If a word is used to describe a concept, does that concept necessarily exist?

Existence and being shouldn't be conflated

A concept of a concept so complex I can't imagine it. Easy.

Is there anything you can't imagine?

those legs are the opposite of innocent, they are so obscene my erection feels like a numb rod of solid granite

*rips bong*
dude...

certainly are. we can't imagine everything because we lack all possible points of reference in our limited mode of existence in 3d space and linear forward moving time.

i might add that the mental world stems from the physical world, and only from a small part of it. the rest isn't mapped onto any mental world. it therefore remains uncharted territory, and only physical.

If we presume that thoughts originate in 'the material world', then they obviously do exist in the material world.

As a concept, yes, but not in the sense that objects which seem to exist independent of our perception do.

Great film, btw.

What's the difference?

It has been conceived by someone - either as a thoroughly thought out concept or as a vague abstraction. In either case it has already been conceived.

>tfw you thought you had checkmate, but it was only check

they're distinct. the number 2 doesn't physically exist. it exists in mental world, and even in the Platonic mathematical world. 'a concept i cannot imagine because it's too complex' only exists in the mental world.

Stockings are a miracle. They somehow make the most innocent of legs obscene by covering them

If you can use a word univocally to describe a concept, and your proposition is true, then that implies the concept exists.

It was conceived by me in asking the question? Because user that just leads to me saying everything must then be conceivable.
And... oh here we go... that would have to include the inconceivable.

A seepe is a number that is both odd and even.

Doe seepe's exist?

In the mental world, but not in the Platonic mathematical world.

Yes.

6. It's even but flip it around and you get 9, an odd number.

What about if there was seepe found in the future? Would it have been part of the mathematical world all along? Or is the mathematical world reached by scientific consensus?

Veeky Forums still on that first year undergrad "deep" questions stuff, huh?

What's your answer then smartypants

>Would it have been part of the mathematical world all along?

Yes.

TIL Roger Penrose is a bong ripping dude undergrad.

Probably a nonce too

So the mathematical world includes things that may or may not actually be in the mathematical world.

No but it includes things we are not yet aware of.

No. I can say singularity or apocalypse, and neither of those things currently or foreseeably exist. These concepts exist in the realm of thought and language, being able to be conceptualized in language and understood by man, but thinking of them does not bring them into physical reality.

If it is so complex that it cannot be conceived, then it cannot be conceptualized and thus does not exist.

The concept exists in your mind.

Except for if you thought something was mathematical and later it turned out you were wrong.

Should add:
It's a common question though, is mathematics invented or discovered?

youtube.com/watch?v=TKlPj_qGIt8

I also believe it's discovered rather than invented.

Yes. Because as (you) reveal, it is already a concept.

What is this question called? It's like a weaker version of the ontological argument.

A Exists = True.

What exists actually means is irrelevant, since it is only used to evaluate whether the statement A exists is true or false. Alternatively, A exists could = false, therefore this posits a potentially negative value for "exists."

Define "true"

What the hell does that even mean? Explain.

A truthy value is a value that is considered true when evaluated in a Boolean context. All values are truthy unless they are explicitly defined as falsy.

For example the expression (A) is true, because to be untrue it would need to be explicitly defined as untrue (!A), and since the value of A is variable, but A always equals A as given by the reflexive property, the statement A is true is redundant, since it contains the same information given by the statement (A) by itself.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meinong's_jungle

Dang, I thought it was the prostitute scene from 8 1/2.

Well, you guys just had to derail this thread with prostitution and syllogisms didn't you.

thats real dumb bud, you can't know whether statement 'a exists' is true or false if you don't define 'exist'

yes, using the word to describe a concept sets the described concept in existence to be further explained, but it does not necessarily have to xeist before the word is used.

no
/thread/

yes

>see OPs post
>this immediately that he should define "exist"
>see this
FPBP.

Only inside the limits of the system you're using that word for.

There's not such a thing as "the absolut", just a bunch of stories that fits well with certain ways the world works.

