Consciousness

It follows the same rules as Chaos Theory. Can the path of a cyclone be calculated? Sure, anyone can predict the path of a cyclone by watching it for a few hours.

Can you predict when and where the first cyclone after 2030 will appear? No. But it follows the same natural laws.

I'm asking you... is that what the word it in the quoted phrase referred to? You should know, assuming you're the one who wrote it, really

The scientific method requires a falsifiable test. I just acknowledged that. I don't know what it'd be. No need for hostility.

Describing a system with mathematics and actually computing reasonable results from that description are often times separated by a huge gap of difficulty. Chaos is just one example of that.

>consciousness is a natural system
^That one's false. "Consciousness" is a vague suitcase word with lots of convoluted and even conflicting different meanings depending on who you try to get a definition for it from.
What you can clearly define about the brain and its functionality can be described mathematically. What you can't doesn't really exist except as a misunderstanding. Which I guess you could also explain mathematically, but if you start explaining how the misunderstanding happened the people falling for that misunderstanding will object that you're not really talking about their special "consciousness" idea that they can't clearly define.

>>all natural systems can be described mathematically
Even if thus is true, it doesn't mean humans have the potential to describe _all_ natural systems mathematically.
Also, why "natural" systems???
Are you holding out a loophole for unnatural systems? supernatural? artificial systems?

>>all natural systems can be described mathematically
Godel says no.

>Godel says...
Isn't it remarkable how most of the time this phrase is posted, the poster has no idea what they're talking about?

Everything can be described through mathematics, even though that doesn't mean we're able to do so.

Using quotes is a quite agreeable way of using arguments you don't understand yourself, plus argument of authority.
Furthermore in that case where the name IS the only argument lmao

Any time someone references Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems or uses "quantum" as an adjective I automatically assume they're retarded.

Fuck geoffrey boycott, cunt.

>All natural systems can be described mathematically
Probabilistically maybe, not even remotely the same

This. Most people are brainlets and can't really grasp this, so they say that not everything is quantifiable.

Then every non-equilibrium system in a steady state that is weakly cpupled to its environment can be described by bayesian probability.

Or more simply - assuming it is ergodic, every system posessing a markov blanket can be described by bayesian probability.

the mind is not mechanical and as such cannot be described mathematically

>the mind is not mechanical
Then why does it consistently fail in similar ways in response to different sorts of physical brain trauma?

Consciousness does not belong to our universe (or our reality). We can't use tools from this universe to describe something outside of this universe.

Plus : biology is the only science we can't describe with math. There are no formula, no theorem in biology.

Conclusion : all your statements are false.

>biology is the only science we can't describe with math
You can describe biology with mathematics, it just isn't practical to do so. It'd be like trying to play baseball on the sole basis of a numerical interpretation of the physical data. You could try to do something like that, but it'd be a lot more practical to just play the game in the normal way.
>Consciousness does not belong to our universe (or our reality)
That's not really right or wrong as a claim because consciousness isn't an actual thing to begin with, it's a vague term for a bunch of different meanings, many of which are abstract and not literally in existence beyond being helpful ideas to behave around.

just be cause you're not conscious doesn't mean no one else is

>Plus : biology is the only science we can't describe with math. There are no formula, no theorem in biology.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_and_theoretical_biology
>Consciousness does not belong to our universe (or our reality
this is bait!

>en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_and_theoretical_biology

yeah no.

dynamical systems, free energym good regulator. life has been explained. now fuck off faghead

>life has been explained

I have the hots for this person who I hope is a female

>all natural systems can be described mathematically
prove it
>consciousness is a natural system
prove this retarded 'consciousness' shit exists

Hindu goddess Kali. Confirmed female.

>>all natural systems can be described mathematically
Not provable. Quantum physics, for example, seems to be based upon global side effects.

>>consciousness is a natural system
Consciousness isn't a system, nor is it real. It's a concept for an artifact of a process.

>>consciousness can be described mathematically
False for the reasons stated above.

>Which, if any, of these statements is false?
All of them, probably. Now get back to /x/.

