The hard problem of consciousness

It also creates big holes in dualist arguments, because of the interaction problem (if experience is separate from the physical are separate, how can they interact?) Epiphenomenalism solves the interaction problem by saying phenomenal experience doesn't affect the physical, yet the very thing you describe seems to indicate just that.

A possible solution to that is if the physical can epiphenomenally cause the mental, then wouldn't it be possible that the physical would process information that could in some sense describe features of the mental, explaining how the physical can come up with verbal reports/thoughts about it: It's simply corresponding with the phenomenal experience without directly accessing it. An analogy would be: when a computer burns a disc, the would-be contents of the disc is going to be in the computers memory when the disc is created, and if saved, the computer could describe the disc, without reading anything from it. The computer has then caused the disc, and is able to describe it without reading anything from its final form. This leaves the question of how exactly information crosses to the "phenomenal realm", but that gap doesn't create as many problems as causal interaction the other way around.

To expand on this gap, you could ask, how is it that something as irreducible and and seemingly fundamental as phenomenal experience can directly interact with something as high level as neurobiology? This is where maybe the integrated information theory can come into play. Phenomenal experience is not directly caused on a level where matter interacts very fundamentally, but on the higher levels where information is very integrated, and from that experience is formed through some kind of irreducible emergence.

Fuckin hell, this truly is the NON-problem of consciousness.

This explains it very succinctly without the fluff: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popper's_three_worlds

How does this solve the P-zombie problem?

>Hard problem doubters
It happens because of information processing and then magic

>Hard problem believers
It happens because of some phenomenon we don't understand yet

You got that backwards friendo.

You don't understand the hard problem. Dan dennet is a quack

Not sure what you mean by solve, but it's consistent with the assumptions the p-zombie argument makes; that subjective experience has no causal powers of its own.

ITT: People who cannot even grasp the concept of irreducibility

The problem is simple: somebody misinterprets their observations then makes a bunch of assumptions based on that, which they then label as "obvious facts".

The hard problem claims a bunch of properties for consciousness that I do not observe it as having. And since my observations do not create the same contradictions as the ones pointed out in that article, my observations are necessarily more reliable.

I believe that not every human is truly conscious.

If you've been color blind your entire life, and other people claim they can see color, would you assume that your observations are necessarily more reliable because you don't misinterpret your observations with silly color illusions?

If a P-zombie is truly indistinguishable, then it disproves qualia by showing that mental properties are unnecessary. If a P-zombie is distinguishable, then it disproves qualia by showing that mental properties are physical.

I'm skeptical about this given how processed stimuli are once you actually experience them. I think an interesting thing to consider is the so-called McGurk effect, on which I encourage to read. It's quite striking that the sounds you perceive are not systematically determined by the wavelengths your ears pick up. I think qualia, such as colors or sounds, are more of an abstraction created by the mind than faithful representations of the stimuli to which we are exposed.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McGurk_effect

I could build a range of information processing systems, starting with simple ones, and increasing the complexity up to human level.

At some level of complexity in this series of systems, I will have built a machine which is conscious.

I will know every component in this machine, but as for explaining why it is conscious, I will only be able to point to the differences between the conscious machine, and the simpler, unconscious machines.

I will have no better understanding of consciousness besides that this machine has some component/module that the other machines lack.

>And since my observations do not create the same contradictions

But, a P-zombie being indistinguishable or not doesn't necessarily say something about the the realness of qualia, it says something about the realness of its causal effects.

There is also a difference between functionally indistinguishable and intrinsically indistinguishable. Two things can appear to function identically, yet don't at some level we can't access empirically.

I don't see how that has any relation. Human perception is obviously not "pure" because the brain takes various shortcuts, but that has nothing to do with qualia.

Realness = Causal Effects

If something had no causal effect, nobody would ever know about it.

>I think qualia, such as colors or sounds, are more of an abstraction created by the mind than faithful representations of the stimuli to which we are exposed
I think you're cherrypicking with anecdotal evidence (McGirk effect). If people without identifiable mental impairments were experiencing the McGirk effect in their daily lives, and as a result, there was no consensus on basic laws and properties, you might have a case. The subjective assessment of these laws and properties is irrelevant.

It's not inconceivable to assume that some aspects of the universe has no observable casual effects. If there is, I don't think it's fair to say they are any less real.

What is the name of this fallacy?

>Popperian cosmology rejects this essentialism, but maintains the common sense view that physical and mental states exist, and they interact.
Not much of an explanation there.