No. Example: patriarchy

Go to bed Descartes

Concepts can only exist in the first place if there is a word or potential word for them. Read some Wittgenstein brah

Words aren't used to describe concepts. Words are used to describe things. Concepts do not exist. Things exist. Talking about concepts is a confused heuristic for talking about words.

he literally is, and almost nobody who works on metamathematics or QM takes his views on the implications of Godel's theorems or the role of QM in consciousness (or vice versa) seriously

Actually the statements A exists is assumed to be true, because the "truth" comes from it being a truthy statement, "A exists" is a positive boolean expression regardless of whether or not "a" exists. All statements are true statements for this reason, that's why parmenides was right.

"Suppose that you are looking at a green object and have a conscious experience of greenness. In the view that I am suggesting, the brain contains a chunk of information that describes the state of experiencing, and it contains a chunk of information that describes spectral green. Those two chunks are bound together. In that way, the brain computes a larger, composite description of experiencing green. Once that description is in place, other machinery accesses the description, abstracts information from it, summarizes it, and can verbalize it. The brain can, after all, report only the information that it has. Awareness as information instantiated in the brain. Access to the information allows us to say that we are aware.
This approach is deeply unsatisfying—which does not argue against it. A theory does not need to be satisfying to be true. The approach is unsatisfying partly because it takes away some of the magic. It says, in effect, there is no subjective feeling inside, at least not quite as people have typically imagined it. Instead, there is a description of having a feeling and a computed certainty that the description is accurate and not merely a description. The brain, accessing that information, can then act in the ways that we know people to act—it can decide that it has a subjective feeling, and it can talk about the subjective feeling. Let’s explore further what it might mean for awareness to be a description constructed by circuitry in the brain. The brain is an expert at constructing descriptions. When you look at an apple, your visual system encodes and combines many sensory features. Some of these features are diagrammed in Figure 2.4. Perhaps the apple is green. It’s more or less round. Perhaps it’s moving—rolling to the right. Binding of stimulus features such as color and shape and motion into a single larger representation has been studied intensively, especially in the domain of visual perception..."
(Graziano, Consciousness and the Social Brain, 1 of 2)

"..A green apple is encoded in the visual system as a set of stimulus features described by chunks of information that are bound together. The property of awareness might be another computed stimulus feature bound to the rest.
I am suggesting that the property of awareness is another such computed feature, a description, a chunk of information, that can be bound to the larger object file. The many chunks of information depicted in Figure 2.4 are connected into a single representation, a description in which the greenness, the roundness, the movement, and the property of having a conscious experience, are wedded together. My cognitive machinery can access that information, that bound representation, and report on it. Hence the machinery of my brain can report that it is aware of the apple and its features.
In this account, awareness is information; it is a description; it is a description of the experiencing of something; and it is a perception-like feature, in the sense that it can be bound to other features to help form an overarching description of an object.
I suggest that there is no other way for an information-processing device, such as a brain, to conclude that it has a conscious experience attached to an apple. It must construct an informational description of the apple, an informational description of conscious experience, and bind the two together.
The object does not need to be an apple, of course. The explanation is potentially general. Instead of visual information about an apple you could have touch information, or a representation of a math equation, or a representation of an emotion, or a representation of your own person-hood, or a representation of the words you are reading at this moment. Awareness, as a chunk of information, could in principle be bound to any of these other categories of information. Hence you could be aware of the objects around you, of sights and sounds, of introspective content, of your physical body, of your emotional state, of your own personal identity. You could bind the awareness feature to many different types of information.
Why would the brain construct such a strange chunk of information unless it represents something of use in the real world?
The brain constructs descriptions of real entities in the real world. Those descriptions may not always be accurate. They may be simplified or schematized, but they generally reflect something useful to know. When the brain encodes information about the color of an apple, for example, that information relates to something physically real—wavelengths reflecting from the surface of the apple. What real or useful property might be represented by this strange chunk of information that describes the state of being aware? Why attach an “awareness feature” to the other, more concrete features in order to make up the brain’s description of an apple?"
(Graziano, Consciousness and the Social Brain, 2 of 2)

Yes

you fucked up here

Go read some Hegel. You're embarrassing yourselves.
Science of Logic, bitch!

thanks, sir.