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23825119

This paper presents a heuristic proof (and simulations of a primordial soup) suggesting that life-or biological self-organization-is an inevitable and emergent property of any (ergodic) random dynamical system that possesses a Markov blanket. This conclusion is based on the following arguments: if the coupling among an ensemble of dynamical systems is mediated by short-range forces, then the states of remote systems must be conditionally independent. These independencies induce a Markov blanket that separates internal and external states in a statistical sense. The existence of a Markov blanket means that internal states will appear to minimize a free energy functional of the states of their Markov blanket. Crucially, this is the same quantity that is optimized in Bayesian inference. Therefore, the internal states (and their blanket) will appear to engage in active Bayesian inference. In other words, they will appear to model-and act on-their world to preserve their functional and structural integrity, leading to homoeostasis and a simple form of autopoiesis.

journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1002400

In this paper, we propose that the brain (and other self-organised biological systems) can be characterised via the mathematical apparatus of a gauge theory. The picture that emerges from this approach suggests that any biological system (from a neuron to an organism) can be cast as resolving uncertainty about its external milieu, either by changing its internal states or its relationship to the environment. Using formal arguments, we show that a gauge theory for neuronal dynamics—based on approximate Bayesian inference—has the potential to shed new light on phenomena that have thus far eluded a formal description, such as attention and the link between action and perception.

ingentaconnect.com.sci-hub.io/content/imp/jcs/2014/00000021/F0020001/art00001

This paper considers the Cartesian theatre as a metaphor for the virtual reality models that the brain uses to make inferences about the world. This treatment derives from our attempts to understand dreaming and waking consciousness in terms of free energy minimization. The idea here is that the Cartesian theatre is not observed by an internal (homuncular) audience but furnishes a theatre in which fictive narratives and fantasies can be rehearsed and tested against sensory evidence. We suppose the brain is driven by the imperative to infer the causes of its sensory samples; in much the same way as scientists are compelled to test hypotheses about experimental data. This recapitulates Helmholtz's notion of unconscious inference and Gregory's treatment of perception as hypothesis testing. However, we take this further and consider the active sampling of the world as the gathering of confirmatory evidence for hypotheses based on our virtual reality. The ensuing picture of consciousness (or active inference) resolves a number of seemingly hard problems in consciousness research and is internally consistent with current thinking in systems neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology. In this formalism, there is a dualism that distinguishes between the (conscious) process of inference and the (material) process that entails inference. This separation is reflected by the distinction between beliefs (probability distributions over hidden world states or res cogitans) and the physical brain states (sufficient statistics or res extensa) that encode them. This formal approach allows us to appeal to simple but fundamental theorems in information theory and statistical thermodynamics that dissolve some of the mysterious aspects of consciousness.

None. With a mathematical system of a sufficient expressive power it's most likely possible.

hey are you that user i lost track of, we were arguing about the relevance of biosemiotics?

>This paper considers the Cartesian theatre as a metaphor for the virtual reality models that the brain uses to make inferences about the world
why dont just except sign logic in biological systems? no need for metaphors.

>why dont just except sign logic in biological systems? no need for metaphors.
accept*, recognize..

undcomm504.wordpress.com/2013/02/24/firstness-secondness-and-thirdness-in-peirce/
>This triadic structure recurs throughout Peirce’s analysis. He loves typologies, especially those that describe levels of mediation. The typology he returns to most is that of firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which describe degrees of mediation and reflexivity. Firstness is a condition of unmediated, unreflexive access. Firsts are experience without reaction, cause without effect. Secondness is a condition of mediated but not yet reflexive access. Seconds are experience and the reaction it evokes, cause and the effect it provokes, but not yet a reflection on the reaction or effect. Thirdness is a condition of mediated, reflexive access. Thirds are experience, reaction, and the reflection upon that reaction. They are cause, effect, and the extension of that effect to the form of habit or convention or law
this is just pierce, the role of thirdness and this virtual reality has been elaborated on by contemporary biosemioticians. The point is the triadic structure is a model of how meaning has to be made.

