THE GREAT DEBATE

>Heidelberg

As a philosophy student who has read both of them I 95% agree.

Then explain how we ARE language according to Heidegger instead of being IN language

No, Wittgenstein was right, you'll just have to cope with the "horror"

Ok, thanks for saving me from reading being and time, just flushed it down the toilet

Both, Kant was the last philosopher to be 'right'.

Mu.

Idiots.

jesus christ what an awful reading of Wittgenstein

>finally decide to read Being and Time
FISHING FOR BIRDIE

WE ARE US

AM GIRL

TRIPPED DOWN

NOSE HIT ON GROUND

>posting-towards-shit

it's another "this person is wrong" post without any reason why.

You have never read neither Heidegger nor Wittgenstein.

How about this: DFW misinterprets Wittgenstein's rejection of the *requirement* that human practices have a transcendental grounding in order to be genuinely intelligible and legitimate as the rejection of such a grounding that is *nevertheless* required in order to make them genuinely intelligible and legitimate. If you follow a thinker in their rejection of the transcendental but retain -- unlike that thinker -- the need for the transcendental, of course you end up at sea. This is evident in DFW's idea that the world disappears into mere language for the later Wittgenstein and his sense of being lost in language.

The fundamental line in the Investigations is that I *do* know my way about until I get confused and make the mistake of starting to philosophize. The full quote is "a philosophical problem has the form: 'I don’t know my way about,'" and his goal is "to show the fly [the philosopher] the way out of the fly-bottle." DFW gets this totally wrong by suggesting that this is a problem with language instead of philosophy. Language is in order as is, although some of its grammatical features are used by us to make general models/pictures (e.g., "object and name") that we apply outside of the in-order context where they originally appeared.

As per the above, Wittgenstein thinks that language and thinking have gone wrong at some point by the time that we arrive at ontology, so he is far from "treating reality" in any way whatever. His later methodology is linguistic, to be sure, but DFW interprets him in an ontological way, despite his rejection of ontology (which DFW even mentions).

oh it's another this post will never receive a substantive reply

man ya can't win

...

Look, I'll put it clearier, because Heidegger doesn't say that we are language (we are Dasein). Wittgenstein as well as Heidegger implies that 'language' (derrida's writting) is a constitutive aspect of humans who are 'in' language, Heidegger somehow says that language is a constitutive aspect of Dasein, but other times he doesn't put it that clearly, (that's why Derrida interpreting Heidegger puts that clearly) I think the main purpose of DFW in this text is to state that Wittgenstein said it better, but they were saying similar things. In fact, you can see some "similarities" between Wittgenstein's thought and Derrida's (inheritor of Heidegger), viz "you can't go besides the limits of language" = "there's nothing outside the text".
t. native speaker

that's an awful paragraph but I was tired of re-writting, I hope you understand what I was trying to say is that DFW's purpose is to say simply that Wittgenstein said it better therefore he's the real daddy of postmodernism

Never touched Heidegger, but Wittgenstein is literally
>U KANT KNOW NUFFIN
: The philosopher

neither. both were wrong to move away from /ourguy/

>How about this: DFW misinterprets Wittgenstein's rejection of the *requirement* that human practices have a transcendental grounding in order to be genuinely intelligible and legitimate as the rejection of such a grounding that is *nevertheless* required in order to make them genuinely intelligible and legitimate.

We're reaching the point where I can't follow philosophical discourse anymore. I should probably actually take a philosophy course before getting too invested in these threads.

He said it more clearly, but hardly better.

I think I understood the rest of that post but I still can't make out that first paragraph

The one who was not redpilled.

but they both were

It really is an awful analysis of Wittgenstein--to the point that any essential point Wittgenstein makes about the nature of reality is flat-out ignored and instead replaced by Wallace's own ideas with a sheen of Wittgensteinian language that Wallace tries to pass off as genuine analysis.

There are multiple issues here. First off, Wallace conflates early and late Wittgenstein, describing the Tractatus more than Philosophical Investigations. In both systems Witty posits that language internalizes how we see the world, but it's the TLP that we would have a better grasp of language "outside" of it. This is essentially what the TLP tries to do: while admitting that you can't use language to explain your way out of it, it hopes that given the right propositions you can intuit your way to the perspective from which the limits of language are sensible but not expressible (the famous throwing aside of the ladder). Even though using language to describe the structure of language is a distortion, there are still objective facts about it: for instance, that language is reducible to propositions about facts, that facts work by showing a picture of the world, that the relationship between the logic of the world and the logic of our language makes language capable of describing reality, etc. Furthermore, Wallace is wrong about the solipsism of the TLP. Witty only mentions solipsism insofar as the solipsist is correct in thinking he should only believe that the sensible facts which make up his inner world are his own doing and do not exist "outside" him. BUT--and this is what Wallace ignores--the solipsist is wrong to conclude that because of this he has the right to make the metaphysical determination that nothing EXISTS outside of himself. In this case Witty would argue that the solipsist is using language beyond its logical boundaries to create a nonsensical metaphysical statement.

Wallace makes a similar misreading about point #7 in TLP. Here's the essential part Wallace misses: THERE IS AN OUTSIDE BUT WE JUST CAN'T TALK ABOUT IT. In fact, if there was no "outside" from language, none of it would be possible. Point 6.41: "The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value -- and if there were, it would be of no value." And of course, Point #7: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must pass over in silence." Witty isn't saying he should deny the existence of ethics or aesthetics, but simply that these things transcend language. To treat them silently is to do so with the silence of reverence, not that of apathy. On the other hand, the solipsist has no issue speaking on these things. Since he himself is the standard by which everything exists, he can speak about everything because he is everything. So Wallace, in the above quote and all his essays on the TLP is completely, inexcusably wrong.