Sure it is. Only dopey philosophers think anything else actually matters.

Our consciousness didn't arise from nothing, as there is a physical process that gives rise to our ontology. Our experience is based on physical processes, and I don't think the subjective feelings that arise when observing these processes (qualia) should be relevant to anyone but artists and writers.

Different colors may produce different feelings, but regardless of the shade, the vast majority of people will be able to identify the color. Can we perfectly describe it? The artists and writers will try... and fail.

It's not a fallacy

It's assuming the outcome of an experiment that has never been performed.

I believe it's called a "thought experiment"

The McGurk effect is a very solid effect which has nothing to do with mental illness. In fact, I encourage you to watch stimuli which incite the effect. Also, any study of the mind is hopeless if we don't take into consideration subjective assessments. If your hope was to conduct cognitive science in the way the physical sciences are done, I doubt you would get many interesting results. Behaviorism, while not completely effaced, is not particularly relevant to much of the progress which has been done in understanding cognitive systems.

>I don't care about it
>therefore the problem is solved

None of us truly exist, we're all just delusions.
Your whole life, personality and being just a dream.
A movie projection playing inside your head, only there's no one watching.

The delusion of being a person arose out of convenience, to spread your chemicals, there's no one there being deluded.
There's no unity or experience of being a person, it's all just disconnected sensory spikes, the brain constructs the delusion as a dream in hindsight.

>The delusion of being a person arose out of convenience
That's not what consciousness is.

...

Read about emergence before you share your 2 cent philosophy.

ITT: We post attention whoring brainlets

>the McGurk effect is a very solid effect which has nothing to do with mental illness
I realize that. I'm saying that there's a reason it's called an effect, and it's simply a matter of the brain adapting to stimuli and filtering the most relevant information for optimal performance. Also, I should have said *were/weren't experiencing this effect.*

>Behaviorism, while not completely effaced, is not particularly relevant to much of the progress which has been done in understanding cognitive systems
At this point, progress is extremely relative.

You're welcome. Screencap this thread.

Can you retards stop arguing about mcgurk effect? It has nothing to do with the discussion of consciousness. McGurk effect is an inductive bias used by the brain for processing of speech.

The discussion on the McGurk effect was brought up to discuss the link between qualia and the stimuli which cause them. The link between the perception of qualia and consciousness is salient, and I don't see how you're missing this point.

The other guy started it. And don't you ever tell me when I can and cannot discuss McGurk.

I think we have more of a case of Dunning-Kruger effect going on with you two.

Oh yeah? Well you're just a pseudo-intellectual.

Alright, I'm done shitposting. Kek

Alright, I've got to admit that's pretty clever of you. Good job.

Related meme.

Really makes you wonder about the nature of some of the people in this thread.

>You're not having experiences, you're just experiencing the illusion that you're exper... wait.

>- now, if everyone was experiencing different colors then that would be truly perplexing.
Is it proof that everyone experiences a similar red/blue/green/colors by using color theory as evidence?
I "know" you and I experience a similar red and yellow because color theory says those colors are sharp and contrasting and I find that combination sharp and contrasting but that wouldn't be the case if my "red and yellow" was something more like your "brown and orange"

What's to say that there is only 1 stream of subjective experience in your brain? What if you're only one of the many systems that have experiences, and the actions you consider subconscious is still subjectively experienced in another part of your brain? That would mean that there are many conscious entities in your brain that are all experiencing reading this text in one way or another, depending on what functions that part of the brain is concerned with. Suicide then becomes a very direct ethical concern considering a single conscious entity is not in charge of making every decision.

This idea begs a question of identity. The thoughts and actions of your person would therefore not longer be you. The only thing that is truly yours is your conscious experience, which is arguably still true even if there is only 1 stream of consciousness, but this illustrates that reality in a clearer way.

The idea of subjective experience is completely unfounded.

Because people can identify hundreds of shades. And if people were experiencing different combinations of colors, there would not be consensus on various shades of color.

>The idea of subjective experience is completely unfounded.

this may be the most laughable thing I've ever read on Veeky Forums. Do you have any idea what you actually meant by that or were you just stringing words together

Subjective experience is quite literally the only thing in the universe which is founded.

Everything you experience could be a complete illusion... but you are still experiencing something.

The thing that we cannot imagine the world without; the thing that we consider "essential" is the acting force and not a passive observer. The statement isn't "I observe, therefore I am" It's "I think, therefore I am". Though "I" is not really good there.

>McGurk effect

That's fascinating as fuck

theres no proof that anyone but me is conscious

That's true, but it is a reasonable assumption.