>all natural systems can be described mathematically
[citation needed]

Same with the No Free Lunch theorem in learning theory

You can pull that circlejerk on Veeky Forums but not Veeky Forums

If it isn't explained now, it can't be explained.

yes i am user

Consciousness is natural, but it isn't a system.

one of the major advantages of free energy is that it is able to explain things organically rather than imposing structures on reality such as this triad. Another impressive attribute is that it is formally equivalent to thermodynamic free energy and provides the crucial link between our brain as an information processor and our brain (and the whole organism) as a physical energetic system. There is increasing evidence that physical and inferential free energy are analogous in terms of information and thermodynamics. Biosemiotics cannot do this and must impose anthropocentric structures which committ essentialistic errors onto an organic process.

In other words.

>BTFO

Semiotics is a social science.

An emergent behavior found in human brains.

Hey retard, biosemiotics and free energy are complementary and this is what biosemiotics explains >Semiotics is a social science.
It is a science you utter pleb, it has nothing to do innately with social interactions. Biosemiotics is focused on the logical dimensions of the science. Calling the triadic model anthropocentric is completely retarded and betrays your ignorance.

Semiosis is not a structure it is a process

The first one. Describe the quantum states of helium exactly mathematically. Or any three body problem.

The statement that description has any relevance.

Awesome...

it is anthropocentric because it isnt empirically derived and its arbitrary and the whole idea of meanings and signs is anthropocentric. thermodynamic models are organic.

Biosemiotics doesn't explain shit. Its not a theory of the brain or biology. Its just vague bullshit and semiotics is a social science. If you think it has nothing to do with social interaction you dont even know what it is. Semiotics derives from philosophy, linguistics and social science theories like structuralism. It is historically from social sciences or humanities. Ffs, one of the videos you sent me was by an anthropologist so just stop talking shit.

>BTFO
>You'll do fookin nootin, you'll do nootin

who gives a fuck

If, by natural systems, you mean any thing occurring in nature then your first statement is incorrect. There are elements of the working universe that math cannot describe. Naturally, if your first premise is false, the following two are not true.

The first one, which of course invalidates the third

do you "see" something in front of you? Do you "smell" something? Do you "feel"?

>"consciousness" is some spoopy paranormal magic and shiet and not an array of extremely complex biochemical reactions
>the universe isn't deterministic, muh uncertainty principle, muh dead&alive cats I read it on IFLS
>muh god is real m'kay even though I have no evidence, aside from some meaningless philosophical wanks
Do brainlets actually believe these? Should having an IQ below 120 be considered mental retardation?

3 is false, 1 and 2 are true. Modus ponens and the BARBARA syllogism are invalid.

For example:

1. All Quakers are pacifists.
2. Richard Nixon is a Quaker
3. Richard Nixon is a pacifist

1 and 2 are true but 3 is false

In early 2016, it would be justified to believe that:

1. If a Democrat wins the 2016 presidential election, then if Hillary Clinton does not win, Bernie Sanders will.
2. A Democrat will win the 2016 presidential election.

But it would not be justified to believe that

3. If Hillary does not win the 2016 presidential election, then Bernie Sanders will.

I see what appears to be a fish in a net. I conclude that "If that animal is a fish, then if it has lungs it ls a lungfish." But I cannot conclude that "If that animal has lungs, it is a lungfish."

>somebody spent several minutes of his life to type all that retarded shit

She's very pretty.

>anthropocentric because it isnt empirically derived
?
>the whole idea of meanings and signs is anthropocentric.
No, your whole idea of meaning and signs is anthropocentric
See
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/m/pubmed/26276466/?i=4&from=/18365164/related

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/m/pubmed/18365164/

Thermodynamic models are great at explaining representation but not interpretation. Which is why old guard are literally using the Cartesian theater as a metaphor to understand interpretation without recognizing meaning and signification. Biosemioticians have been making fun of biology for years for Cartesian dogma.
>Biosemiotics doesn't explain shit. Its not a theory of the brain or biology. Its just vague bullshit and semiotics is a social science. If you think it has nothing to do with social interaction you dont even know what it is. Semiotics derives from philosophy, linguistics and social science theories like structuralism.
Ignored because it's not worth my time arguing with someone about something that they clearly do not know about.
>Ffs, one of the videos you sent me was by an anthropologist so just stop talking shit.
Talking about theoretical biology, particularly the emergence of biosemiotics from things closely related to free energy, he may have mentioned free energy directly even, it's been a while since I watched it.
>>BTFO
>You'll do fookin nootin, you'll do nootin
Take this kind of shit attitude towards debate to Anyone that is remotely literate in ontology.