(Upcoming post will discuss PI)

In Philosophical Investigations, however, this outside is not possible. Since any linguistic exchange is fundamentally rooted in shared, unspoken understandings between speakers, being outside of language would make understanding it impossible.
>If I were separate from language, if I could somehow detach from it and climb up and look down on it, get the lay of the land so to speak, I could study it “objectively,” take it apart, deconstruct it, know its operations and boundaries and deficiencies.
This really only makes sense in context of the TLP.

>He died right on the edge of explicitly treating reality as linguistic instead of ontological.
Fucking no, I have no idea why Wallace thought this, unless you go full idealist and say "reality" is only possible to experience as mind. In all phases of Wittgenstein "external reality" exists, but Wittgenstein's issue is always that to simply posit the proposition "external reality exists" leads to linguistic confusions that are insolvable. Instead, since we can only talk about language, the only investigation we have is to see what the limits of language tell us about our relationship to the world.

The following remark from 1929, when Witty was first turning away from the logical monism of TLP, is worth quoting at length:

>Once I wrote, 'A proposition is laid against reality like a ruler. Only the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be measured.' I now prefer to say that a system of propositions is laid against reality like a ruler. What I mean by this is the following. If I lay a ruler against a spatial object, I lay all the graduating lines against it at the same time.

>It is not the individual graduating lines that are laid against it, but the entire scale. If I know that the object extends to graduating line 10, I also know immediately that it does not extend to graduating lines 11, 12, and so forth. The statements describing for me the length of an object form a system, a system of propositions. Now it is such an entire system of propositions that is compared with reality, not a single proposition.

(Hopefully I can finish this in one more post)

From the above quote, it's clear that some language-games are better at "interpreting reality" than others. Teasing this out is what later Witty envisions for philosophy: when a disagreement arises, the philosopher should trace out the language-games that the speakers are coming from and then find which statements assume the wrong lang-game in the other speaker. For instance, it would be absurd to correct someone who says, "The sun has risen," by explaining to them that the sun does not actually rise but instead appears on the horizon from the rotation of the earth, because the first person is speaking in everyday language to make a point about the time of day, not an astronomical assertion about the nature of the sun. Conversely, if you are trying to speak about the time of day and say, "The sun has appeared over the horizon," just to be "correct" about the nature of the sun, you won't make your point about the time of day. The response will justifiably be, "What the fuck are you talking about?" And when you respond that you meant the sun has risen, you'll be told, "Well just say that you autistic fuck."

All in all, Wallace laments the loss of something that Wittgenstein never rejects. Witty refuses to speak on certain matters out of a desire to avoid confusion, but this does not add up to explicit rejections of them. Witty can only write about speaking, but the current underneath his whole project is feeling: he has so much respect for ethics, ontology, romanticism, etc, that he would rather let them simply be actions and inexpressible feelings that speak on them and distort their mystery into something to be killed and dissected.

>treating reality as linguistic instead of ontological
>reality is linguistic
How retarded does one have to be to genuinely believe that ***reality is linguistic***? Language is just a tool you fucking imbeciles, you are falling for the meme philosophy of a frustrated autist.

Good posts user

nice

>This was Wittgenstein’s double bind: you can either treat language as an infinitely small dense dot, or you let it become the world—the exterior and everything in it. The former banishes you from the Garden. The latter seems more promising. If the world is itself a linguistic construct, there’s nothing “outside” language for language to have to picture or refer to.
I rejected those answers; instead, I chose something different. I chose the impossible. I chose... H e g e l.

He is correct in saying they're similar. The OP doesn't even make sense. They are more similar than they are not,

they often talked about different things. I have to admit Heidegger is a fucking beast, but reading Witt. for me it was more enlighting

First post worst post

...

>Teasing this out is what later Witty envisions for philosophy: when a disagreement arises, the philosopher should trace out the language-games that the speakers are coming from and then find which statements assume the wrong lang-game in the other speaker.

is this foreshadowing deconstruction?

>If I were separate from language, if I could somehow detach from it and climb up and look down on it, get the lay of the land so to speak, I could study it “objectively,” take it apart, deconstruct it, know its operations and boundaries and deficiencies.

related:
people.missouristate.edu/rshain/JournalFrenchPhil09_Shain_PDF.pdf

>From this perspective, the common message of Wittgenstein, Dewey, and Heidegger is a historicist one. Each of the three reminds us that investigations of the foundations of knowledge or morality or language or society may be simply apologetics, attempts to eternalize a certain contemporary language-game, social practice, or self-image.

What a waste of quints.

Stop posting this shit.

Again, Solipsist/Absurdist schools of thought are few and far between, and most of them are STEM-based.

this man saved us from analytic philosophy but no one ever listened

>tfw all epistemological roads begrudgingly converge in the recognition of the Logos and the acceptance of Matter as secondary to Mind

The mistake is thinking that analytic philosophy is something to be rescued from

>tfw too brainlet to understand the quality posts ITT
Can I get a quick rundown?

Both men are based as fuck.

somewhat underrated post

Feels good man.

> Point 6.41: "The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value -- and if there were, it would be of no value." And of course, Point #7: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must pass over in silence." Witty isn't saying he should deny the existence of ethics or aesthetics, but simply that these things transcend language. To treat them silently is to do so with the silence of reverence, not that of apathy.

I can't bring myself to agree with this. Does he not, right there, not only actively talk about, but also clearly with a tone of apathy and not reverence? Does he simply mean that we can not revere things inside language?
What did Wittgenstein think about Art, specifically literature? Did he dismiss it entirely?