"I will now explain consciousness"

yyour hard problem will never be answered. qualia = neurons. simple as.

Mate can you even read. See

The problem he has is he's trying to shoehorn 13th century theology into present day neuroscience. He's arguing for Thomism, m8.

wut

If any of you can properly restate the arguments people make for the hard problem as clearly as possible (doesn't have to be long, simply explain why we think it poses a problem for science), and then explain why it's misguided, it would at least convince me you understand the arguments (and maybe change my mind).

Where in the world did you get that at all from what I've said?

Do you just not get it?
They died because they were in love and thought the other had died. Pixels on a screen have nothing to do with experiencing love or irony. This is why I said neuroscience is autism.

>Recall a childhood memory. Did you? It wouldn't have happened if I hadn't just spurred you to do so.
This doesn't really address why there is a "you" or "I". Why there is a subjective experience. I could accept this to be true and all it would say is that experience is deterministic not where/why/how the experience itself comes to be. The only reason "I" have a childhood memory is because my serial machine state body has a subjective experience of a childhood where are those states stored? Where are the hard drives that I recall that configuration from?

I second this.
If reductive materialism isn't true then by law of excluded middle Thomism is.

The idea is that there are "easy problems" of consciousness (how the brain computes numbers, how we change our attention, etc, the mechanistic HOWs), and then theres the "hard problem" of consciousness, which is how all those mechanistic operations form "qualia" and "experiences".
The reason I (and Dan Dennet, and Stanislas Dehaene, and Pat Churchland, and everyone in the field) think it's a nonsense "problem" can best be explained by analogy.

The terms used... "qualia" and "phenomenal experience" are the same as "vital energy" and "phlogiston". They're used as shortcut terms to describe the whole processes happening as a result of the "easy problems".

An analogy would be:
"The easy problems of life are things like 'how does the heart pump blood, how do the muscles contract, etc, mechanistic questions... but the hard problem of life is 'how do those mechanistic processes form the 'elan vital' in all living things and the 'phlogistic fire of our metabolism'.

Point is... proponents of the hard problem are taking for granted that "qualia" exists simply because "it's obvious!". But I'm saying that the answers to the easy problems, once we have them all (which we don't yet)... will explain fully how consciousness works just like the easy problems of life explain fully how the "elan vital" works (in other words, how we are alive).

>This doesn't really address why there is a "you" or "I". Why there is a subjective experience.
I know this, and have agreed multiple times. We simply do not know. We will likely never know.