>
they are using the cartesian metaphor to make themselves seem more accessible to people interested in consciousness. I fucking told you before, these free energy ideas are better because they tell you why and how someone interpretes something. interpretation by itself is anthropocentric, while thermodynamic models tell you why and how organisms need to do this in a universal and organic sense.

I fucking looked at a biosemiotics article by one of the leading guys - i told you this before - and he does a history of semiotics and refers to its origins in philosophy and social science so stfu.

how is it related to free energy.

>BTFO

Tired of your bullshit.

You believe you do, but it's just a belief. If you look into how our visual processing works, a scary amount of it is based on our brain just telling us bullshit stories. The actual stimuli we register is surprisingly scarce and even though we tend to believe we're "seeing" everything around us, what our eyes are really doing when examined in a controlled setting is darting around and pulling in tiny little details that serve as seeds for the narratives our brains generate about how things ought to be.

But that doesnt mean we don't have experiences. Please don't confound the temporal integration of information across saccades with us having illusory experience. Just don't.

>brains telling us bullshit
Isn't there an inconsistency. What is the brain talking to.

>just a belief.
You don't have experiences with your beliefs?

>But that doesnt mean we don't have experiences.
That's exactly what I believe it means though. Or at least it's one piece of evidence for that. There are other reasons to believe this too, but that's a good example in my opinion anyway.
>Please don't confound the temporal integration of information across saccades with us having illusory experience.
"Illusory" is a loaded term. People tend to assume "illusion" implies "experience," and in this case "experience" would be the "illusion" itself, so using it usually isn't very productive since it leads to people complaining you can't have illusions without implying "experience" when that's really just a semantics debate about the word choice. In any event, I don't see how you can interpret that narrative reliant sight behavior as anything other than evidence for how our belief there's an immanent "experience" thing is not a true belief.
>What is the brain talking to.
The brain is a highly convoluted mess of about 100 trillion different connections. Many different subsystems exist inside it and they communicate to each other.
>You don't have experiences with your beliefs?
Let me ask you this: How would you ever know if you were actually having an "experience" vs. just being fed the notion "I've had an experience?" Your brain can do the latter and you would have no way of knowing you never really "experienced" anything. And given it can do this, what reason do we have to believe the former is the case when the brain can get the job done doing the latter with the benefit of operating entirely within the bounds of explicable, physical causality? With both being equal, I think it makes more sense to take the explanation that doesn't invoke some alternative non-physical reality.

No fucking psychologist or neuroscientist would agree with you. They'd only say that conscious experience is not as it seems. In any sense you seem to be using a very specific definition of experience since you cannot deny your own phenomenology.

Please don't confound the temporal integration of information across saccades with us not having experience.

>The brain is a highly convoluted mess of about 100 trillion different connections. Many different subsystems exist inside it and they communicate to each other.

so you basically got BTFO by your own question because you can't answer my rhetorical question and clearly dont understand it judging by your answer.

>How would you ever know if you were actually having an "experience" vs. just being fed the notion "I've had an experience?

define what a fucking experience is then because as far as im concerned, being fed the notion entails an experience. And i reiterate. The experience being "true" is of no relevance.

Experience isnt a bloody non-physical reality. im not a dualist.

>you cannot deny your own phenomenology
Why not?
>Please don't confound the temporal integration of information across saccades with us not having experience.
Instead of asking me not to do that, you can make an argument for why doing that isn't correct.
>so you basically got BTFO by your own question because you can't answer my rhetorical question and clearly dont understand it judging by your answer.
Just because you personally believe the brain can't have subsystems that communicate to each other doesn't mean you're right. Maybe try making an argument for why subsystems can't communicate to each other in that way instead of just asserting how you believe this isn't true.

