Why haven't you accepted idealism and God?

Why haven't you accepted idealism and God?

There are three main responses to the mind body problem. Either we accept that a) protons are unconscious and human beings are conscious: meaning that there exists a collection of unthinking atoms somewhere in between the two that when arranged in a slightly different configuration to another, practically identical, collection of unthinking atoms, miraculously gives rise to a first person experience of the self (materialism), or b) telekinetic interaction between the different substances (dualism), or c) the notion of ‘conscious’ protons combining together in though some mysterious mechanism (Panpsychism).

But what if idealism is true?

Contrary to common sense? Well so is physics. Quantum mechanics teaches us that objective reality, contrary to our common sense intuition, does not exist prior to measurement. In the standard Copengagen interpretation of quantum mechanics there exists a ‘Heisenberg cut’ – a boundary between the observer and the observed. Von Neumann argued that all material objects must be placed on the ‘observed’ side of the Heisenberg cut, and that only consciousness can be placed on the ‘observer’ side. The Heisenberg cut is one of the main axioms underlying quantum mechanics, and since ‘dechoherance’ can’t solve the measurement problem, the boundary must be placed somewhere. Defining an observer as an immaterial mind is difficult to accept for someone wedded to materialism; but it is the only way to solve the problem of ‘where to put the cut’, while holding to the Copenhagen interpretation. Otherwise, the measurement problem simply remains a mystery.

Thus, only idealism can solve the hard problem and the measurement problem. But this doctrine raises some serious questions: if the world is nothing but ideas, why do they seem to show more persistence and stability than objects of our imaginations or in our dreams? How is it that these ideas are ordered to such minute details so as to make the most detailed scientific investigations show consistency? When I use the word ‘idea’ here I’m referring to the Berkeleyan notion of ‘ideas of the sense’ – these are the physical objects we passively perceive through our senses, as opposed to what we are able to willingly conjure up in our mind’s eye though imagination. Since these ‘ideas of the sense’ are necessarily the product of a mind, and evidently not of our own mind – because I cannot, however hard I try, imagine anything as remotely detailed and ordered as what we perceive through the senses (even in a dream) – it follows that these ideas must be caused by another, far more powerful, mind.

That mind must be God.

Other urls found in this thread:

physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2007/apr/20/quantum-physics-says-goodbye-to-reality
twitter.com/NSFWRedditVideo

Garbage.

>Quantum mechanics teaches us that objective reality, contrary to our common sense intuition, does not exist prior to measurement.

It does not. Operationally and mathematically, quantum mechanics tells us nothing about how the world is.

> In the standard Copengagen interpretation of quantum mechanics there exists a ‘Heisenberg cut’ – a boundary between the observer and the observed. Von Neumann argued that all material objects must be placed on the ‘observed’ side of the Heisenberg cut, and that only consciousness can be placed on the ‘observer’ side.

Neumann and Bohr's interpretations are vastly different. Copenhagen does not postulate consciousness as a necessary requirement for the collapse of the wave function nor is there even a consensus over what Bohr really meant, although his own statements point towards a belief in an objective reality underlying quantum phenomenon. Neumann's is usually ranked lower than other interpretations because there is no explicit mechanism by which consciousness might be said to cause collapse. Why pick this over Bohmian or Everettian mechanics? Everett's contribution towards the development of decoherence would at least point in the direction of Many Worlds as opposed to consciousness.

The saddest thing of all is that you completely overlook the one thing that could potentially support your point: Bell's Theorem. A rejection of counterfactual definiteness would entail a notion of scientific discovery that becomes nothing more than reading the pointer clicks on our instruments as opposed to acquiring privileged access to the external world. Only then might the moon not be there when no one is looking.

>It does not. Operationally and mathematically, quantum mechanics tells us nothing about how the world is

What? Quantum mechanics tells us that a system prior to measurement (observation) is described by the ‘wave function’, which evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger equation as a ‘superposition’ of different states.

We can get into the ontology of a wave function if you like, but an object in a superposition cannot be said to 'exist' in the same way a table 'exists' when I look at it.

The double slit experiment, and others like it, tells a great deal about how the world is and your assertion there is frankly bizarre.

>Copenhagen does not postulate consciousness as a necessary requirement for the collapse of the wave function
Not *necessarily* no. You can always take the 'shut up and calculate' approach, but von-Neumann's logic is undeniable.

