Who is right?

mind if I screencap this for my facebook?

youtube.com/watch?v=0S3aH-BNf6I
Audio version.

I'd appreciate if you posted it on r/Veeky Forums first.

>test the chemicals
>trust the chemicals

At best he could argue one trusts the science on it. Saying trusting something is knowledge isn't really right

donald duck we could say is something like an 'eliminative materialist'

which is wrong

mickey isn't right, because he too agrees ones perceptions =/are chemicals in ones brain

Donald isn't necessarily an eliminative materialist. He's more broadly a reductive physicalist, which, in it's local and disjunctive form [quick sketch: S⇒(M⇔P) where P is the set of all sufficient (physical) realizers of mental state M in organism/structure of type S], I find to be at least plausible.
The supervenience of value on the physical is however not in contradiction with the reductive view, so Donald doesn't need to infer that there's no (intrinsic) value.

I think Mickey's point is that [(Mental state(Donald's believe about chemicals))=chemicals in the brain]. In that sense it are the chemicals that are trusting in themselves. He seems to be a proponent of the brain identity theory, but his clumsy wording suggests that his actual view on personhood is far less coherent.

Fuck me, I'm being a retard.
This is wrong: P is the set of all sufficient (physical) realizers
This is right: P is the disjunction of all sufficient (physical) realizers

I'm . The thing is they aren't trusting, they '''know'''. If a bomb provokes the explosion of another bomb is the 2nd explosion different?

First of all I don't think Mickey's version of the (brain) identity theory is right. A more emergentist version would be more acceptable. It are not the chemicals that know/trust; the structure of chemicals is knowing/trusting. See my previous post.
That being said, I don't know if I agree with you. Mickey's second point is that all knowledge is ultimately based on believe.
I have no formal training in epistemology, but let me try to unpack this. I don't know precisely what Mickey has in mind, but I believe the following to be at least consistent with his ideas. Mickey can suppose a hierarchical structure of epistemological. There's a set of indirect proposition in which the members are inferred from other members of the same set or from a different set with direct propositions. The direct propositions are the data (the given) that prevent 'turtles all the way down' and in a way ground knowledge. However, I don't think we can say we 'know' these data, because they are by definition unjustifiable, because there are no propositions 'more basic'. (Assumption: knowledge = justified true believe.) Saying we trust the data seems to be more appropriate. So Mickey posits that knowledge is ultimately trust and thus he can also say 'structure of chemicals trusts x'. Note that by making trust and knowledge mutually translatable we can also say 'structure of chemicals trusts x'.
(I've understood that analytic phil, under influence of Sellars and co., has moved away from this view of givenness, but I've just started my study of Sellars so I can't say more about that.)

>If a bomb provokes the explosion of another bomb is the 2nd explosion different?
So yes, the direct proposition that provoked the indirect proposition is in fact different.
Perhaps I failed to grasp your point here. Please do expand.

This holy fuck

Donald's statement doesn't preclude it being subject to itself. He is in no way a hypocrite. This is what most retards who argue against determinism just can't understand, that you're within the 'determination' doesn't discount the nature of said thing. It's possible to observe upon being an observer.

>Assumption: knowledge = justified true believe.

Do you think even your proposed epistemology here is going too far, or presuming too much, by assuming that we have to have direct, conscious ACCESS to the propositions we "trust" in order to act on them as a ground?

It seems to me like you're (in a way) begging the question, by presuming that rational deliberation on various points is the basis of action, and then when you get hung up on the problem that we obviously assume or presuppose a great deal when we act, you solve it by saying "well, some of those things we 'trust'" -- i.e., you can't quite abandon the idea that we have rational, deliberative access to all the items that we're "acting on the basis of," so you're forced to imagine a situation where we still have that access, but some of them are unquestionable.

If you get what I mean, I'm basically saying, maybe the issue isn't whether they are questioned-and-unquestionable, but that they are unquestioned.

I would agree knowledge is a kind of trust, but I think a lot of it goes on behind the eyes. That doesn't mean I think we're completely grounded in some arational or irrational finitude, since the most amazing thing ABOUT our consciousness seems to be that we can revise what goes on behind our eyes, revise even the bases from which we normally act reflexively.

I think I need to clerify something. That was not an exposition on my personal theory of knowledge. I was, from Mickey's point of view, trying to justify his usage of the word 'trust' by giving a consistent framework to explan his idea. All my posts on Mickey have so far been mostly an exegesis. Maybe my inacceptance of Mickey's position was too implicit. I don't agree with his conception of personhood, which I've identified as a very specific version of the identity theory, and I probably don't agree with his epistemology, though that one is harder to call, because he doesn't give give a detailed theory.
I will now continue to reply to your post 'from Mickey's point of view as constructed by me'.

>in order to act on them as a ground?
>by presuming that rational deliberation on various points is the basis of action
I wasn't talking about reasons to act etc. Just the structure of knowledge related propositions. It is true that we act on the basis of the results of this structure, I think we can think these two issues apart.
But before I respond to the rest of the post, I need to know why you think it's necessary to invoke actions and reasons for actions in at this point in the discussion. Keep in mind: I haven't talked about the way the structure of our knowledge influences our actions. More concrete: I have not implied things like "we have to have direct, conscious ACCESS to the propositions we "trust" in order to act on them as a ground". I don't see any prima facie reasons to strongly connect the directness or indirectness of a proposition with it's weight in decision taking.

I was admittedly just jumping in from the front page, so I didn't know how much of what you were saying was you vs. Mickey, sorry yo. I think I'd still take issue with you defending Mickey's position in that way. What Mickey is saying relates (to me) more to the mind-body problem and phenomenology, than any formal structure of making propositions about knowledge or facts.

