wanted to.