Does science not rely on certain basic assumptions?

Does science not rely on certain basic assumptions?

For example, the existence of an external reality, the reliability of induction and, subsequently, that universal laws can be derived from inductive reasoning?

If these are assumed on a common sense basis, then it is somewhat understandable; however, they are not based in reason, as they cannot be deductively proven and most certainly not inductively (as that would entail circular reasoning).

In light of this (if science requires certain assumptions), then how can we hope to argue against the acceptance of assumptions that lead to contradictions of scientific fact?

How are we to discern which assumptions are permitted and which are not?

Doesn't it just boil down to intuitive, but ultimately arbitrary, preference?

>Doesn't it just boil down to intuitive, but ultimately arbitrary, preference?

Sort of. Usually everyone agrees on some basic things like using your eyes to see or trusting in things that have 95% likelihood.

With those basic agreements, everything else can continue to happen.

People who reject those basic things are pretty dumb in my opinion.

>People who reject those basic things are pretty dumb in my opinion

Yeah, that, or continental philosophers, a.k.a. people who won't take common sense for an answer, yet seem to have no trouble sneaking fantastical metaphysical baggage into their theories.

I'm OP, btw.

if an assumption leads to a contradiction of scientific fact then you just run with the theory until it leads to a clear, unexplainable contradiction with observable results.

If the science you act upon is ~95% 'because we can see it', then most science is based on the constant of the speed of light in a vacuum.

What's wrong with using a different axiom/reference point? It's like logarithms. Do you only care about getting close to 1 (0.9 recurring) or do you want to go to infinity and beyond?

>If the science you act upon is ~95% 'because we can see it'

I think that's meant for >using your eyes to see or trusting in things that have 95% likelihood

I don't really know why you addressed that to me.

>then most science is based on the constant of the speed of light in a vacuum

That's an over-simplification, based on a literal interpretation of metaphorical language.

That user wasn't simply referring to sight, when he said 'using your eyes to see', but instead perception in general.

Assuming the reliability of induction, in relation to science, involves assuming the reliability of inductive reasoning as applied to perceivable reality (as opposed to pure mathematics).

>Do you only care about getting close to 1 (0.9 recurring) or do you want to go to infinity and beyond?

I wouldn't refer to syntax errors being unintentionally used as a gateway for mysticism and emotional bias to enter philosophy, as a different 'reference point', but ok.

Yes, I was oversimplifying, but it was to demonstrate the point that most people simply assume that they can't ever exceed a system or that thermodynamics is the only thing that can exist.

Perceptions. If a quantum outcome observed changes it, then perhaps more research should be spent on why it being observed changes the outcome rather than attempting to get it to 'behave' properly.

Syntax errors are simply errors that an existing system will not accept, not that it is not somehow applicable with another system (or a merging of systems).

I would call that imagination, creativity, speculation, innovation, etc.

I would not necessarily call these things science or knowledge.

These things are more of a ying to a yang, imho - complimentary yet distinct.

Correct. Maths cannot be isolated, otherwise it is ONLY a straight line. If we all consider maths a 'superset', then utilizing any subset efficiently enough will eventually yield a mathematical truth. This translates as: The more you know, the more you are able to figure out.

>most people simply assume that they can't ever exceed a system or that thermodynamics is the only thing that can exist

Firstly, most people do not have an understanding of thermodynamics or much else in science.

Secondly, while it's true that many of those that do have such an understanding, may be drawn into triumphalist dogmatism, that says a lot more about the human mind, than it does about the process of scientific inquiry.

And finally, there are plenty of people thinking about how 'universal laws' may not be so universal at all, including those of thermodynamics, but instead temporal snippets of evolving systems, just to mention one area of theoretical interest.

>If a quantum outcome observed changes it, then perhaps more research should be spent on why it being observed changes the outcome

'Observed' meaning interacting with a quantum system, whether indirectly carried out by a human observer or directly carried out by a random environmental variable (I.e. A water molecule, in the brain, bumping into a sodium atom that is in a superposition of states, leading to decoherence).