If we start with a superposition (S), the interaction of S with a measurement apparatus (M) would result in a superposition. But we could think of another apparatus (M0 ) that measures M and S, and we’d still have a superposition, and keeping doing this indefinitely, ever adding more measurement apparatuses to the chain – including our eyes, our optical nerves and our brain. We would be left with a brain/measurement apparatus/system that is still in a superposition. But since we never actually observe a superposition, this chain needs to stop somewhere. According to von Neumann there is only one step when we know for sure that we do not have a superposition: when we gain conscious knowledge of the measurement apparatus; i.e. when matter interacts with the mind.

>Why pick this over Bohmian or Everettian mechanics?
It's telling that even Einstein - who hated Copenhagen - couldn't bring himself to adopt 'Bohm's approach'. (It was actually Prince Louis de Broglie who invented the 'pilot-wave theory', but he wasn't a media savvy commie like Bohm...) The theory is incomplete. It is incompatible with relativistic quantum mechanical models and with loop corrections (Feynman diagrams), as Hardy's paradox shows. It is simply a caricature of nature.

As for 'Everettian mechanics', it is an outright violation of Occam's Razor. And more importantly, no Everettian has been able to find a consistent derivation of the Born probabilities.

The choice between Copenhagen and other 'interpretations' isn't a philosophical decision on my part, it's just a better theory.

>The saddest thing of all is that you completely overlook the one thing that could potentially support your point: Bell's Theorem.

Well yes, the experimental violation Bell's (and Laggatt's) inequality only supports my argument and invalidates your very first claim in your post.

This all you have managed to achieve in this post is adding to the strength of my argument, whilst failing to debunk it with two vastly inferior interpretations of QM.

you are right desu. Look into the weirdway and Oneirosophy.

Look at the Kabbalah tree of life.

Consciousness (essence of God) -> Intellect -> emotions/feeling -> the world. It is the same way our perception is crafted. Both God is God and we are God -- more accurately, our piece of consciousness is divine.

>Quantum mechanics
>objective reality, does not exist
Quantum mechanics in its current state doesn't tell us anything about objective reality. It gives us a good approximation based off our current level of mathematical and scientific knowledge. Quantum mechanics still needs work, as do many aspects of physics.

>Quantum mechanics teaches us that objective reality, contrary to our common sense intuition, does not exist prior to measurement.
Isn't that a misinterpretation? I'm pretty sure measurements just happens to effect the results

>What? Quantum mechanics tells us that a system prior to measurement (observation) is described by the ‘wave function’, which evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger equation as a ‘superposition’ of different states.

And that's all it says.

>We can get into the ontology of a wave function if you like, but an object in a superposition cannot be said to 'exist' in the same way a table 'exists' when I look at it.

Precisely. Why do you presume the "superposition of different states" characterized by the wave function to be ontic rather than epistemic? And even if it is ontic, there are interpretations that preserve determinate properties in a system.

>The double slit experiment, and others like it, tells a great deal about how the world is and your assertion there is frankly bizarre.

No, it doesn't. For it to tell us anything there has to be a "story" to explain it. We can do experiments and verify that wave-particle duality is an existent phenomenon, but any understanding of what is actually occurring in the experiment requires an interpretation. Your assertions are unwarranted.

>If we start with a superposition (S), the interaction of S with a measurement apparatus (M) would result in a superposition. But we could think of another apparatus (M0 ) that measures M and S, and we’d still have a superposition, and keeping doing this indefinitely, ever adding more measurement apparatuses to the chain – including our eyes, our optical nerves and our brain. We would be left with a brain/measurement apparatus/system that is still in a superposition. But since we never actually observe a superposition, this chain needs to stop somewhere. According to von Neumann there is only one step when we know for sure that we do not have a superposition: when we gain conscious knowledge of the measurement apparatus; i.e. when matter interacts with the mind.

Sounds like you're inadvertently endorsing the many-minds interpretation. You say it yourself, the measurement apparatus is entangled with the superposition of the system under measurement. Worlds split at the level of minds. This still doesn't entail idealism or panpsychism. You better rethink this if you're so worried about Occam.

>The theory is incomplete. It is incompatible with relativistic quantum mechanical models and with loop corrections (Feynman diagrams), as Hardy's paradox shows. It is simply a caricature of nature.

