Is he the final boss?

>Most people get interested into Heidegger without really understanding him. Then they understand him, realize he's a one-tricky pony autist who insists that everyone also autistically repeat the same question over and over and lose interest.

Can you expand on this? I know nothing about Heidegger: what's his one trick? What's that question?

YHBT: He has no idea what he's talking about.

I'm pretty sure he was usign the socratic method

The question of Being. i.e., the foundations of metaphysics or how philosophy has gotten it wrong since Plato.

I was referring to that user.

What's the question of being? Can you make an example of it?

>the foundations of metaphysics or how philosophy has gotten it wrong since Plato.
In what aspect?

I'm not using the socratic method, like that user implied, I'm just genuinely interested to know in what ways someone would think after having internalized the Heidegger's system

lol

No he's actually pretty entry level and requires no prior knowledge to get into.

I'm not that user but, the question of being is trying to understand what it means to exist. It's an incredibly large question and the main reason I find fault in Heidegger's work. To take on such a large project in the way Heidegger does just leads to an endless horizon of poetics where truth is not considered.

To make an example is like any example of trying to define a word. What does it mean to be human? Well, two legs isnt necessary, having isnt necessary, so then what is necessary? Similarly what does it mean to be? The question seems to take on everything, so anything becomes an example (as long as you say it comes from Dasein, aka man, since we are the perspective that is asking and answering the question. It's our existence we are considering, not a ducks). This focus on man is what he does in Being and Time.

>In what aspect

Heidegger says that they treat metaphysics ontically, or like a sterile object to be discussed. The way I just described being is more like what Heidegger is against. I bring up necessary properties and things like that. To make it easier, he explains two ways to approach things, present at hand and ready to hand.

Ready to hand is how a carpenter uses a hammer after years of practice. He doesnt think about it. Present at hand is how a researcher would consider the hammer when trying to develop a new hammer. Heidegger says that metaphysics has treated being in the second sense and forgotten the more important ready to hand aspects of existence.

Here I think is another problem with Heidegger. He himself is talking about Being through present at hand, which means there is no difference between his methodology and those he criticizes. However he says he is talking about different topics, ready to hand topics. Why this is relevant I forgot.

having hair isnt necessary*

>He himself is talking about Being through present at hand, which means there is no difference between his methodology and those he criticizes.

There's a difference between the action of discussing a theory of ontology, which will always be a present-at-hand mode of being, and whether that theory of ontology properly indicates the various modes of being that entities can have in the world. If you read the chapter on Heidegger's Critique of Descartes, you'll see what the difference is between his methodology and the methodology of other philosophers, and it might illustrate why Heidegger believes philosophers have not truly understood how to explore Being and how it affects the various involvements and relationships that entities can have, prior towards any ontological or ontical commitment (like discussions of substance, properties of matter, etc.). Descartes, for example, fails to distinguish the ready-to-hand mode of being, since everything is present-at-hand through his understanding of substance.

Nope.

>whether that theory of ontology properly indicates the various modes of being that entities can have in the world

I said that

>However he says he is talking about different topics, ready to hand topics. Why this is relevant I forgot.

>Descartes, for example, fails to distinguish the ready-to-hand mode of being

The point I'm bringing up is why is that mode of being relevant.

Because when you talk about being, you're exploring what "are" things and the various ways things can "be". Some things are most what they are as the sum of observable properties. such as a rock. Others are most of what they are when they withdraw from notice, such as equipment. Talking about modes of Being isn't particularly important except for establishing the foundations of Heidegger's metaphysical investigations, since I think that his talks about epistemology, truth, care, death, guilt, authenticity, and time are far more interesting.

>Others are most of what they are when they withdraw from notice, such as equipment.

I'm not convinced of this

>Talking about modes of Being isn't particularly important except for establishing the foundations of Heidegger's metaphysical investigations

welp

Equipment isn't most itself when you're looking at it. Equipment is most itself when you're using it. And when you're using it, it draws you away from the observable properties of the equipment and towards some project in the world. Examining equipment doesn't make it more useful unless it's of the kind of circumspection that's directly related to carrying out its use. Remember, the question of Being is related to what it means for entities to "be", and equipment "is" in ways that most entities are not.