I do believe the brain has subsystems, im addressing that you didnt answer my question.

You shouldn't confound it because you are assuming that experience entails a one to one connection with sensory input and perception of such when the brain is hierarchically organised with fast fluctuations being enslaved by slow ones this isnt necessarily the case. experience isn't linear to perception otherwise you wouldnt be able to decouple experience from sensory input. just because what we see is more sparse than we think doesnt mean that there is no experience, just that experience is integrated over saccades and enslaved by a rich hub that processes things over slower timescales.

if you deny your own phenomenology then you still lack an explanation for it.

Why do you believe that doesn't answer your question? To try to defend my answer with an analogy, suppose I wrote:
>a couple having sex
And you responded:
>Isn't there an inconsistency? Who is the couple having sex with?
To which I would reply that the couple actually consists of two sub-units, the two people who make up the couple, and in this way there's no contradiction in referring to "couple" like a singular noun while also recognizing the couple is doing something that involves both an actor and a subject acted upon. The multiplicity of the term allows for actor and subject to both exist.
>if you deny your own phenomenology then you still lack an explanation for it.
My explanation for the *belief* in this phenomenology (and this is different from how you're phrasing it since you wrote "having an explanation for it" which would imply having an explanation for something I'm arguing doesn't exist) is that there is a physical world including people like ourselves who exhibit behavior that operates around the notion of these abstract fictions we refer to as "experiences," and it's our behavior around these abstractions that are the the real thing going on, with these abstractions having the same sort of non-existence to them that the eye of a storm or your center of gravity would have i.e. a non-thing which ends up being concepts we can reference to give ourselves a different understanding of the real things in reference to "it." With "experience," we don't deliberately make this abstraction (it happens on a lower / more automatic level), but otherwise this is also similar to the more purposeful abstractions we engage in like money.
If you were to ask how we can explain the existence of money, not in terms of the "easy problems" of the mere physical paper representing it, but in terms of the "hard problem" of money as a non-physical phenomenon, I would answer that "money" doesn't really exist at all beyond being a useful abstract fiction we behave around.

>The multiplicity of the term allows for actor and subject to both exist.

not unless you demonstrate it with evidence.

> real thing going on

how many fucking times do i have to tell you that its irrelevant if its "real". thats not the point.

>not unless you demonstrate it with evidence.
What specifically are you looking for in terms of evidence that the brain communicates with itself?
>its irrelevant if its "real". thats not the point.
Why do you keep on asserting things instead of explaining why you believe in these things? It doesn't really help to state what you believe in without explaining why even if you were correct about one or more of these things you're asserting. I could try to guess at what you mean by "real" in this context and how it might be different from the sense I'm using the word, but it'd probably be easier for you to just make an argument instead of letting me try to come up with your argument for you.

another BTFO to your argument is that you cant fucking even observe the "real" world except through your fictive experience so wtf are you talking about.

> I fucking told you before, these free energy ideas are better because they tell you why and how someone interpretes something
How does free energy exist explain pic related?
Biosemiotics allows it to be evolutionary by allowing a signified element, a reflexive product of interpertation to continue on to be further inferred and the dynamic meaning.
>interpretation by itself is anthropocentric
How so? Are you implying the human ability to interpret meaning from external signs (for example: seeing the sun go down and interpreting it is about to be dark) is an evolutionary novel process?
Or are you implying that language and human understanding is not sign-based?
If so tell me why.
>I fucking looked
> BTFO
wew lad
>how is it related to free energy.
Free energy explains how information can be represented, and interpreted to be signified.

>you cant fucking even observe the "real" world except through your fictive experience
It depends on your definition of "observe." A thermostat is in a way "observing" temperature. That doesn't mean it has "experiences."

im telling you that the words interpretation and signs are human creations. im saying that those terms are human loaded terms. im saying that you can explain these things dynamically without appealing to signs or interpretation which have more than a whiff oh homunculus about them and are derived from our own metacognition. so yes, they are anthropocentric.

>Free energy explains how information can be represented, and interpreted to be signified.

lol this reply literally admits you lost.