This line of thinking really irritates me. I mean, like said, it's true, but people who use it in these conversations should be gassed.

It reminds me of that silly question about the tree falling in the forest: does it make a sound? It's safe to assume, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the tree would still create the physical reaction that we would perceive as sound, but if there's no one around to process the stimuli... then there's no one to perceive it as sound.

It's safe to assume, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the fate of the universe doesn't hinge on our ability to perceive it, and that matter and energy would continue to interact in the same fashion without us.

Yes, this is empiricist, materialist, physicalist, whatever you wanna call it.
>but like... what is reality, maaaan

t. Someone who thinks the simulation hypothesis is plausible.

I agree with you, but I think there is a lot of nuance you can add to an idealistic viewpoint, to the point where whether or not it's really idealism is a bit murky.

Let's assume that there is some sort of objective reality, that function even if you and I were not here experiencing it. That doesn't mean that the reality that we experience, isn't a complete fabrication of our minds. The fabrication uses inputs from the objective reality, but what we're experiencing isn't at all representative of the true objective qualities of this objective reality. The sound of the tree, how the tree looks, and what we think of trees, are not qualities of the objective reality, but of the reality that we create. With all that in mind, the notion that the tree didn't make a sound might not be as silly as it first appears, considering the fact that neither sound, "falling", or "ground", can be intrinsic qualities of the objective reality.

I think we're on the same page.

There's no proof that anybody but you si conscious. Therefore: the only correct conclusion is that you are the only thing that truly exists, and everything around you is just a Show you put on for yourself, like a dream.

That's some solid logic right there lad. No wonder postmerdernism has such a strong influence on scientific research.

Anyone else find it peculiar how hard of a line there is between people who can conceive of a hard problem, and those who can't? Those who argue for the hard problem are amazed that the people on the other side can't understand it, and the people arguing against a hard problem are amazed that people make such a big deal out of nothing.

Is it that language about mental states is so private that words have vastly different definitions depending on who you talk to, or do people actually understand the gap between experience and function, but still don't think it needs to be ontologically explained? People who don't see a hard problem often don't directly respond to this question, so it would be interesting if someone here did.

It's because the definition of consciousness is either never made clear, a nonsense definition is given, or a definition that doesn't even work within the problem is given.

The definition of consciousness when talking about the hard problem is always stated clearly: we're talking about the subjective experience, what "it is like" to be you, the fact that you are subject to experiences. You should, intuitively be able to understand what's meant by this.

Is this what you would consider a nonsense definition? If so, then understand that it's not a definition meant to explain what consciousness is - it's meant to refer to the very phenomena that we're trying to understand. If people knew what it was, there wouldn't be a hard problem.

The problem is that definition makes false assumptions. It's nowhere near as "primal" as people think it is.

Would you mind elaborating a little bit?

>What is Veeky Forums's response to the hard problem of consciousness?
Monads. That guy Leibniz was right.

Well I'm glad this huge philosophical puzzle was solved by no more than six words.

What false assumptions does it make and what do you mean exactly by primal?

I would argue that your experience is the most primal thing there is, and the only thing you can be truly sure exists, for the same reasons Descartes did.

Conscious motions are distinguished from non-conscious motions by the presence of X. Consciousness is the conceptualization of X.

So the question is "what is X". All this stuff about "experience" is just a huge red herring.

Now you're talking about consciousness in the form of the cognitive functional systems of the brain. The question of what the difference is between subconscious and conscious actions is a question that can be solved by a functional explanation of the brain. This is however not at all what we're talking about.

We're concerned with the phenomenal consciousness, why it feels like something at all instead of you just being a clump of particles, going about its thing completely in the dark.

Yeah it seems like you're missing the point.It seems clear to me that I'm constantly experiencing a variety of qualia, such as colors, tastes, sounds, pain, pleasure, etc. The hard problem is concerned with why we experience these, and also how. It seems difficult to explain how qualia emerge into how we perceive them from their physical stimuli.

You don't seem to understand that thoughts(feelings) are actions too. And being explainable is the point of this definition; it's a more reliable definition because it doesn't spawn unsolvable problems.

The idea of qualia is based on misunderstanding the limits of human communication, human perception, and human imagination.

A powerful extraterrestrial that is perfect at all of these things does not have a concept of qualia. It does not see the color red, it senses photons with certain wavelengths and understands how they interact with certain surfaces. It does not taste or smell anything, it perceives the chemical structures and all of their potential interactions. And it can communicate information of these things perfectly; another alien of the same type that has been in perfect darkness for its entire life could have the properties of photons communicated to it in such a way that encountering a real photon for the first time will not cause it to gain any additional knowledge about its properties.