Quantum mechanics and relativity will always be in tension so long as superluminal causal influences are allowed by an ontic interpretation of the wave function. Hardy's paradox reaffirms the simple truth that local hidden variable models are ruled out by empirical experiment. Hardly a fatal blow to Bohm.

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>As for 'Everettian mechanics', it is an outright violation of Occam's Razor. And more importantly, no Everettian has been able to find a consistent derivation of the Born probabilities.

Occam's Razor is a methodological luxury, not a physical rule. And while we're on the topic of simplicity, everett's relative state formulation is just quantum mechanics taken literally without any extra structure or exotic assumptions like "wave function collapse". The schrodinger equation is all you need to derive such an interpretation.

>The choice between Copenhagen and other 'interpretations' isn't a philosophical decision on my part, it's just a better theory.

Copenhagen is not a theory. An interpretation is not a theory.

>Well yes, the experimental violation Bell's (and Laggatt's) inequality only supports my argument and invalidates your very first claim in your post.

It doesn't, because my point is you're assuming an ontology without warrant. Quantum mechanics does not posit an ontology, for that you need an interpretation. I can just as easily interpret the probabilities encountered in the formalism as epistemic. Bell's Theorem tells how the world cannot be, not how it is. And Bell himself was an advocate of eliminating locality rather than realism.

your argument is shit. Read more

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bump

ah, the god of the gaps argument. a good one.

I see you in this thread and I just have one thing to tell you

see you on the other end of the spiral, deep digger ;)

What did he mean by this?

>using quantum mechanics to justify your mental masturbation

stop please

Have you ever considered there're hypotheses you haven't considered? Not to mention ones a little less reductive/simplistic. I've considered the idea you might be insincere in your posting, but via reducto ad unlikely, I'd say not. Just try to be less myopic my frand

because i need no True World theory in my life

>No, it doesn't. For it to tell us anything there has to be a "story" to explain it. We can do experiments and verify that wave-particle duality is an existent phenomenon, but any understanding of what is actually occurring in the experiment requires an interpretation.

I do not deny that. The the interpratation I hold to is the mainstream Copenhagen one, which teaches us that prior to measurement, as system exists as a wave of potentiality.

As you've already mentioned, the violation of Bell's inequalities rules out local hidden variable theories which attempt to restore the realism in the sense that definiteness of the outcome in a single measurement can be ensured by using a supplementary variable. And as I mentioned, the violation of Leggatt's inequality rules out a broad class of hidden-variables theories that focus on realism.

These experiments do not add anything to Copenhagen, they simply confirm what it is already telling us. That reality does not really exist when we are not observing it.

physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2007/apr/20/quantum-physics-says-goodbye-to-reality


>Sounds like you're inadvertently endorsing the many-minds interpretation. You say it yourself, the measurement apparatus is entangled with the superposition of the system under measurement. Worlds split at the level of minds. This still doesn't entail idealism or panpsychism. You better rethink this if you're so worried about Occam.

This has nothing to do with 'many minds'. All von Neumann's formulation tells us is that consciousness or perception can't be reduced to matter, otherwise it would also become entangled exist in a superposition - which never happens. One might argue that this entails dualism: a mind/body split. But as I mentioned in my first post, and as you mentioned in your last post, dualism is plagued by the interaction problem.

Berkeleyan idealism is also consistent with von Neumann's formulation. On this view, God creates in us consistent and 'ideas of the sense', or 'level 1 data', which prior to observation exists in a state of superposition, as described by the Schrödinger equation. When we make an observation, we collapse level 1 data into definite level 2 phenomena – what we commonly refer to as 'reality'.

The problem of 'how does consciousness cause collapse' is only a problem for someone wedded to materialism or dualism. On idealism, before, between and after perception, there is no physical reality. And as Schopenhauer argued, to speak of ‘time’ or ‘causation’ before perception is to use these concepts outside of the only realm in which they can be used.

>Hardy's paradox reaffirms the simple truth that local hidden variable models are ruled out by empirical experiment. Hardly a fatal blow to Bohm.

In Hardy's paradox, any local realist theory predicts the probability of a certain combined outcome to be P=0, while experiments and quantum mechanics say P=1/16. There is no calculation in Bohmian mechanics that reproduces P=1/16. Thus, the theory is incompatible with the experimental facts of modern physics.