>Biosemiotics allows it to be evolutionary by allowing a signified element, a reflexive product of interpertation to continue on to be further inferred and the dynamic meaning

can we get down to the real physics and biochemistry of this please.. the stuff that can explain away the use of signs or interpretation which are ill-defined, especially in the sense of non-human systems.

>How does free energy exist explain pic related?

Like it explains everything else its dealt and with the added benefit that in terms of molecular or chemical processes, it closely mirrors helmholtz free energy in physics since it is formally exactly the same quantity. so its very good at looking at how systems relate to their entropies and energies and how information is also a physical quantity.

Also, this.

rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/12/105/20141383

>BTFO.

RE: Evidence the brain communicates with itself / feeds itself narratives about what to believe, have you read any of Gazzaniga's work on this topic? He studied split brain patients and is known for his "left brain interpreter" concept. The idea the brain should be understood as made up of multiple different quasi-independent communicating subsystems is actually a pretty popular one, but I think his work on that topic is probably the best known.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left_brain_interpreter#References
Marvin Minsky (was a cognitive scientist who did a lot of high profile AI work) had similar ideas from a different discipline's perspective. The chapters of his book The Emotion Machine are linked on his website here:
web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/

How do you define natural? Are metaphysical concepts natural? How do you mathematically describe art?

you miss my point retard. my point is that you seem to be basing your arguments on whether experiences are validated by things that are "real" and you're proposing that there are real things out there happening which dont reflect experience, but im saying that all of your anlaysis on this is also based on the kinds of "experiences" or "cognition" that you deem not to be representing something real.

There isnt enough evidence for his ideas or any ideas on brain lateralization as of yet. The brain might be so dynamic that it isn't formed of discrete subsystems. infact, a better model is that systems spontaneously form and dissipate depending on the context all over the brain and that the brain is in a continuous state of change in terms of these "systems"; something known as metastability. One interesting thing is that laterality often depends on whether you're left or right handed. I doubt there are any innate fixed subsystems in the brain - they form in development depending on the input it gets.

hmm, whats better? some vague crap like this?

"Biosemiotics allows it to be evolutionary by allowing a signified element, a reflexive product of interpertation to continue on to be further inferred and the dynamic meaning."

or an actual published paper by one of the biggest figures in neuroscience using a well defined computational framework.

>BTFO.

You keep on mistaking disagreement with misunderstanding. I understand you fine. I just don't agree with you.
>you seem to be basing your arguments on whether experiences are validated by things that are "real" and you're proposing that there are real things out there happening which dont reflect experience, but im saying that all of your anlaysis on this is also based on the kinds of "experiences" or "cognition" that you deem not to be representing something real
Your complaint here assumes that we have "experience" and that's the source of our knowledge. So of course what I'm arguing isn't going to be compatible with that assumption given what I'm arguing is that "experience" never actually takes place.
That's what the thermostat example was for. To show you how something most of us would agree doesn't have "experiences" could still take in stimuli and exhibit behavior based on it. You can increase the complexity and have a robot that takes in stimuli and does stuff with it like maybe a world where no one exists anymore except some version of that Watson AI that spends all its time answering Jeopardy questions the humans left it before they went extinct from a global nuclear holocaust or whatever. And again, I think most people would be OK with saying that Watson AI wouldn't be having "experiences" either. So all I'm saying is just as we went from thermostats to Watson, we can increase the complexity yet again and go from Watson to humans, and we can say we're not really having "experiences" either. Not having "experiences" doesn't prevent us from taking in stimuli or engaging in behavior like the behavior of having this discussion about whether or not we have "experience."

You're saying the brain is tricking people into thinking they have experiences. Why isn't the brain tricking you in your perceptions. in the thoughts that come into your head. That i could construe as experience and which you disagree. my point was irrelevant on whether you believe experience is real or not.

>BTFO
>Youll do fookin nootin.

Im starting to feel like you dont even know what the "experiences" you disagree with really are.

as in you have no real definition or way of differentiating them from what else is going on in our brains.