>welp

I mean, it's important, but it sounds like quibbling until you start talking about the good stuff in the middle and end of Being and Time.

not even a miniboss brah

The problem is, why break up existence into different modes of existence, and this break up especially?

>Equipment isn't most itself when you're looking at it

Is this true? How can you prove that?

>Equipment is most itself when you're using it.

Is this true? How can you prove that?

>but it sounds like quibbling until you start talking about the good stuff in the middle and end of Being and Time.

I'm just more interested in methodology and foundations

Just wait until the new DLC comes out

>Is this true? How can you prove that?
Design.

Watch the documentary Being in the World.

>I'm just more interested in methodology and foundations
Then read his book.

>Is this true? How can you prove that?

It's self-evident. There are normal things, which are defined by their properties. And then there are things that can be skillfully used, in addition to having properties. The fact that equipment can be skillfully used is a defining feature that sets it apart from other things.

>Is this true? How can you prove that?

Is a hammer most itself when you're looking at it, or when you're using it?

>Design.
What does that mean

>Then read his book.
I have.

>It's self-evident.
No.

>Is a hammer most itself when you're looking at it, or when you're using it?
I have no idea. I have no criteria to judge this on and it seems like this just some irrelevant opinion. When is something most itself? What does that even mean?

>I have

Does this trouble you?

I doubt I could make this post
If I had not read it. I'll also let you know that I did not continue reading Heidegger after that, so I have no read anything after his turn. Now even Basic Writings.

>He himself is talking about Being through present at hand
Being is not an entity, and as such it does not have one of the three particular modes of being. Being is rather what is common to both ready-to-hand, present-at-hand and Dasein. Namely, that they exist. In any case, Heidegger is making ontology from Dasein as it is a priviledged mode of being (the only that can question the nature of being itself).
Heidegger's main quibble with the tradition is not that it has treated the question of Being wrongly, rather that by postulating the subject/object distinction (and thus treating everything as present to hand) it has made impossible to properly formulate the question about Being at all.

>leads to an endless horizon of poetics where truth is not considered.
Read The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger does talk about truth quite a bit. He doesn't advocate for a correspondence theory of truth, but rather revives the greek aletheia. Truth is cultural and historically dependent and it's founded in our historical worlds through art, science, religion, ontology... It's not an absolute truth, a platonic truth, it is the truth about Being. It is the backgroung through which we understand (disclose through a world) the always concealing earth.

Because when you say:
>He himself is talking about Being through present at hand
you show you completely missed the point of the ontological difference i.e. the reason why he wrote the book in the first place, and thus you end up missing out on the message of process philosophy, the overcoming of subject/object and a big fat middle finger to ontotheology.

Are you an autodidact?

>Being is not an entity, and as such it does not have one of the three particular modes of being.

Are other "abstract things" not entities as well? Can we not talk about grammar, talk about properties themselves, and then wonder which mode of being it has? That there is talking about talking, and then talking?

Being can clearly be talked about in both modes, for that is exactly what Heidegger is trying to point out. Heidegger making the mundane fundamental to ontology is through talking about Being when it is ready to hand.

If Being did not have one of the three particular modes of being, Heidegger could not have written Being and Time.

>you completely missed the point of the ontological difference

No I did not, I just think he is wrong. I made the point here
What is Heidegger, or anyone doing, when writing a book? What is the relation between the thing being written about and the writer?

How does Heidegger's modes of being deal with abstract entities?

>Are you an autodidact?
No I've done research on Heidegger while an undergrad and since then I've switched camps.

>abstract things
>abstract entities
For fuck's sake.

>What is Heidegger, or anyone doing, when writing a book?
>Dasein is never ‘proximally’ an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a ‘relationship’ towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it.
I mean, read this last sentence how many hundreds of times it is necessary to get it. Is it any wonder I didn't think you read him (and still do?)

>I've switched camps.
You were never anywhere near his camp.

>For fuck's sake.

You're getting hung up on the fact that I am not only using Heidegger's way of talking about the world.

I gave you examples, grammar, properties, talking about talking, etc, how does Heidegger make sense of these when we ask, how do we encounter them? How do they present themselves to us, how do they become disclosed?