>Occam's Razor is a methodological luxury, not a physical rule. And while we're on the topic of simplicity, everett's relative state...

I notice you have ignored my point about the Born probabilities. The Born rule allows us to calculate the probability of what the different outcomes of an experiment will be and the likelihood of each becoming the actual outcome.

Late the probabilistic decay of a particle, we cannot know with certainty when it will decay, we can only know the probability. After one hour, we can say decay is 50% likely, after two hours, 75%, after three hours, 87.5% and so on. But this is a fatal flaw for the many worlds interpretation. Because what does it mean to say decay is more likely that not, if both possibilities are supposed to split into different worlds and be equally real? On the basis of the Schrodinger equation alone, how can one possibility be, say, a billion times less likely to appear than some other one?

In an experiment we can know the different probabilities and the many worlds interpretation fails to account for this. As I said, no Everettian has been able to derive Born probabilities. This renders the theory useless as a scientific theory. If the theory doesn't support the data, the data doesn't support the theory.

Thus, Bohmian and Everettian mechanics are theories with less predictive power than Copenhagen and should be rejected on that basis.

Again, not only have you been unable to show how my argument is internally inconsistent, but you have also been unable to demonstrate why any alternative metaphysical doctrine is superior to my idealistic one, since your argument rests on support for inferior 'interpretations' of QM.

>Have you ever considered there're hypotheses you haven't considered?

Of course I have. I was a materialist and atheist for most of my life. But once I realised the intimate connection between the hard problem of consciousness and the measurement problem in QM, I came to the conclusion that consciousness must be something non-physical.

Dualism and panpschism were initially obvious alternatives to materialism but they are plagued with the interaction problem and the combination problem.

When I read Berkeley for the first time, I found a philosophy, however counterintuitive, that seemed to best fit the data.

Idealism is a dope's philosophy. Disgusting systematics. Science is nothing but disgusting systematics.
Take your pagan god elsewhere.

I like you.

OP is a pseud bitch.

>Idealism is a dope's philosophy

>OP is a pseud bitch

Great quality posts.

>it s a teen from the liberal middle class has faith in scientific realism episode

Not an argument.

>confusing physics with philosophy

>thinks he can discover the truth about reality with no reference to empirical facts

You should read Heisenberg's Physics and Philosophy.

Phenomena are redundant to God, guy.

>These experiments do not add anything to Copenhagen, they simply confirm what it is already telling us. That reality does not really exist when we are not observing it.

physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/2007/apr/20/quantum-physics-says-goodbye-to-reality

There is a confusion here between two notions of "realism". I guess I can't fault some physicists for failing to grasp the philosophical import of what Bell was trying to demonstrate. The kind of realism that would have to be rejected to preserve locality negates even the possibility of a physical probability density without determinate properties spread out in Hilbert space (never mind the problem of interpreting such a space physically). It would, in effect, mean denying that science is acquiring knowledge about an objective reality. The rejection of "realism" that the researchers in your link seem to countenance is that of a system with determinate properties prior to measurement. In essence, an ontological wave function. There is still something very real in this instance, just not something of a classical character. There is still an objective reality underlying the quantum phenomenon. As they say in the article:

> "Our study shows that 'just' giving up the concept of locality would not be enough to obtain a more complete description of quantum mechanics," Aspelmeyer told Physics Web. "You would also have to give up certain intuitive features of realism."

You can't have nonlocality without a physical wave-function collapse. You can't have a physical wave-function collapse without there being a wave function that exists in the first place.

>All von Neumann's formulation tells us is that consciousness or perception can't be reduced to matter, otherwise it would also become entangled exist in a superposition - which never happens.

How do you know? An observer being unable to tell which branch of a superposition he is in does not negate the possibility that he is in one. What Neumann is doing is rejecting a serious proposition out of hand for no other reason than he can't see it. He can't see wave functions collapsing either, yet he is quick to endorse the view that they do.

>In Hardy's paradox, any local realist theory predicts the probability of a certain combined outcome to be P=0, while experiments and quantum mechanics say P=1/16. There is no calculation in Bohmian mechanics that reproduces P=1/16. Thus, the theory is incompatible with the experimental facts of modern physics.