Let's not allow a dubious semantic inference open the door to the aforementioned mysticism.

>rather than attempting to get it to 'behave' properly.

Again, you seem to be painting all scientists with the brush of dogmatism; I'm sure I do not need to highlight the erroneous nature of such generalizations.

>Syntax errors are simply errors that an existing system will not accept, not that it is not somehow applicable with another system (or a merging of systems).

That's just plainly untrue.

The problem of descriptions had been a philosophical problem for millennia, before its syntax was reevaluated, in relation to modern logical analysis.

Confusions of this sort gave rise to a range of metaphysical innovations; however, none of the proposed 'solutions' had rational grounding, but instead were merely aesthetically or emotionally appealing.

>Doesn't it just boil down to intuitive, but ultimately arbitrary, preference?

Sort of. Calling them arbitrary is crass oversimplification, but for all effects it doesn't really matter.
You just found out about the problem with empiricism, the necessary assumption that experiments are reliable as a reflection of reality, that causation is a fenomenom instead of a coincidence, and it has been around for centuries.

If you really intend to obtain further knowledge on the matter, i recommend that you read on the skeptics' work, particularly that of the most famous ones. David Hume and Descartes are obvious choices.

To elaborate on the last topic (the description problem):

Take a statement such as 'the fury hat does not exist'.

What exactly doesn't exist here?

'The fury hat', of course.

But in replying as such, I am attributing some sort of existence to it.

I'm clearly not making the same statement as 'the round triangle doesn't exist'; however, this seems to imply that a 'round triangle' is one thing and the 'fury hat' is another.

The 'theory of descriptions' informs us that the syntax of this statement is identical to: 'there is no entity c such that "x is fury and hat-like" is true when x is c, but not otherwise'.

This realisation managed to clear up around 2000 years of confusion over the notion of 'existence', which was unleashed in the Theaetus of Plato.

>You just found out about the problem with empiricism, the necessary assumption that experiments are reliable as a reflection of reality

I can assure you that I most certainly did not; however, framing my thread in such a manner was sure to lure more people in and I was curious as to what the anons of Veeky Forums would have to say.

>For example, the existence of an external reality, the reliability of induction and, subsequently, that universal laws can be derived from inductive reasoning?

Do you have any other "examples"? That's not just some assumptions. This is emrbracing reality. If you reject reality - stop using it.

See: Hume, David.

Oi so you're just baiting people?

That's a pretty mean-spirited thing to do, good sir. Please refrain from further uncalled actions that may further degradate and compromise the quality the most prestigious board we find ourselves currently in.

Also, fuck you, man.

I'm unsure of why it is still classed as mysticism when I am simply attempting to describe utilization of multiple subsets to aid in the understanding of their superset.

I feel that might be a 'relative' versus 'absolute' syntax discussion.

>Please refrain from further uncalled actions that may further degradate and compromise the quality the most prestigious board we find ourselves currently in.

Lol

>I'm unsure of why it is still classed as mysticism when I am simply attempting to describe utilization of multiple subsets to aid in the understanding of their superset

Then we have misunderstood each other somewhere.

>I feel that might be a 'relative' versus 'absolute' syntax discussion.

Well, yes to some extent; however, the absolute is layered with much unfounded metaphysical baggage, even by some of the greatest thinkers.

Does he give an alternative? Or is he just reasoning against reason?

How can you use reason to argue for the viability of induction?

Think about it.

You can't prove its legitimacy deductively and if you tried to prove it inductively, you'd be using circular reasoning.

So the reliability of induction must be assumed, on a common sense or intuitive basis.

>How can you use reason to argue for the viability of induction?
How can you use reason against it?

What I'm saying is - any meaningful understanding of this reality must be build on certain assumptions. That reasoning works and that our senses touch reality. Rejecting that is pointless - you will be on your own inside your mind. Now tell me about the fruits of that kind of journey you and David made.

Correct, all reason is ultimately based on axioms.

We believe the opposite of what we've observed before will occur in the future. Why do we believe this? Well you see, it's never worked before.