This is a common problem I see with people idolizing Heidegger. If you question him, then you have to deal with how he uses his language, and my questions are aiming at a point. How do we deal with these things, which anyone else not following Heidegger's tradition, would call more abstract than my mundane experience of opening a door when not thinking about opening the door, specifically when considering how Heidegger breaks up how we encounter?

>I mean, read this last sentence how many hundreds of times it is necessary to get it. Is it any wonder I didn't think you read him (and still do?)

What I just said could be said for this. Answer my question, how would Heidegger talk about how we encounter these things, abstract or not?

>You were never anywhere near his camp.
Weird you would be so hostile over questions and be more interested in attacking my character. You'd gain a lot by giving the other the benefit on the doubt, rather than barbed words.

>Are other "abstract things" not entities as well?
You are misunderstanding Being. As I pointed out and repeated, Being is not an entity, abstract or otherwise. Dreyfus raged at translators and commentarists capitalizing Being because it led people to make the same mistake that you are making: that Being with a capital B is some sort of platonic idea, which of course would be repeating the old mistakes of metaphysics that Heidegger wants to avoid.

I am not saying that. I understand the holistic nature Heidegger describes Being with, and why he starts with Dasein in starting his project of ontology.

Put Being aside, and answer my question. How would Heidegger describe how we encounter them?

Encounter what? Abstract entities?
I would say both in present-at-hand (talking or theorizing about love) and ready-to-hand (loving).
But Being is not an abstract entity like love, so I don't see how this ties together.

>But Being is not an abstract entity like love, so I don't see how this ties together.

Did you write this?

>There's a difference between the action of discussing a theory of ontology, which will always be a present-at-hand mode of being

If not, would you disagree with it?

>Did you write this?
Yes, believe it or not, he typed on a keyboard and a sign was produced.

Still says nothing as to the quest to figure out the signified, a quest Western metaphysics hardly even bothered with for too long, we're still stuck at what is basically a pre-ontological, pre-theoretical, "intuitive" understanding of Being.

>Yes, believe it or not, he typed on a keyboard and a sign was produced.

What? Are you talking in the third person? My question was asking if you were the author of the statement, nothing else.

The point being if you did write that, or at least agree with what is being said, then you agree that Heidegger was encountering Being in a present at hand fashion. He was talking about Being.

Which contradicts this
>Being is not an entity, and as such it does not have one of the three particular modes of being.

I see no reason why Being is excluded

I see where you are getting at and certainly you may be onto something there but you are straddling away from Heidegger's understanding of Being. Which is obviously a legit thing to do if you want to criticise him.
>would you disagree with it?
Yes, specially with the part about >present-at-hand mode of being. For two main reasons:
1) Because Being is not something we can encounter as present-at-hand or ready-to-hand or Dasein for that matter. It is common and underlying to all these modes of being.
2) Because Heidegger's theory of ontology is concerned with all the modes of being, not only with present-at-hand.

What Heidegger is trying to do is blow up the metaphysical tradition from the inside. This is why he makes up so many neologisms, and why Wittgenstein said that Heidegger was "bumping against the limits of language". He is trying to reform our philosophical discourse so it is more amenable to think about Being. Since he is articulating his thoughts in a manner that makes them intelligible for the tradition (which he would later regret) he is incurring in a sort of contradiction. All these new concepts and expressions are a sort of ladder that should be discarded once the objective (the destruction of metaphysics) is accomplished.

I don't know if I'm making any sense. It's hard to talk about these things, doubly so in English.

I'm that guy. His one question is "What is 'is'?" (is = Being, existence). Sort of like Kierkegaard who autistically sperged over the question of "Is repetition possible?"

But the only difference is that Heidegger literally destroys everything of western civilization (he calls this de-struktion, it's really identical to Derrida's deconstruction) and then says we have to rebuild it up by focusing on the question "What is 'is'?" It's basically more terrible Nietzschean anti-nihilism that does nothing other than bring about more nihilism and sooner.

I get and sympathize with a lot of Heidegger's project but I don't think all the problems he sees are caused by a simple 'forgetfulness of being' because I don't think questioning being gets you to where Heidegger wanted western civilization to go (and I think he realized the futility of his philosophical project at the end of his life).

I don't think history is a progressive forgetting of "what is 'is?'" (Neither does Gadamer, who is a lot better than Heidegger) And I don't think language is as important as Heidegger would like to claim. If German really is closer to ancient Greek, which in its verb forms is always aware of "is", then Germans should be more open to existence and less technophiles, but the Nazis were the opposite.