Again, Hardy's paradox simply shows that local realism must be ruled out by quantum mechanics. The "non-realism" you speak of in this instance is a function of a non-classical probability density capable of producing non-local effects. Not non-realism in the sense of Bell. Bohm's interpretation, while realist, presents a mechanism by which these non-local effects can be derived.

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>I notice you have ignored my point about the Born probabilities. The Born rule allows us to calculate the probability of what the different outcomes of an experiment will be and the likelihood of each becoming the actual outcome.

The weight of the observer performing the measurement ending up in one particular branch may do the work of probability just fine, as per the Oxford Everettians. I am well aware that each interpretation has its problems, but given that the notion of probability is problematic in itself (how do we interpret p? frequencies? propensities? degrees of belief?) I do not find this to be any more problematic.

Don't misunderstand my argument. I am agnostic when it comes to deciding between interpretations of quantum mechanics. My point is that you are basing your metaphysical speculation off of further metaphysical speculation that you take to be established fact. Quantum mechanics does not tell us that reality does not exist when we are not observing it. At most, it tells us that we do not live in a classical world. These are two very different claims. There is no consensus on which interpretation is correct. Furthermore, you misunderstand different conceptions of non-realism that has dogged physicists since Bell published his theorem.

2/2

Bumping for idealists getting entangled in cloud cotton.

>There is still something very real in this instance, just not something of a classical character. There is still an objective reality underlying the quantum phenomenon.

This is where you're wrong. Quantum mechanics is inherently subjective; it allows for different observers to have different answers to the same question -- and for them all to be equally correct. This is because, fundamentally, the moment when a measurement takes place is a subjective matter.

The thought experiment involving Wigner's friend (who observes Schrödinger's cat and both are confined in a box) makes it clear why the wave functions (and similarly density matrices) are ultimately subjective.

Wigner's friend already observes the cat and views the result as a fact. However, for Wigner himself, the friend is just a bound state of many protons and electrons so it (or he or she) evolves into general linear superpositions of macroscopically distinct (as well as similar) states. So Wigner and Wigner's friend may use descriptions in which the wave function 'collapses' at different moments. Wigner's friend's wave function for the cat (and his own brain) collapses when he sees the cat; the wave function for the whole box used by Wigner 'collapses' later, when Wigner actually looks.

This is no contradiction. The moment of the collapse itself cannot be objectively measured because it's a purely subjective process used by a particular observer who uses a particular state vector. When it comes to the properties of the cat that may be measured, both Wigner and his friend will agree about the outcomes.

As long as you don't really 'perceive' (or 'are aware of') the result of a measurement, you are not allowed to assume that the measured quantity or anything related to it has an objective state that would have to be agreed upon by everyone.

The subjective character of the 'collapse' is actually needed to avoid violations of relativity, as I mentioned earlier. If the collapse were an objective process of any kind, the collapse needed to enforce the correlations that follow from quantum entanglement would have to involve the superluminal propagation of 'real information', and that's simply not allowed by the Lorentz invariance. And this is another reason why 'interpretations' like Bohmian mechanics can't be true.

In fact, calling them 'interpretations' is misleading, since that would imply they are able to generate the exact same predictions as standard QM, which is false. Really, they are alternative theories with poor predictive power and more contradictions when compared with Copenhagen. This isn't 'metaphysical speculation'; as I've said, if the theory doesn't support the data, the data doesn't support the theory.

(1/2)

'Consciousness causes collapse' is metaphysical speculation, I will admit. But the reason I have adopted this view is because any other Copenhagen-based interpretation must give special status to measuring devices and describe them in classical terms, despite the fact that they are made up of atomic constituents that could be described in the mathematical language of quantum theory. The standard approach works 'for all practical purposes', but it is physically incoherent.

This has lead people like Henry Stapp to adopt a dualist metaphysics, but this comes with far more metaphysical baggage than materialism -- namely the interaction problem and questions over how a material brain could produce immaterial consciousness. I am therefore forced to adopt a metaphysics that is compatible with von-Neumann's formulation and - although this hasn't been discussed in this thread - the hard problem of consciousness; namely, idealism.

Of course I am basing this on a set of plausible sounding assumptions:
>Copenhagen is correct, Bohmian, Everettian, GRW etc. are wrong
>von Neumann is correct
>substance dualism is wrong

And you may argue that if your conclusion runs contrary to common sense you should abandon one of your plausible sounding assumptions. I cannot see the appeal of things like Bohmian mechanics, but will not begrudge anyone for not going with von Neumann and simply accepting that, although QM works FAPP, physics itself is incomplete and metaphysical speculation is meaningless. In other words, shut up and calculate.