>A powerful extraterrestrial that is perfect at all of these things does not have a concept of qualia.

[citation needed]

> It does not see the color red, it senses photons with certain wavelengths and understands how they interact with certain surfaces

The very notion of sensing is exactly what a qualia means.

So a computer has qualia?

That's such an interesting question! I've been asking myself that for quite some time. I imagine one distinction which is necessary to describe things as qualia is that they be consciously experienced. If the computer does not have the capacity for self-reference, probably not. But a computer capable of self-reference might. But anyway, that's just my 2 cents, so obviously it's not worth a whole lot.

It sounds to me like qualia is a useless concept and the real question is about the defining element of conscious action, which I what I already said.

How about the concept of 'fun'? That seems impossible to quantify because it can be drastically different from person to person, as well as change for a particular person. Would your perfect extraterrestrial have a complete understanding of the concept of fun?

>You don't seem to understand that thoughts(feelings) are actions too
Qualia does not have a functional explanation like actions, this is exactly the conclusions of the hard problem.

>And being explainable is the point of this definition; it's a more reliable definition because it doesn't spawn unsolvable problems.
You can explain something in very simple ways, that doesn't mean that it's automatically correct, especially not when you are presented with such a glaring gap between function and experience.

>The idea of qualia is based on misunderstanding the limits of human communication, human perception, and human imagination.
How can you speak with such certainty about this?

If it is something that it is like to be a computer, then yes. Is it? That's not clear.

Well I suppose at that point it all depends on where you place the upper bound on what you deem 'acceptable research'. In any case, I think qualia remain something quite intuitive, and I would like to imagine that one day, we will have interesting models of emergence which may shed some light on how these come to be and why.

"Fun" doesn't refer to one thing; it's not a concrete concept.

But (the thing you believe to be)qualia IS an action. If it wasn't an action, you wouldn't be talking about it right now.

>yfw dennett is here botting the poll

kek

>If it wasn't an action, you wouldn't be talking about it right now.
That is a good point. I went into details about this in an earlier post, see

>"Fun" doesn't refer to one thing; it's not a concrete concept.

No way, fun and boredom are absolute concepts. But hey I just looked in the thread hoping there were some recent breakthroughs in the field, not for this sort of argument.

So then is the only disagreement about the nature of X?

So far you've stated that subjective experience is nothing more than neurological functions, in principle no harder to explain than why we act in certain ways. You've said that the mystery of qualia is nothing more than a trick of language. I completely disagree with both premises, and the thread is full of reasons as to why.

Subjective experience, in relation to my model, is a misinterpretation the comes from not realizing that thoughts are a type of action, and that X is not necessarily seated in any physical space. We don't know what X is yet.

>Why doesn't all the data processing go on "in the dark", without the phenomenal experience?

What is the subconscious?

>How about the concept of 'fun'? That seems impossible to quantify

Dopamine release in the presence of compelling, novel or beneficial experiences (or just heroin).

Evolution developed this coercive process among higher organisms to encourage their spread into unfamiliar territory where they might better flourish...they might not, but the evolutionary process doesn't give a shit about individuals, just species.

At least you didn't use the brainlet example of "love" as some mystical, science-proof example.

God. He made us in his image. Entirely. In that sense we have his budding capabilities.

Sure, but I wouldn't necessarily say that thoughts ARE subjective experience. We can conceive of a system that thinks functionally without any subjective experience at all. With us, my way of looking at it is that we also experience the thoughts, but they could have very well happened without anyone there to experience them, like we assume a simple computer program would work.

>X is not necessarily seated in any physical space. We don't know what X is yet.

Up until now you seemed to be an eliminatist/reductivist, but according to this it seems like you think there is some sort of metaphysical mystery surrounding consciousness?

>We can conceive of a system that thinks functionally without any subjective experience at all.
And what gives you any reason to think that this isn't the case for you already?

The mystery isn't metaphysical. X is just currently beyond measurement by anything except the systems of human cognition, but human cognition is still a physical process. X is a fundamental aspect of all reality that is only measured within a limited space by human cognition. But despite being only measured in limited space, humans have a grasp of the entire thing; it does not differ based on where it is measured. This results in all conscious motions tracked by a single system being classified as caused by a single agent.

The problem with consciousness is that it isn't science, and its hard to get you people to go back to