The strength of the Nazis was that they were 50 years ahead of the allies technologically. So while Heidegger was jerking off to the possibility of Nazism being the "custodian of being" and renewing Europe, all these people who think in German were actually just building rockets and other technologies for social control.

Heidegger is Adorno-tier. Both made sweeping generalizations that turned out to be flat out wrong and useless (ex. Adorno sees jazz as proto-fascist, yet most of the Nazi resistance was done by people who listened to shitty jazz).

>The strength of the Nazis was that they were 50 years ahead of the allies technologically. So while Heidegger was jerking off to the possibility of Nazism being the "custodian of being" and renewing Europe, all these people who think in German were actually just building rockets and other technologies for social control.
This is why Heidegger became disillusioned with nazism later on. His vision for Germany and National Socialism was to realize the historical destiny of the German historical Volk.

This historical destiny is manifested in the work of the great artists. Heidegger considered that his work was to interpret the words of the Gods that spoke through the poet (Hölderlin). Then the Führer (Führer comes from fahren: to drive, to lead. Same as Duce, from duco: to lead or guide) can lead the Volk to its historical destiny, that was manifested in the works of the poet. It's important to realize that Heidegger was a revolutionary and a conservative, so this historical destiny, while being something radically new, has always come from the previous tradition.

Basically Heidegger wanted an aesthetization of politics, which in a way is what the Nazis tried to do: to turn the world into a work of art. But of course the only way to do this is to rip the world apart. Paul Celan talks about this: how the horror of fascism happens imbued in the German romantic tradition. The nazis were descendants of Hölderlin, Wagner. They were vegetarians and naturists (in fact the Wehrmacht wore oak leaves on their uniforms). The extermination of the jews was conducted alongside the formation of classical orchestras in the camps, which is what Celan is getting at in his poem "Todesfuge". What makes the jewish genocide so unique is that it was conducted algonside (and in name of) the sublime.

I'm not a Nazi btw

Yes, but he's like one of those super hard FInal Fantasy bosses that make you waste hours and hours of your life, and when you kill him you just receive a shitty key item and a summon you never use

>This is why Heidegger became disillusioned with nazism later on.

But why, for Heidegger, were the Nazis so technophilic? He says you can't do philosophy in languages other than Greek or German, but then what's the advantage of thinking in German? The Nazis were mostly comlpetely oblivious to the question of Being. So we can't really say there's an advantage to German. We can't really say German speaks Being while other languages merely speak of Being.

It's all one hokey myth invented by Heidegger while he was chilling in his cabin.

>Because Being is not something we can encounter as present-at-hand or ready-to-hand or Dasein for that matter. It is common and underlying to all these modes of being.

There lies the problem. From what we can tell about present at hand, everything has the potential to become present at hand, and usually it is done when we theorize about it. We abstract it.

What then is Heidegger doing when he theorizes about Being? Why is it that what he is doing follows the lines he defines for present at hand, with the exception being that Being is clearly interested in Dasein, whereas all other examples would be disinterested.

Again, if Being cannot be theorized upon, then how does Being and Time exist?

>Since he is articulating his thoughts in a manner that makes them intelligible for the tradition (which he would later regret) he is incurring in a sort of contradiction.

And this is why I said his project is a failure. The turn occurs for a reason. This project on ontology becomes an endless poetic horizon. It can never be exhausted, just like poetry can never be exhausted when trying to express anything. This project will never get closer to the truth.

>I don't know if I'm making any sense. It's hard to talk about these things, doubly so in English.

You're making sense dont worry

>What then is Heidegger doing when he theorizes about Being?
The meaning-seeking creature he called Dasein.

>Why is it that what he is doing follows the lines he defines for present at hand, with the exception being that Being is clearly interested in Dasein, whereas all other examples would be disinterested.
Because we can ponder all those things from outside. Take love, mentioned above. We still can talk about love while not in love, for example.

But we cannot cease to be in order to contemplate what does "to be" mean, from the outside.

I'm the other guy who thinks Heidegger was a failure.