How so? How can you explain looking at a sunset(object) and nowing it is about to be dark without prior signification from interpreting that happening from a prior sunset?
If it is simply inferrence how can what happened the prior night be inferred without something(representamine) standing in some respect for the information inferred the prior night(interpertant) to the system ? Free energy does not explain that kind of dynamic meaning-making. It explains how information is inferred. You are a complete pleb. The triadic structure is a logical model of the process of semiosis MUST take place, and the process of semiosis MUST take place for this kind of dynamic meaning-making to take place.
>lol this reply literally admits you lost.
No it means is updated my rhetoric as I thought(try it some time) about the context, I was wrong but I was not wrong about biosemiotics I was confused of the role the FEP plays in biosemiotics.
>can we get down to the real physics and biochemistry of this please.. the stuff that can explain away the use of signs or interpretation which are ill-defined, especially in the sense of non-human systems.
Why? biosemiotic is a logic.
>closely mirrors helmholtz free energy in physics since it is formally exactly the same quantity.
And how do you say this former quantity is mirrored? Something that stands for it in some way that makes it totally not a sign? I can't tell if this is mental gymnastics or if you are too pigheaded to understand what a biosemiotic is.

>You're saying the brain is tricking people into thinking they have experiences.
Yes. That sounds sort of malicious though, and I would add that this is actually an extremely useful behavior for us to have, behaving around a reference point that isn't actually there in reality. It would be way less efficient if we had to behave in reference to all the tiny literal details that go on in our physiological reality. Reference to "experiences" give us a similar power that references to "numbers" give us, with both cases involving shortcut ways of engaging the world, not in terms of its raw details, but instead with the abstraction of salient commonalities among these raw details.
>Why isn't the brain tricking you in your perceptions. in the thoughts that come into your head.
It is.
>That i could construe as experience and which you disagree. my point was irrelevant on whether you believe experience is real or not.
I don't follow what you're saying here.
>BTFO
Why do you keep framing this like it's a competition? It'd probably be easier to have a productive discussion with you on these topics if you stopped trying to nail me with petty semantic pot shots.

>Consciousness

t.

>
you're using the word "interpretation" in some magical sense when interpretation is inference you bloody nonce; read over what you just said. You literally just explained inference.
>without something(representamine) standing in some respect for the information inferred the prior night(interpertant) to the system ?
if you're criticising inference you shouldnt use that word in your criticism LOL.

>Why? biosemiotic is a logic.
Logic is vacuous unless you have something to work with. The world works on physics and biochemistry so we need to explain it that way.

>And how do you say this former quantity is mirrored?

it is mirrored because the free energy im talking about was derived from helmholtz physical free energy by geoffrey hinton. It is mathematically exactly the same. Its not a sign because they aren't exactly the same but they share the same equilibrium in terms of complexity and physical structures and in both neuroscience and thermodynamics, they seem to have a similar significance for self-organized systems and this isn't a sign because those significances have been derived independently. There is very little communication between the two areas as of yet.

What is a biosemiotic then? A sign? What if what you're trying to explain can be explained better and without using biased loaded terms. What if what you consider a sign can be explained by free energy principles where you use that as your starting concept.

>rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/12/105/20141383
very interesting, thanks!before i continue on let me point out some things from the abstract.
> In brief, casting the minimization of thermodynamic free energy in terms of variational free energy allows one to interpret (the dynamics of) a system as inferring the causes of its inputs
> interpret
anthropocentrism >>>/trash
> interpretation of genetic codes as parametrizing a generative model—predicting the signals sensed by cells in the target morphology—and epigenetic processes as the subsequent inversion of that model.
so it explains how biological signs(call them codes and signals if you like, that doesnt change the fact that they are signs) come to be and how they are interpreted? like i have been saying all along!
>This theoretical formulation may complement bottom-up strategies—that currently focus on molecular pathways—with (constructivist) top-down approaches that have proved themselves in neuroscience and cybernetics.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3285384/
"Functional Information: Towards Synthesis of Biosemiotics and Cybernetics"
the interface of free energy and biosemiotics is actually a very interesting research focus, thanks for the heads up

Essentially, the similarity stems from information and entropy in physics having the same mathematical structure (and again, this is actually coincidential). This allows machine learning to be described in terms of thermodynamics. And then free energy came along following this alot later.