I, however, cannot remain metaphysically agnostic.

You're probably a lit/philosophy student trying to talk about the brain and mind without the slightest bit of knowledge on neuroscience or physics. Worse yet, you're falling into this semantic game wherein you establish a variety of dichotomies (reality - perception, consciousness - unconsciousness, and so son.) and simplify a topic that requires a great deal of nuance to understand.

For real, if there weren't any patterns that could be collectively be perceived in a similar, or same, light then we could literally not even communicate or perceive one or the other.

If your post contains more green text than not then you should probably just not post.

>You're probably a lit/philosophy student trying to talk about the brain and mind without the slightest bit of knowledge on neuroscience or physics.

this, its so fucking obvious. half baked rambling about quantam mechanics by arts majors merits eternal punishment at the bottom of pseud hell. OP you will be chewed in the jaws of pseud satan for this thread

GOD DAMN IT WHY NOT JUST POST ACTUAL CONTENT FROM BERKELEY?
IT'S NOT LIKE HE'S THAT HARD TO UNDERSTAND
FUCK, OP

>>As long as you don't really 'perceive' (or 'are aware of') the result of a measurement, you are not allowed to assume that the measured quantity or anything related to it has an objective state that would have to be agreed upon by everyone.
i don't know shit about qm but i know from axiom of causality, in which you are not allowed to have anything less than 100% faith in or else your brain should explode, that every cause has an effect and was itself caused, therefore the measurement must have a result independently of my observation of it.

...

are you memeing at me

>detailed, well-written, and passionate arguments on Veeky Forums about quantum mechanics
>better and more learned than any discussion we ever have on literature
what the fuck guys

On the off chance you're not samefagging, his arguments are borderline nonsensical and based on his poor understanding of the a few wikipedia articles.

>Quantum mechanics is inherently subjective; it allows for different observers to have different answers to the same question -- and for them all to be equally correct. This is because, fundamentally, the moment when a measurement takes place is a subjective matter.

Even if I were to grant to you that consciousness causes collapse and that measurement is defined as conscious observation of a result, as opposed to the standard decoherent view of a system decaying into its environment (and yes, I recognize that decoherence + an interpretation is required to resolve the measurement problem), that still would not invalidate the objectivity of what is described by collapse. SOMETHING is collapsing.

>Wigner's friend already observes the cat and views the result as a fact. However, for Wigner himself, the friend is just a bound state of many protons and electrons so it (or he or she) evolves into general linear superpositions of macroscopically distinct (as well as similar) states.

What do you think superpositions are? What do you think collapse is? Even here, you implicitly endorse realism about the quantum state, not irrealism about reality when nobody is looking. There is nothing here that cannot be resolved by Everett or GRW. There is something non-classical about reality, but this is different from saying it doesn't exist.

>The subjective character of the 'collapse' is actually needed to avoid violations of relativity, as I mentioned earlier. If the collapse were an objective process of any kind, the collapse needed to enforce the correlations that follow from quantum entanglement would have to involve the superluminal propagation of 'real information', and that's simply not allowed by the Lorentz invariance. And this is another reason why 'interpretations' like Bohmian mechanics can't be true.

You do realize that the Neumann-Wigner interpretation is nonlocal, right? As is Copenhagen, which was the point of the EPR paper. Bell's proof is also a nonlocality proof. The principle of local causality is the only sacrosanct assumption made in the theorem, and Bell specifically pointed this out. As we well know, it is not only quantum mechanics that violates his inequalities, but the world itself. Is this a violation of Lorentz invariance? Maybe. But I would point out that what special relativity expressly forbids is the surmounting of c from sub-c speeds, not necessarily speeds that are "born" superluminal. Copenhagen is nonlocal. Wigner is nonlocal. Any interpretation that employs wave function collapse, regardless of what causes it, is nonlocal.

>This isn't 'metaphysical speculation'; as I've said, if the theory doesn't support the data, the data doesn't support the theory.

All interpretations generate the exact same predictions as quantum mechanics. The only interpretations we know of that don't are local hidden variable models.

bump