Have you heard/read his correspondence with a Catholic priest, guy called Welte, I think? Heidegger's situation is interesting because earlier he had declared he couldn't believe in the Catholic system, but was still sort of into Christianity (this fits with his critiques of scholasticism) but then near the end of his life he makes contact with a local Catholic priest again and ends up getting a Catholic funeral.

The letters as far as I know are untranslated, and I don't read German but it's interesting to see that Heidegger when from wanting to become a priest in his youth, to abandoning Catholicism and critiquing it philosophically, inventing a kind of radical Lutheranism, and then possibly quietely regretting it and returning to Thomism/Catholicism.

I don't see any other reasons as to why he should make contact again with Catholicism.

>The meaning-seeking creature he called Dasein.
This doesn't make sense in response to my question. My question was baiting for the answer, he in fact IS talking about Being in a present at hand fashion.

>Because we can ponder all those things from outside.

This is another non-issue for me. I don't need to be outside existence to contemplate existence, or to get at existence. Just like me being in love would not somehow stop me from theorizing about love.

>Have you heard/read his correspondence with a Catholic priest, guy called Welte, I think?

No I havent, but the story falls in line from what I have heard about later Heidegger, mainly that he became some sort of mystic.

aha what is that from

>this is why I said his project is a failure. The turn occurs for a reason. This project on ontology becomes an endless poetic horizon
I can agree with this. In fact, I think Heidegger could also agree with this. I have to admit that my knowledge of early Heidegger is not the best, and you seem to have a much better grasp on it. However
>This project will never get closer to the truth
With this I can't agree. The truth is no longer a fixed thing, it is fluid and historically determinated. The former truth is the truth of modernity, of the subject gaining mastery over the object. Philosophy struggles with the advance of natural science because natural science is the logical conclusion to modern philosophy.

SO what is this fluid concept of truth? Well, it must be post-modern in its literal sense. It is fluid and changing, the truth of the world and not of the earth. It does not mean that truth is reduced to doxa, that everything is suddenly valid, rather it is alethaic: truth is an unconcealment that conceals at the same time. It is one of the many possible interpretations of the phenomenologic abundance that is earth. You mentioned poetry, which is a constant in Heidegger's talk about truth. The poet (and for Heidegger, every artist is a poet) is founding this changing truth, he is quite literally creating/changing/reafirming our historical world in his work.
Not me, btw

>He says you can't do philosophy in languages other than Greek or German
Honestly, I think what he meant is that HE could not do philosophy in languages other than German or ancient Greek. When asked how to translate his philosphy to another language he would simply shrug it off. His method is etymological, his neologisms don't really translate outside German. He also has a constant of turning verbs into nouns (Die Sprache spricht, der Raum räumt) which again does not work in other languages most of the time.

I follow Wittgenstein on this one: he encountered the "background" that Heidegger calls world, but he often called it a system or simply grammar. If everything already happens within a system, and this system is much like Heidegger's world historically and linguistically determinated, then relativism and subjectivity should run rampant. However, Witty thought that there is no priviledged grammar because there is no priviledged truth. What matters is that all grammars provide access to the truth. So no, German or Greek do not have an advantage for philosophy or any other enterprise really.

What is the best way to get a relatively thorough understanding of Heidegger on your own? Do I have to read through Husserl, or are secondary sources fine? What secondary sources are best?

Skiing is unconceals being.

> I think what he meant is that HE could not do philosophy in languages other than German

Nah, he specifically calls out french and english as being shit. He says french people prefer german once they learn it. These languages don't preserve the verb tenses necessary to perceive existence anti-metaphysically, according to Heidegger.

Read Being and Time. Knowing Aristotle's metaphysics might help, knowing Husserl might help, knowing Kant might help.

What I would advise is to read Being and Time and push through it. Don't get stuck on something that confuses you . Heidegger has a horrible habit of using a term before he explains it. In fact the explanation or definition usually comes at the end of the given section

Read Sein und Zeit and listen to Dreyfus lectures on youtube. You should be familiar with the philosophical tradition as a whole, because that's what Heidegger will be taking jabs at. You don't really NEED to be familiar with one particular author, but some may help you understand certain concepts and ideas. Aristotle and Kirkergaard come to mind, but surely Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and many more would also help.

Don't read B&T. Just know Husserl's intentionality, what Heraclitus said, some general knowledge of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, Kierkegaard's autism and Nietzsche.

