Qualia

>trusting your brain
brainlet

I'm not even sure my brain exists, at least not to the same degree that I'm sure of the fact that I'm currently experiencing things.

Several of my exes aren't sure my brain exists either of course, but my grounds are philosophical.

>create an arguement where someone knows "everything" about visual information processing
>purposefully exclude a huge swath of that knowledge
>wow guys guess qualia exists!
That is literally this argument.

The integration of information in the brain into more general ideas like colors, textures, rhythms, ideas is the nature of perception. The information is combined and organized and this newly coalesced artificial structure is the mental construction. Neural networks give us a clue of how this might work at a basic level but clearly the brain is more complex and sophisticated.
The way neural networks process images is a really good example of this.

>Ok, this board is completely philosophically retarded.
>It's remarkable that it's possible to be far enough up your own arse that you question whether or not you actually experience anything.
>People have managed to convince themselves that the one thing they can actually be sure of isn't even real. My sides.
As predicted, you never get any real arguments in favor of literal "qualia" existing that aren't some variation of "but we know it's really happening, how can you deny your own experiences!"
Intensity of belief isn't evidence that belief is correct. Stroke patients will often have very certain beliefs in completely untrue ideas like the reason they can't move one of their arms isn't that they're paralyzed but instead that the arm the doctor is asking them about belongs to the patient in the bed across from theirs. Or to use an example that doesn't involve any sort of illness or physical trauma, most blindly accepts blatantly impossible phenomena as true each night while dreaming only to realize after waking that these dream plot points were ridiculous.
Given the choice between the premise "qualia" are literal existing phenomena that transcend physics and need some new science to account for vs. the premise our brains sometimes work in terms of untrue but useful beliefs, I don't see why anyone would choose the former over the latter.

There is a third alternative, which is that simply knowing how the brain produces qualia does not mean you activate the physical mechanism producing qualia. Perhaps with this knowledge Mary can perform brain surgery on herself, activate the mechanism, and experience the color red before stepping outside. Either way, the experiment has nothing to do with the physicality of qualia.

Its completely different. The truth of 'my arm is there' is completely distinct from the sensation that your arm sends to you. Even when your limb is missing, the subjective experience of thinking your arm is there isn't 'false', you are still feeling a subjective feeling. The existence of a subjective experience is self-evident upon it being experienced. You are not making an empirical truth claim. The sensation of red can't be reduced to a belief. 'This is red' can be. The sensation of red itself can't. Assuming the existence of qualia makes way fewer epistemological assumptions than presuming that an external world exists outside our mind, which contains a physical brain, and that our subjective experience is some kind of illusion produced by the evolved advantage of having a false belief. The philosophical starting point for any epistemic structure is the subjective experience you have.

qualia is an illusion, everything is deterministic
what we experience as qualia is just the cumulation of many, many deterministic events

>Even when your limb is missing, the subjective experience of thinking your arm is there isn't 'false', you are still feeling a subjective feeling.
Even people who believe in "qualia" (like Chalmers) don't believe what you're arguing there, which is why the philosophical zombie argument exists. You can't have a philosophical zombie argument unless you believe it's possible for someone to behave as though they're having an experience even though they aren't in reality.

There's subjective information that we can communicate which we have no distinctive subjective experience for, like saying you are 'bored'. Also we can distinguish subjective experiences which are qualitatively unique (colours, sounds, smells, etc) and ones which seem not to be (seeing triangles and squares, the experience of something touching our hands or neck, etc). So any materialistic account of qualia has to explain why these distinctions occur. I.e. why do we encode some experiences as false beliefs involving qualitative differences, while others are encoded as beliefs that things are not qualitatively different.