I think my central issue with "your" (I mean, your hypothetical version of Mickey's) position is that you speak in terms of propositions and knowledge at all, when to me it's more plausible that he's implying a phenomenological perspective, or at least a language-game type thing. Coming from either of those perspectives, this seems unusual to me:
>So Mickey posits that knowledge is ultimately trust and thus he can also say 'structure of chemicals trusts x'.
because it seems to jump ahead unnecessarily far for the topic, OR it's an unusual way of formulating the language-game/phenomenology argument. Specifically the language of "trust" seems dangerous to me, and I'd want to limit it to Geworfenheit (thrownness into an always-already) or grammar (rule-bound language games).

To simplify, I don't think Mickey is making a claim about the "justifiability" in ANY formal system (logical, or scientific, e.g.) of making knowledge claims. He's saying: The preconditions for you having the language and culture necessary to talk about humans "just" being chemical cocktails at all, in the first place, presuppose a more complex element that you aren't explaining. It's not about the formal permissibility of saying "x is y" (so therefore we need to come up with a formal system of how a priori given "facts"). It doesn't need to go that far. Mickey's problem is already there at the "you are a mind, thinking of a world at all" level. He's saying "you have the necessary grammatical equipment to TALK ABOUT the nature of justification, to make propositions, in the first place."

>I don't see any prima facie reasons to strongly connect the directness or indirectness of a proposition with it's weight in decision taking.
I don't think I fully understand this though. My only problem with this is that it's possibly a red herring to talk about formal (i.e., conventional, rule-bound) systems of statement justification, when we only need to (or want to) talk about the brute fact that justification (rule-following) is already taking place. It's doing regional ontology when Mickey is really saying, "Explain the existence of ontology, first."

He's slamming scientific realism as an epistemology. He's saying, the world can't "tell you" that you are made of chemicals. The world doesn't speak. YOU do. What needs explaining is that you speak, is that you GIVE NAMES, with meanings and implications - not that you have "found" some names "in" the world (which you haven't, anyway).

Perfect

That's a very different reading of mickey. Interesting to see that you get almost the complete opposite out of the text. You sound like some Heideggerian with a bit of Wittgenstein II, so no wonder you got something different out of it. Thought we probably are both projecting, let me at least give the rationale behind my reading.
Mickey seems to adress three things. Respectively: the mind-bodyproblem, an epistemological claim and the question what we ought to do. In my post I've only adressed the first two things.
mind-bodyproblem:
I read it as follows: Mickey agrees that the chemicals in our brain inform us. I expand a bit on it here . My explanation of Mickey just wording it clumsily is indeed a strong indicator that I'm interpreting too loosely...
On second reading, your interpretation seems more plausible. I was projecting my own ideas on Mickey.
an epistemological claim
What I'm doing here should be clear by now. . I'm giving a theory that is consistent with Mickey's claim that renders 'trust' intelligible.
So
>I think my central issue with "your" (I mean, your hypothetical version of Mickey's) position is that you speak in terms of propositions and knowledge at all, when to me it's more plausible that he's implying a phenomenological perspective, or at least a language-game type thing.
That's because in that post I was adressing the epistemological claim. I do agree the mind-bodyproblem is his main point thought.
>Specifically the language of "trust" seems dangerous to me
you're right. It might've been beyond saving for my reading.
>I'd want to limit it to Geworfenheit
I would prefer the more neutral 'givenness', to prevent committing to the existential baggage of Geworfenheit.
>grammar (rule-bound language games)
I don't think I understand what you're hinting at here
>To simplify, I don't think Mickey is making a claim about the "justifiability" in ANY formal system (logical, or scientific, e.g.) of making knowledge claims. He's saying: The preconditions for you having the language and culture necessary to talk about humans "just" being chemical cocktails at all, in the first place, presuppose a more complex element that you aren't explaining.
I see no textual evidence for language and culture elements of your reading.
>It's not about the formal permissibility of saying "x is y" (so therefore we need to come up with a formal system of how a priori given "facts"). It doesn't need to go that far. Mickey's problem is already there at the "you are a mind, thinking of a world at all" level. He's saying "you have the necessary grammatical equipment to TALK ABOUT the nature of justification, to make propositions, in the first place."
I was seperating the epistemological claim and the mind-body problem. So the trust is knowledge is seperate from the (structues of) chemicals are mental states.

to be continued.

theyre both reddit

(cont.)
>My only problem with this is that it's possibly a red herring to talk about formal (i.e., conventional, rule-bound) systems of statement justification, when we only need to (or want to) talk about the brute fact that justification (rule-following) is already taking place. It's doing regional ontology when Mickey is really saying, "Explain the existence of ontology, first."
I'll return the favor: "I don't think I fully understand this though." :^)
I guess that's due to me having only a superficial grasp of Heidegger.

>He's saying, the world can't "tell you" that you are made of chemicals. The world doesn't speak. YOU do. What needs explaining is that you speak, is that you GIVE NAMES, with meanings and implications - not that you have "found" some names "in" the world (which you haven't, anyway).
Is that really what he's saying? That doesn't seem to be a very strong point. Because Mickey interpretations aside, I don't think I [me-me ∧ ¬Mickey-me] fully agree with you/Mickey-you. There is no 'you' beyond the epiphenomenon supervening on the physical. We really are the structure of the chemicals in our body, thought we are not the resultant (parts=whole) of that structure but an emergent. The whole is more than it's parts, but we still 'only' supervenience.

Obviously Mickey is the most correct, but Donald's statement has the most utility.

Everyone knows that reductionistic science has produced insanely advanced technology. The question is whether that technology will be used for the Good, whatever the Good may be. I mean, science is as likely to annihilate us all as it is to help us live better and longer lives.