>The truth is no longer a fixed thing, it is fluid and historically determinated.

You just state something like this as matter of fact. You have to prove this.

>Philosophy struggles with the advance of natural science because natural science is the logical conclusion to modern philosophy.

This is simply false. Science does not deal with deduction the way mathematics of philosophy does. Science is one field of philosophy.

>rather it is alethaic: truth is an unconcealment that conceals at the same time.

From what I understand of later Heidegger he rejects this. There is aletheia and truth. Philosophy is concerned with the latter, "thinking" for Heidegger is concerned with the former.
>It is one of the many possible interpretations of the phenomenologic abundance that is earth.

Again, an inexhaustible poetics detached from truth. Truth no longer matters.

This Heidegger stinks of idealism and is exactly what Husserl was trying to get away from. He even warned Heidegger in the beginning that he was falling into mysticism. He was right.

mathematics OR philosophy**

>You just state something like this as matter of fact. You have to prove this.
Well considering Heidegger wrote a couple of books trying to prove this I'm going to redirect you to these because I am not capable of explaining it on a Veeky Forums post. You have read Sein und Zeit so you must be familiar with his idea of world, you can see how our understanding of what is true and false, good and bad, our understanding of being itself is historically determinated and therefore changing.

>Science does not deal with deduction the way mathematics of philosophy does. Science is one field of philosophy.
Perhaps I phrased this wrong. Natural science is the conclusion of the epistemological approach that is common to the modern metaphysics of a cognoscent subject detached and in front of a world that is the totality of objects.
This is why epistemology in the tradtional sense is becoming philosophy of science and philosophy as a whole has taken a linguistic turn instead.

>From what I understand of later Heidegger he rejects this
Source please? I am legit interested.

>Again, an inexhaustible poetics
Yes
>detached from truth. Truth no longer matters.
That depends on how you define truth I guess

>He even warned Heidegger in the beginning that he was falling into mysticism. He was right.
I wholeheartely agree, later heidegger gives 0 fucks about being intelligible by the tradition and goes on about the fourfold, god and whatnot. He definetly took a mystic or poetic turn at the end of his life.

think you replied to the wrong person

Yeah, I wanted to say how I understood this phrase seeing from where he was coming from.
He literally thought that German was a superior language, that much is clear. He was wrong though.

He looks like a Nazi.

>You have read Sein und Zeit so you must be familiar with his idea of world, you can see how our understanding of what is true and false, good and bad, our understanding of being itself is historically determinated and therefore changing.

No I understand where you are coming from, clearly. I simply dont like how you state it as if it is matter of fact true. For example, if I ask, is the predicate of a given sentence ascribed or denied to the subject, the person will give one or the other answer. The given claim is true or false. Now, it may be that the person answering the question is giving the answer based on a limited source of knowledge based on their context, but that does not mean that truth itself is being determined because of that.

>This is why epistemology in the tradtional sense is becoming philosophy of science and philosophy as a whole has taken a linguistic turn instead.

No. Philosophy took a linguistic turn because of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, all of whom were deeply grounded in mathematics and not the natural sciences. The only reason Frege starts his project to under definite descriptions, arguably the beginning of philosophy of language, was to create a solid foundation for his project to ground all maths in logic. Russel and Wittgenstein were also within this project.

>Source please? I am legit interested.

"The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" - Heidegger

>That depends on how you define truth I guess
Yes, and I would in every case argue that what we are talking about is more and more detached form truth.

One does not ask if Odysseus really did wash up on the shores of Ithaca; if this statement in the Iliad is true or false. It is a work of art, truth is not the point. One may be interested in such a point, but that is clearly the exception, and is essentially asking if the Iliad is not only art but a historical document. This shift in categories means that the document serves as two categories, and the question is only asking about one category, the one that is not art.

To stretch the word truth to contain the expression of art is to make the word worthless.

Thanks bros

>When is something most itself?

Are you concerned with identity or not?

>I have no criteria to judge this on and it seems like this just some irrelevant opinion.

If you've read the book, then you wouldn't think this. I don't know what there isn't to get. You haven't even tried to make sense of the question, which seems incredibly obvious to everybody else, so how do you expect me to help you?

>Are you concerned with identity or not?

If I am the one asking the question then I am concerned with it. Answer the question.

>If you've read the book, then you wouldn't think this.

What is so bewildering about questioning Heidegger.

>which seems incredibly obvious to everybody else

Then it should be incredibly easy for you to answer the question, shouldn't it?

>truth itself
What is this "truth itself"? All you have is a provisional, historically-constrained understanding, speaking of which my provisional, historically-constrained understanding says you have no access to any "truth itself."

You made it abundantly clear you just don't get process philosophy ITT.

>All you have is a provisional

Yes, that was the point. The example I was discussing does not need a theory defining what truth is, I only needed to give an example that a predicate can be ascribed or denied to a subject and that the fault of the one answering the question does not determine the truth of the answer, the answer is independent of them. If this particular instance we are talking about wasn't true, everyone is always right about everything, thus, I didn't give an example. I thought that was self evident.

To answer your question, what is truth itself, I don't know, but it certainly is not completely determined by the person answering any and every question. That is impossible.

>Then it should be incredibly easy for you to answer the question, shouldn't it?

I did answer the question. I don't why you think Heidegger hasn't covered enough ground when it comes to identifying entities, their properties, and their involvements. It's like I give an explanation, and you have no idea what I'm talking about, even though it seems completely obvious with a little bit of imagination about what could possibly inform us about the identity of an entity. You might as well bother me for stating that 2+2=4 because you're skeptical of addition.

>What is so bewildering about questioning Heidegger.

Because he has already addressed your concerns in his reasoning about why Being isn't a being, why there are several modes of Being that things can have, etc.

well, he's right to not give a shit about muh hammer because that question relies on phenomenology, which is shit (unless its max scheler, who completely btfo'd heidegger, for which the latter had no response other than y-you forgot about being).

In fact, I think it's more contentious the way he describes Dasein's mode of Being because of how crucial it is to the center of Heidegger's metaphysical system. Present-at-hand, ready-to-hand, etc., are all pretty straightforward IMO, but modes of Being are predicated on the various ways that Dasein interacts with other entities in the world through a "pre-ontological understanding of Being".

Heidegger isn't really doing phenomenology the way other phenomenologists do phenomenology. What's really doing is using phenomenology to inform the various involvements that entities can have in the world without relying on the Cartesian baggage of employing the subject-object distinction.

>the answer is independent of them
There is no "Dasein-free" answer.

> If this particular instance we are talking about wasn't true, everyone is always right about everything
No, we're just ignorant, all the while figuring out some things little by little.

You keep living in a world where answers, truth, "abstract entities", etc. are located in Plato's Hyperuranium, instead of ongoing relations between people and their environment.

You didn't read Heraclitus, did you?

still relies on intentionality from husserl

no intentionality then heidegger cant do his hammer shit and the rest naturally falls apart

Doesn't rely on intentionality when the focus is on how equipment, in their being, point Dasein towards projects in the world. Dasein is already thrown into a world where equipment and its various uses are already intelligible, without input necessary from any individual Dasein. There's no intentionality required when dealing with things in their ready-to-hand mode of being (equipment) because you aren't scrutinizing their properties, but rather skillfully coping with them as they withdraw from your notice, and this skillful coping is not the result of anything but your absorption of the relevant practices that a part of a world.

>but rather skillfully coping with them as they withdraw from your notice, and this skillful coping is not the result of anything but your absorption of the relevant practices that a part of a world.

thats intentionality, my little nigga

>acting without noticing or interpreting because the world was built that way

>mfw rocks in a landslide have intentionality too

The fact that Dasein has intentions doesn't mean that the ready-to-hand state is governed by intentions. You're not actively interpreting anything when you're absorbed in your involvements while skillfully using equipment.

>You're not actively interpreting anything when you're absorbed in your involvements while skillfully using equipment.

correct, because i intend, i dont actively interpret

thats literally what is intentionality

>correct, because i intend, i dont actively interpret

The ready-to-hand mode of being isn't caused by you, it's caused by the equipment existing in the world with the relations that it does. In other words, you don't play any role in directing the hammer as much as it directs you as a result of being thrown into a world where possibilities of manipulating equipment are already laid out there for you.

>I did answer the question.
No you didn't. You just keep dodging the problem by saying the answer to the problem is so obvious that who could ever wonder anything else

Let me make this painstakingly easy for you

Let's say I am arguing that a hammer is most itself when it is observed.

I am FULLY aware that Heidegger doesn't argue this, but I am asking you to defend his position against my claim if you agree with Heidegger. I am asking you to stop being an idol worshiper and be critical of Heidegger.

>There is no "Dasein-free" answer.

You need to learn that simply spouting the hymns of your idol is not an argument. People are questioning Heidegger's arguments, retorting that what is being asked is not in agreement with Heidegger is redundant.

I'll just ignore the rest of your sloppy rhetoric and bait

>you're not actively interpreting anything when you're absorbed in your involvements while skillfully using equipment.

I've always wondered about that. What if I am interpreting how I am typing while I am typing it out, like I am doing right now? It is necessary for me to keep typing hinge free in order for me to make that claim, and typing doesnt really stop my mind from thinking and theorizing about the act of typing.

>Let's say I am arguing that a hammer is most itself when it is observed.
What was it designed for? Being stared at?

>What if I am interpreting how I am typing while I am typing it out, like I am doing right now?
Well if one types like my dad one key at a time using only the index fingers while stumbling a lot, that is not skillful activity. I told you to watch the documentary Being in the World because it shows you the experiences of people with mad skillz that completely immerse themselves in their activity.

For most of the day I use glasses, but I don't think about glasses, I barely even register their existence. When they stop working properly we can go from readines-to-hand to unreadiness-to-hand and then are brought to my attention, and I can think of them as present-at-hand. Spatially they're extremely close to me, but phenomenologically they aren't. It's all about de-severance, what is brought "close" not physically, but to my attention.

Heidegger's arguing that we acquire and use skills for purposes, we think more about where we are walking but not too much about the fact that we are walking. It's like breathing manually or leaving the "autopilot" on.

Evolutionarily speaking this overthinking organism that ponders on every damnable item is a later development. This "lowered activity of thought" in most of our lives looks a lot like an energy saving strategy, where motor schemes perfected by practice are left in charge of lower functions compared to the cognitive, strategizing and philosophizing ones, which only worry about the wheres and whys of movement.

As the other user said:
>The fact that Dasein has intentions doesn't mean that the ready-to-hand state is governed by intentions

The intentions of Dasein are not in the ready-to-hand object, they aim elsewhere, they aim beyond:
>I am currently working with a computer (a with-which), in the practical context of my office (an in-which), in order to write this encyclopedia entry (an in-order-to), which is aimed towards presenting an introduction to Heidegger's philosophy (a towards-this), for the sake of my academic work, that is, for the sake of my being an academic (a for-the-sake-of-which).

>You need to learn that simply spouting the hymns of your idol is not an argument. People are questioning Heidegger's arguments, retorting that what is being asked is not in agreement with Heidegger is redundant.
>I'll just ignore the rest of your sloppy rhetoric and bait
Do you prefer the flavor of Wittgenstein's On Certainity? You cannot eliminate Dasein from an answer, you fucking are one.

Would you at least show us an uninterpreted, immediate, humanity-free access to truth descending upon humanity, before you retreat with your tail between your legs.

>I am asking you to stop being an idol worshiper and be critical of Heidegger.

I don't worship Heidegger. I think his work is incomplete and wrong at certain turns. But I literally don't understand why you have an issue with. If you were able to put up a real counterargument besides repeating "nuh uh", then maybe I'd have something to work with. Even a brief statement about other possible answers would immensely help, but you've done nothing but whine and bitch like a fucking autistic contrarian.

>You need to learn that simply spouting the hymns of your idol is not an argument. People are questioning Heidegger's arguments, retorting that what is being asked is not in agreement with Heidegger is redundant.

FYI, that person isn't me. There was a mix-up earlier where somebody else claimed to be me.

>I've always wondered about that. What if I am interpreting how I am typing while I am typing it out, like I am doing right now? It is necessary for me to keep typing hinge free in order for me to make that claim, and typing doesnt really stop my mind from thinking and theorizing about the act of typing.

If you had to think long and hard about each key stroke, then you wouldn't be skillfully coping with your keyboard at 5 WPM. A little bit of common sense goes a long way with understanding Heidegger.